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village based upon US Marine Corps human terrain data. This simulation demonstrated how the implemented
system can infer the personality traits and contextual factors that cause certain agents to adopt pro-US or anti-
US memes, using Gaussian mixture clustering analysis and cross-cluster analysis. Finally, this research
identified significant gaps in empirical science with respect to studying memes. These roadblocks and their
potential solutions are explored in the conclusions of this work.
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Abstract
This research employed systems social science inquiry to build a synthesis
model that would be useful for modeling meme evolution. First, a formal
definition of memes was proposed that balances both ontological adequacy
and empirical observability. Based on this definition, a systems model for
meme evolution was synthesized from Shannon Information Theory and
elements of Bandura’s Social Cognitive Learning Theory. Research in perception,
social psychology, learning, and communication were incorporated to explain
the cognitive and environmental processes guiding meme evolution. By
extending the PMFServ cognitive architecture, socio-cognitive agents were
created who could simulate social learning of Gibson affordances. The
PMFServ agent based model was used to examine two scenarios: a simulation
to test for potential memes inside the Stanford Prison Experiment and a
simulation of pro-US and anti-US meme competition within the fictional
Hamariyah Iraqi village. The Stanford Prison Experiment simulation was
designed, calibrated, and tested using the original Stanford Prison Experiment
archival data. This scenario was used to study potential memes within a real-
life context. The Stanford Prison Experiment simulation was complemented
by internal and external validity testing. The Hamariyah Iraqi village was
used to analyze meme competition in a fictional village based upon US
Marine Corps human terrain data. This simulation demonstrated how the
implemented system can infer the personality traits and contextual factors
that cause certain agents to adopt pro-US or anti-US memes, using Gaussian
mixture clustering analysis and cross-cluster analysis. Finally, this research
identified significant gaps in empirical science with respect to studying memes.
These roadblocks and their potential solutions are explored in the conclusions
of this work.
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Introduction
How does culture spread and change? Despite being a salient issue since the
times of Plato and Confucius, the processes underlying cultural shifts remain
intractable. Science cannot forecast cultural changes, nor can it consistently
formulate the problem tractably (Koomey, 2002). Even identifying the data
required to study cultural changes remains an open question. Memetics offers
a potential solution, treating culture as an ecosystem of evolving ideas. In this
framework, each meme is analogous to a “species” of cultural information that
reproduces, mutates, and competes within the social system. As such, memes link
individual behavior and cognition with the dynamics of culture. To study memes
effectively, memetics requires rigorous definitions and interfacing with cognitive
approaches (Castelfranchi, 2001). Systems theory provides a framework which
makes functional study of memes possible.
This paper presents a synthesis of systems theories into a useful model for
meme evolution. Shannon’s Information Theory and Bandura’s Social Learning
Theory are central to this architecture (Bandura, 1986; Shannon, 1948). These
theories provide complementary processes for examining the flow of information
between and within individuals, respectively. Semiotics and evolutionary theory
are examined for their insight into the workings of memes. With a rigorous
description of memes in hand, experiments and theory from cognitive psychology,
social psychology, and perception are used to introduce a semantic layer for under-
standing memes. Finally, this model was implemented as an agent based model
and used to simulate real world situations.
1
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1.1 Studying Memetics Using the Systems Social Science
Paradigm
Memes are a relatively new topic in modern science, introduced by philosopher
Richard Dawkins in the The Selfish Gene (Dawkins, 1976). The seminal works on
memes continue to be produced by philosophers, such as in Darwin’s Dangerous
Idea by Dennett (1995) and The Meme Machine by Blackmore (1999). While
this lineage has yielded interesting concepts and propositions, one criticism of
The Meme Machine extends to much of memetics: “There isn’t a lot on the
workings of the memetic machinery” (Gabora, 1999). The study of memetics has
opened questions almost exclusively, with even the rigorous definition of a meme
remaining unclear (Blackmore, 1999, p. 52). While scholars studying memes
agree that memes represent a pattern or behavior that is copied from one person
to another, some scholars continue to debate the definition of memes with little
consideration toward applying the concept to real world issues.
Figure 1.1: Fields Empirically Studying Memes
Meanwhile, a wealth of relevant empirical research has been waiting on the
sidelines without being applied memes. Memes have considerable promise, but
they are a truly interdisciplinary topic that requires a systems approach. Ongoing
work in a variety of fields have implications for the dynamics of memes. Figure 1.1
outlines some of the key fields which are studying all or part of the meme evolution
process. Just as these fields assist in understanding memes, memes can help to
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understand these fields. Unfortunately, social science data has primarily been
analyzed within narrow domains, forming their own disconnected knowledge
hierarchies (Silverman, 2004). The understanding provided by these is deep but
narrow. Understanding memes requires extracting the best wisdom out of social
science theories and using it as the knowledge base for memes.
To organize this information, a systems social science approach was employed
(Silverman, 2010). This process works by synthesizing existing social science
theories and narrowly scoped empirical specialties (silos) into a synthesis model
that can applied to broader social issues. This approach complements reductive
approaches to studying cognition and social systems. Traditionally, reductive
analysis tries to reduce a system down to a set of parts and examine each part.
The systems social science approach focuses on “synthesis” rather than focusing
on “analysis.” Synthesis attempts understand the purpose of each part of the
system and the inter-relationships between these parts. In this way, the systems
social science approach has been used to integrate the results of reductive analysis
and explore their implications on memes within social systems.
Figure 1.2: Systems Social Science Development Cycle. Adapted from Silverman
(2006)
Figure 1.2 shows the development cycle for how focused social science findings
can be operationalized and synthesized into a common framework for social
systems inquiry. This figure was adapted from Silverman (2006) and has been
overlaid with the chapters that describe each step of the development cycle.
This research started with a stated goal of silo-broadening: expanding memetics
to include key empirical research that explains the environmental and cognitive
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mechanisms that underlie memes (a scientific shift). This chapter describes a plan
of research to broaden how memes are approached as a science. In the conclusion
in Chapter 8, the paper returns to this stage to with new hypotheses and ideas
for research on this topic.
To accomplish this goal, empirical research from the domains stated in Figure
1.1 was examined and applied to the problem (available science). Chapters 2, 3,
and 4 each examine different theoretical and empirical concerns related to memes
and how they can be studied as part of a social system. As part of this process,
the theoretical findings were organized into a conceptual framework, which occurs
as part of the transition between “available science” and “component authoring.”
Insight from these theories and findings was integrated into a systems model for
memes, at the conceptual level.
Figure 1.3: Data to Wisdom: Toward Understanding Memes
Synthesizing a model for memes harnesses insight from social science research.
This is partly a knowledge management problem: information related to memes
has not been used to understand memes. Russell Ackoff’s (1989) knowledge
hierarchy defines five levels: data, information, knowledge, understanding, and
wisdom. Figure 1.3 shows the knowledge hierarchy with regard to memes. Little
knowledge and minimal understanding of memes has been achieved, evident in the
lack of practical applications for memes. A schism between information related
to memes and meme knowledge would appear responsible for these limitations.
The primary goal of this work is to bridge this gap, using the Shannon (1948)
information model and Bandura (1986) social cognitive learning model as knowledge
frameworks to aggregate information from social science theories.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 5
Chapter 5 outlines how the systems model was used to create a computational
implementation. This required operationalizing social science theories and models
into component submodels (component authoring). These components were
added as plug-ins to a larger modeling framework, which for this research was
PMFServ (meta-model library). Based upon this expanded framework, individual
scenarios were simulated and examined to study memes (application usage).
Chapter 6 describes two scenario designs: a simulated Stanford Prison Experiment
and an Iraqi village based on human terrain data. From applying the model
to these scenarios, two types of insight were produced. The first insights are
the direct findings from the simulations (what-if analyses). These findings are
presented in the results section, Chapter 7. The second insights are the gaps
in science which must be filled in order to expand the ability of the system to
improve scientific inquiry (gaps in science). These gaps highlight avenues for new
empirical studies and hypotheses to test, in order to expand knowledge about the
mechanisms that influence meme evolution. The conclusions in Chapter 8 outline
the gaps discovered in social science that impede the study of memes, the new
hypotheses that could be tested, and some possible social science experiments
that could greatly improve understanding and modeling meme evolution.
1.2 Objectives
Five core questions are approached in this paper:
1. Definition: What is a meme?
2. Systems Model: What synthesis of theories usefully explains meme evolution?
3. Measurement: How can memes be identified and measured empirically?
4. Implementation: Can the systems model be operationalized into a
computational model?
5. Usefulness: Can the model be used to study real-world scenarios?
Resolving these questions requires a full community’s labor, but the goals of
this research are more modest: workable answers to build a useful architecture for
memes. These key questions have not been adequately addressed for memetics,
which has been limited by its disconnection from the extensive body of related
empirical work. In addressing these questions, equal focus has been placed on
theoretical soundness and applicability to empirical situations. A full chapter
has been devoted to each of these fundamental questions, gradually working from
theoretical concerns to practical applications. Assumptions and simplifications
have been necessary, with all possible effort made to state where and why they
were made. The result is not the final answer for modeling memes, but it does
present a useful architecture for examining memes.
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1.2.1 Definition: Formally Defining Memes
The first question addressed is the definition of a meme, without which any further
discussion would be baseless. This question depends upon further questions: what
are the elements involved in the meme system, what are their key relationships,
and what are necessary and sufficient conditions for a meme to exist in this
system? Chapter 2 presents a functional, empirically-approachable definition to
a meme. This contribution begins by presenting scholarly perspectives on memes,
considering the disparity between different definitions of a meme (Section 2.1).
From this discussion, the concept of a meme is defined in terms of its semantic
information (Section 2.2). Finally, this chapter presents a formal definition for
memes that describes memes in terms of their ability to recursively reproduce
within a society (Sections 2.3 and 2.4). This definition is used as a foundation
for exploring issues of detecting, modeling, and measuring memes.
1.2.2 Systems Model: Synthesis of Theories to Explains Meme Evolution
Building up from the definition in Chapter 2, a systems approach for modeling
meme evolution is presented. Chapter 3 describes a synthesis of the Shannon
(1948) information model with Bandura’s (1986) social learning model, complemented
by additional models of human cognition and social psychology. Within this
framework, meme evolution is emergent from each person’s interaction with
the environment as described in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 fits these individual
interactions into framework formed by synthesizing Bandura’s (1986) observational
learning process with the Shannon (1948) information transmission model. This
synthetic model represents both the physical and cognitive processing of memes.
Using these aspects of the Social Cognitive Learning Theory (Bandura, 1986)
and Information Theory (Shannon, 1948), this chapter describes the ecosystem
for memes.
Within this framework, memes are treated as semantic information. By
treating memes as information, the Shannon (1948) information model provides
an architecture for analysis. The Shannon model has a simple design which
allows for analysis of message transmission, which is one mechanism involved in
memes. The Bandura (1986) model of social learning provides an overlapping
and complementary level of analysis, focusing on how humans process of socially
transmitted information. These models provide good starting points but still
have limited explanatory power without more fine-grained and implementable
mechanisms. To this end, cognitive theories of attention, motivation, and social
psychology were integrated into the framework.
The remainder of Chapter 3 interprets how these cognitive theories work as
mechanisms that guide meme evolution. The mechanisms behind the evolution of
memes are the primary focus of Sections 3.3 and 3.4. The key questions are: Can
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meme behavior be explained by building up from existing theories and science? If
so, what synthesis of theories are sufficient to explain meme dynamics? Through
an extensive literature review, theories have been identified and synthesized to
help explain meme dynamics. Section 3.3 describes how information theory can
be used to explain meme variation and competition between memes. Section 3.4
introduces the cognitive “memetic machinery” of social learning theory, describing
how empirically derived cognitive mechanisms influence meme reproduction, variation,
and competition.
This synthesis model for memes is intended to be a useful model for studying
meme evolution. A systems model is useful if it is complete, holistic, and workable.
To be complete, the model must be able to meaningfully represent all three
mechanisms for meme evolution: reproduction, variation, and selection pressure.
To be holistic, the synthesis of Social Learning Theory (Bandura, 1986) and
Information Theory (Shannon, 1948) must be essential for modeling meme evolution
as opposed to using either theory in isolation. This integration must provide
different insight than the set of disconnected theories. The conclusion of Chapter
3, Section 3.5, presents a fleshed-out conceptual model for memes that consolidates
the mechanisms that affect meme evolution. Chapter 3 demonstrates that the
model is complete and holistic. However, to show that it is workable the model
must be applicable to real-world problems.
1.2.3 Measurement: Identifying and Measuring Memes Empirically
Chapter 4 shows that the definition and synthesis model for memes can be used
to define measurements of memes. These measurements must be strict enough
to be falsifiable, otherwise memetics do not form a well constrained field. The
measurements presented in this section focus on proving that a meme exists and
present methods for measuring meme reproduction. While focusing on general
concepts, as opposed to the nitty-gritty of a specific experimental design, this
chapter provides an outline of approaches to empirically studying different kinds
of memes. Section 4.2 in this chapter also introduces a special type of meme:
socially learned affordances (action possibilities). J. J. Gibson’s (1979) affordance
theory of perception posits that organisms perceive their environment in terms
of the actions it affords. Action affordance learning provides a type of well
structured meme that corresponds directly with a behavioral expression. This
makes socially learned affordances particularly amenable to measurement and
testing models against empirical data.
1.2.4 Implementation: Realizing the Memes Computationally
Having outlined the fundamental concepts for studying memes, the following
chapters focus on transitioning this theory into a workable implementation. Chapter
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5 outlines a computational implementation of the conceptual model defined in
Section 3.5. The realization of the conceptual model is an agent based model,
consisting of multiple autonomous and interacting agents. This computational
model is designed to simulate social learning of affordances within an agent based
simulation, due to their ability to be measured empirically (as detailed in Section
4.2). This particular computational implementation is designed to focus on the
dynamics of meme reproduction rather than meme mutation. While mutation is
also important, this simplification allows for correspondence tests against data
sets collected to examine diffusion of innovation.
Figure 1.4: Levels of Analysis for Memes
The computational model is implemented as an extension of the PMFServ
agent based architecture, as described in Section 5.1. The PMFServ paradigm
is a model of models approach: each simulation consists of groups, each group
consists of agents, and each agent consists of a combination of cognitive models
based on social science literature (Silverman, 2010). As shown in Figure 1.4, these
three levels of analysis correspond to information, knowledge, and understanding.
New computational cognitive components were implemented, formalizing the
information captured by social science theories. These components are each
described in Section 5.2. These components represent the reusable plug-ins
described in the “Meta-Model Library” (Figure 1.2). These components represent
specific theories and empirical relationships that support modeling for memes.
Attention, social influence, and learning models were implemented and connected
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with existing cognitive models to make agents capable of learning affordances
socially. The relationships between models are the knowledge layer for memes,
giving the dynamics for meme processing by a single agent. Decisions and
behavior are emergent from this system of cognitive models. This emergent
behavior feeds into the society, allowing learning and imitation that reproduces
the meme. Reproduction, diffusion, and immunity to a meme are emergent
properties of the larger social system. By simulating real world scenarios and
examining these emergent properties, this implementation has helped increase
understanding of how a meme’s dynamics relate to its society.
1.2.5 Usefulness: Applying the Model to Study Real-World Scenarios
In order to demonstrate that the systems model for memes is useful, the implemented
computational model was applied to two scenarios with real-world relevance:
an examination of potential memes in the Stanford Prison Experiment and a
simulation of competing memes in a fictional Iraqi village. The process of selecting
and creating these scenarios is explained in Chapter 6. A simulation of the
Stanford Prison Experiment was designed, attempting to examine different hy-
potheses for the source of guards’ use of “the hole” on prisoners and prisoners’ use
of resistance against the guards. Empirical data was used to train and validate
the computational model for the Stanford Prison Experiment simulation, which
was collected from the Archives of the History of American Psychology. The
design of the Stanford Prison Experiment scenario is described in Section 6.1.
This Stanford Prison Experiment simulation was trained over a limited period
of the simulation length, with the remainder used for external validity testing.
The hypotheses were tested by examining whether learning of actions as memes
improved the ability of the model to predict the order of when those actions would
be expressed. This analysis used a new metric for sequence correspondence, which
is a normalized variant of an inversion count. This new metric is explained briefly
in Section 7.2.4 and in more detail in Appendix I.
The Hamariyah Iraqi village scenario was intended to model competition
between memes. This scenario design is described in Section 6.2. The Hamariyah
scenario tests the capability of the model to provide wisdom, a legitimate insight
into a situation beyond that provided by the base model. Meme awareness
and meme expression were examined within the village, in an attempt to find
individual and contextual characteristics affecting meme dynamics. This scenario
models a meme for giving information to US forces about insurgent activity and
a competing meme for volunteering to plant an IED for insurgents. In this
respect, the model is used to examine which agents gravitate toward learning
and expressing each meme.
Each scenario is simulated across repeated runs in an experiment framework,
which allows simulation and data analysis over a distribution of possible initial
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states and simulation paths (Nye, Roddy, Bharathy, & Silverman, 2007). These
simulations yield insight into the workability and usefulness of both the realized
and the conceptual model for simulation of memes. If the implemented model
successfully provides insight into examining an empirical scenario and can be used
to examine meme competition in a meaningful manner, the model for memes can
be considered workable.
By this yardstick, the results of these simulations presented in Chapter 7
demonstrate that the systems model for memes is workable. Section 7.3 of
the results demonstrates the internal validity of the model, showing that the
implemented combination of models works appropriately in a testbed condition
in Section 7.3.1. It then demonstrates and explains how different contexts can
affect the apparent influence of different factors on meme transmission, in Section
7.3.2 and the following discussion. This internal validity testing shows interesting
relationships which have empirical implications on their own merit.
The Stanford Prison Experiment scenario is examined for its external validity
in the results Section 7.4.1. This scenario is subjected to a number of validity
metrics chosen before simulating the experiment, to validate that the simulation
represents important dynamics discovered in the empirical data from the experiment.
The key metric applied to this data is one that examines the order that agents first
perform certain actions, also known as the order of first expression. As explained
in Chapter 4, the order of first expression can provide information about meme
transmission if learning the meme is a limiting factor on expressing it. As such,
a sequence ordering metric was used to determine if simulating certain actions as
memes better represented the order of first expression.
Both the Stanford Prison Experiment simulation and the Hamariyah Iraqi
village were also examined using traditional diffusion of innovation metrics, in
sections 7.4.2 and 7.5.1 for the Stanford Prison Experiment scenario and Hamariyah
scenario respectively. This analysis demonstrates that the implemented model
can be used to perform diffusion of innovation experiments and provides insight
into the workings of memes in these simulations. Additionally, both scenarios
were examined to determine the meme adoption dynamics: which agents learned
and expressed certain memes more quickly. This is an important analysis, since
it provides insight that other models for memes lack: a solid representation of
the situational and individual differences that allow memes to spread successfully
through some individuals but not through others. Section 7.4.2 explores these
differences by examining individual agents.
Finally, section 7.5.2 moves beyond the basic meme adoption dynamics and
associates these differences with situational and personality factors that cause
an agent to adopt certain memes quickly as opposed to avoiding them entirely.
These traits are extracted from the simulation data using statistical techniques.
These results demonstrate the ability of the implemented model to examine
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 11
questions of meme competition, at the level of inferring what kinds of agents
are drawn to certain memes. The results of this section are promising and show
that models following this design may be able to successfully infer the individual
and contextual differences that lead people to imitate certain behaviors rather
than others.
1.3 Summary
By using the systems social science methodology and approaching memes in a
structured way, this research presents a path forward for memes- a promising
theoretical concept that has suffered due to its lack of integration with empirical
work (Silverman, 2010). This thesis presents a formal definition for memes, a
systems model for studying memes, approaches for measuring memes empirically,
a computational implementation of the systems model for memes, and two simulated
scenarios which highlight different capabilities of the computational model: comparison
against empirical situations and analyzing meme competition. Each of these
components represents a significant contribution to the discourse on memes and
also explores questions of more general scientific importance in the process.
The overall contribution is to demonstrate that the systems model for memes
is complete, holistic, and workable for modeling meme evolution. This shows
that the systems model for memes is useful, a scientifically meaningful approach
for studying memes. However, there can be no meaningful approach to studying
memes unless memes are explicitly defined. In the following chapter, a formalization
for memes is presented to address this issue.
Chapter 2
Defining Memes
Before embarking on a thorough analysis of memes, they must be verified to be
worthy of study. What are memes? Why are memes important? Memes provide
an algorithmic mechanism for the spread and persistence of behaviors, language,
and ideas within a population. Memes evolve and undergo natural selection, the
same processes underlying gene survival (Dennett, 1995).
The evolution of memes is explained at length in Darwin’s Dangerous Idea
(Dennett, 1995), so only a short summary will be presented. Evolution requires
three processes: inheritance, variation, and selection pressure (Darwin, 1902).
The inheritance of cultural information is incontrovertible, forming the basis of
the socio-cultural learning model and the ratchet model of culture (Bandura,
1986; Tomasello, 1999). Variation of information occurs at many stages, due to
noise in transmission and individual differences when interpreting information.
Selection pressure results from limited capability to process information, limited
time to express memes, and limited motivation to express memes. All three
of Darwin’s conditions are observed, indicating an evolutionary process guiding
cultural information.
Memes connect individual behavior and psychology with their emergent effects
at the societal level. Understanding evolution and reproduction of memes would
be a breakthrough for social science analysis. Public policy initiatives could be
promoted with greater effectiveness by better targeting tipping-point demographics.
At-risk demographics for copycat crimes such as school shootings or suicides
could be identified, given a source incident. Additionally, punctuated equilibria
for belief change could be forecasted- the birth of social norms. The ability to
anticipate and reliably influence norms would revolutionize social science.
12
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2.1 The Debate on Meme Definition
The precise definition of a meme remains a contested ontological question. Memes
have been proposed as a philosophical lens, a scientific discipline, and at the
center of a theory of mind (Dawkins, 1976; Heylighen, 1998; Blackmore, 1999).
Heylighen (1998) treats the matter most similarly, examining how to quantitatively
test for meme existence. This discussion treats memetics, the study of memes, as
a discipline of the social sciences focusing on the evolution of cultural information.
The Tomasello (1999) ratchet model of cultural change expresses the most similar
view of culture, situating it in both the individuals minds and the artifacts
of a society. Under this definition, culture is posited to change through an
evolutionary process (not just “as if” such a process occurred) but is not claimed
as the fundamental process for self or identity.
A further point of confusion is the very meaning of a meme. Dawkins’
seminal definition established a meme as a “unit of cultural information,” the
internalist perspective (Dawkins, 1976). Adaptations to this definition make
claims that such information must be able to be copied and recalled within
the brain (Aunger, 2002). The externalist perspective frames memes in terms
of their physical manifestations, such as behavior, messages, and signs. The
systems perspective must adopt a semiotic view: that internal and external parts
cannot be disentangled. Disconnecting the physical expressions from the cognitive
information fundamentally breaks the meme replication process. This statement
is controversial, but necessary- the evolution of a meme depends both on its
physical manifestations and its cognitive interpretation.
The discussion from memes has also hit snags over the mental representations
of memes within the brain, such as encoding techniques and neural localization.
No stance will be taken over the internal representation of a meme. Studies of
learning and memory in psychology have successfully expanded understanding of
the cognition and behavior for over a century, despite only mapping neurons to
responses for aplysia and squids (Marder, Abbott, Turrigiano, Liu, & Golowasch,
1996; Hodgkin & Huxley, 1952).
The problem of memory and mental representations would appear to be part
of the general study of learning and memory- interesting in its own right, but
not crucial to memetics. As an analogy, an undefragmented hard disk for a
computer will regularly split up large files into many different sectors. If spatial
contiguity is unnecessary for a file on a computer, why would it be necessary in
a brain? It has also been argued that the localization approach may be one of
opportunity, driven by the ability to measure the brain without understanding
of the meaning of measurement (Uttal, 2001). If memes could be localized,
very interesting experiments could be conducted. However, market researchers
regularly measure awareness and attitudes toward ideas and products without
resorting to neurological measures. Sidestepping the physical representation of a
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meme allows greater focus on the information characteristics and function of a
meme.
2.2 Memes as Information
Memes are a special type of information. The term information must be used
carefully, as memes involve multiple types of information. A meme must have
a physical transmission (syntax) as well as a cognitive interpretation (semantic
information). Peripheral and contextual information can overlay additional semantics.
Dual process models of persuasion highlight the importance of these context cues,
which can augment or entirely override the semantic content of a transmission
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).
The core information of a meme is its semantic information. When semantic
information changes, the meme has mutated or a new meme has been created.
A meme reproduces when semantic information is replicated from one agent to
another. Physical and contextual information accompany the meaning of a copied
meme, but are generally absent when a meme is re-expressed. Copying a meme
loses such information. For example, few people repeat jokes they heard in movies
by repeating them in taped re-enactment of that movie. If the context becomes
part of the meme, a variant meme has been created.
Though each new transmission has a new context, this context is very important
for interpreting the physical transmission. Linguistic study addresses such issues
of contextual understanding. The written and spoken versions of a word hold the
same meaning despite differences in physical transmission. Conversely, identical
physical transmissions change semantic meaning based on context (Gerot &
Wignell, 1994). The word “embarazado” means “embarrassed” in Portuguese,
but “pregnant” in Spanish. For a bilingual speaker, the surrounding words
establish the meaning. The relationship between the receiver, syntax, and context
will determine the received semantics- including memes (which are a subset of
semantic information).
This relationship raises the issue of the connection between memes and the
concept of signs in semiotics. Signs are a very general concept, defined generally
as “A sign ... is something which stands to somebody for something in some
respect or capacity” (Peirce, 1931, Vol 2, p.228). One opinion in the semiotics
community views memes as “degenerate signs” because memes “copy” from one
person to another rather than “translate” (Kull, 2000). While this has been a
common approach to memes, there is no theoretical reason why memes should
not need to be translated during the transmission process. Instead, memes can
be viewed as a special subset of signs. Peirce (1931) states that an essential
characteristic of signs is their potential to be interpreted, since a sign “would
lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no interpretant.” In other
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words, a sign must carry some meaning to a receiver in order to be a sign. A
meme must also satisfy this characteristic or else it could never reproduce.
However, an interpretant (received meaning) must observe additional necessary
conditions for its sign to be considered a meme. The information must be
reproducible from one agent to another, the reproduction process must be a result
of behavioral patterns, and some reproduced versions must remain reproducible.
These conditions establish memes as a recursive case of observational learning
(Bandura, 1977). The behavior or message specified by meme must be socially
learned and capable of reproduction with fidelity.
2.3 Memes as Operators
A meme can be defined by its functional ability to sustainably reproduce within
a society through social learning. This is similar to how computer viruses are
defined as a subset of all possible combinations of code strings. In this view, a
meme’s semantic information contains a function definition. This approach to
definition has precedent in biology’s definition of life, in which reproduction is a
necessary process (Koshland Jr., 2002). Wilkins (1998) expresses this condition
for memes in his article What’s in a Meme?
The necessary condition of recursive reproducibility can be expressed
explicitly. The following symbols will be defined:
S - The society of agents under analysis.
Env - The environment that an agent inhabits.
Ω - All possible environments.
Xa - All information stored by an agent a.
xa - Semantic information for a meme, as understood by agent a. xa ∈ Xa.
Ba(Env,Xa) - Behavior function of agent a. Alters and returns Env,
returning it as a changed environment Env∗.
Ba(Env, xa) - Behavior function of an agent a when expressing xa.
Pa(Env,Xa) - Perception function of agent a. Alters and returns Xa,
returning it as a changed set of stored information X∗a .
The term “agent” is used to define members of a society, as it connects this
definition to agent based simulation techniques explored later. At this stage,
interchanging humans with agents must be discouraged, as significant evidence
exists for cultural learning by apes, dolphins, and songbirds (Zentall, 2007).
The reproduction process of a meme is defined in Eqn. 2.1. A single
reproduction requires three steps, each occurring over some span of time. First,
the agent’s relationship to the environment must activate some behavioral
expression of the meme, changing their patterns of activity. Second, this behavior
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Meme Reproduction Process
Assume a1, a2 ∈ S s.t. a1 6= a2 &xa1 ∈ Xa1 &
@ (xa2 ∈ Xa2) s.t. xa2 ≈ xa1
Define R(a1, a2, Env) :
Ba1(Env, x) ∈ Ba1(Env,Xa1)
Env∗ = Ba1(Env, x)
X∗a2 = Pa(Env
∗, Xa2)
where ∃(xa2 ∈ X∗a2) s.t. : xa2 ≈ xa1
(2.1)
Meme Reproduction Non-Triviality Condition
P{∃xa2 ∈ X∗a2 : xa2 ≈ xa1‖Ba1(Env, x) ∈ Ba1(Env,Xa1)} 
P{∃xa2 ∈ X∗a2 : xa2 ≈ xa1‖Ba1(Env, x) /∈ Ba1(Env,Xa1)}
(2.2)
must alter the environment in some observable way. Finally, a second agent
must perceive this environment either during or after the behavior and learn new
information similar to the meme. The question of what makes memes similar
will be discussed further in Section 4.1 and in further depth in Appendix A.
For reproduction (and the meme itself) to be non-trivial then Eqn. 2.2 must
hold. Eqn. 2.2 formally states that the probability of learning the semantics
would be much lower without observing the expression of the meme. This means
that reproduction involves a transmission of semantic, meaningful information as
opposed to a coincidental spontaneous learning event that would have been likely
without such an observation.
From a certain standpoint, this definition of meme reproduction may seem
overly general: any semantic information could be a meme, depending on the
population and the environmental context. Indeed, if one makes no assumptions
about the society or the environment- any information could be a meme. As
a result, any meaningful study of memes must be tied to the society and
environment. As the the environment and societal context is constrained, the
set of possible memes becomes respectively constrained. As such, this definition
of memes uses the society and environmental contexts almost like parameters-
one cannot define memes without defining these two.
The society is important on many levels, depending on the level of
specification given. The first obvious constraint is the species involved. For
instance, humans appear capable of spreading a much different and wider array
of memes than songbirds. Within a species, there are semantic requisites to
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learning certain information. For example, one cannot learn that an apple is on
a dog without also learning about the concept of an apple and a dog. This may
be thought of as a zone of proximal development for learning a meme, where
knowing necessary concepts allows learning the meaningful information of the
meme (Vygotsky, 1980). Through more detailed specification of the society, the
set of possible memes can be constrained significantly. The environment, of which
the communication medium is a part, also defines what memes can theoretically
reproduce. In an extremely noisy environment, with no verbal communication
possible, there would be significant constraints on the memes that could exist.
Even after maximally constraining the possible semantic information that can
be reproduced, humans still have a vast amount of possible semantic information
that can be communicated and reproduced. This definition may seem too general,
bordering on a “theory of everything.” Indeed, the reproduction process is general
with respect to any semantic information. The special quality that differentiates
memes from the larger body of semantic information is its ability to reproduce
recursively- a significant additional constraint.
2.4 Recursive Reproduction of Memes
With reproduction defined, properties important to reproduction can be stated
for the meme’s viability. A necessary condition for semantic information to
comprise a meme is the ability to reproduce recursively, stated formally in
Eqn. 2.1. Information lacking such capability would be sterile and could not
be called a meme. Note that a1 and a3 do not necessarily have to be different
agents. The meme could pass back and forth, as when old friends relay an inside
joke that they’re prone to forgetting.
Figure 2.1: Recursive Reproduction Condition
Env1, Env2 ∈ Ω & ∃(a1, a2, a3) ∈ S & a1 6= a2 & a2 6= a3
s.t. :R(a1, a2, Env1)⇒ R(a2, a3, Env2)
(2.3)
The impact of a meme presented to an agent that has not forgotten their
variant of the same meme does not have a clear effect. Any stimuli presented
many times in sequence could create disconnected sets of information, a single
updated set of associations, or a dynamic variation of connectivity. Such
relationships are specific to an agent’s cognitive processing; these are addressed
as learning in Section 3.4.2. For simplicity, all variants similar enough to be
labeled the same meme will be treated as a single meme. This assumption means
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that an agent cannot reproduce a meme to a carrier of the same meme but can
update its meaning.
Recursive reproduction separates memes from other types of knowledge.
The ability to successfully reproduce enables inheritance. This definition is
ontologically complete: semantic information is a meme within a society and
environment if and only if it can recursively reproduce in that society and
environment. This may still overly general, but further restrictions on defining
memes tend to be arbitrary.
For example, some alternative definitions further restrict the definition
based upon how well the information reproduces or its ability to “motivate”
reproduction Finkelstein (2008). This definition of reproduction places the
cart before the horse- how can one measure how well a meme reproduces if
one disregards inefficient memes? All memes would be, by definition, good at
reproducing. Such restrictions on the definition appear counter-productive. Just
like organisms, some species will reproduce better than others or be better suited
for particular environments. This definition captures the theoretical ability of a
meme to recursively reproduce, without coupling it to the motivational influence
to reproduce or success in reproduction. These characteristics seem better suited
to a continuum approach. Motivation to reproduce a meme is not binary, nor
does it have to be consistent across members in a society. For this reason, these
factors were kept separate from the definition of memes.
As a result, this definition of a meme provides no insight into what allows a
meme to proliferate. By decoupling the definition from factors such as motivation
and competition, these operationalizations serve to define what could spread
as a meme rather than what will spread as a meme. Meaningful memetic
study requires an understanding of the relationship between memes and their
societal environment. The flow of information through a social system must be
understood. In the following sections, a model is proposed that integrates the
effects of cognition and the environment on meme transmission.
Chapter 3
The Meme Process: A Systems
Model for Memes
A meme relies upon semantic information to propagate, meaning there can be
no examination of memes that is disconnected from a population. Memes may
be said to be cultural information not only because they augment culture but
because their entire existence and meaning is predicated on the existence of a
society where they may spread.∗ Members of a society provide an environment
for memes to form an ecosystem.
Memes exist as part of a cultural system. In this context, a culture will
be considered any collection of communicating individuals, their memes, and
their semiotic signs. These three elements are interconnected and irreducible,
as defined by Ackoff’s definition of systems (Ackoff, 1971). Signs represent the
communication of meaning through the physical environment. Memes and signs
are meaningless without a society to interpret them. Similarly, a society incapable
of both receiving and transmitting information between members could hardly
be considered to communicate.
An analogy for such entanglement would be machine code, which has meaning
only in relation to the chipsets of computers. Any random string of bits can in
theory be machine code, given the proper instruction set. This analogy exposes
the weakness of memes when no assumptions are made about the population’s
culture and cognitive processes. The strength of memetics can only come when
a rich understanding of the actors is attained, either individually or as a societal
distribution. Success in such an inquiry requires incorporating fundamental
processes from psychology, behavioral economics, and other empirically active
fields. In the words of Castelfranchi (2001), “Memetics needs cognitive modeling.”
∗After a talk on the UPenn campus, I managed to speak with Daniel Dennett and confirmed
this point with him. A meme can exist only in relation to a population.
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To embed cognitive models appropriately, memes must be expressed explicitly
and rigorously at the systems level.
3.1 Interaction with the Environment
Agents and their environment form a closed system. Agents will be assumed to
represent a boundary between the cognitive and physical domains, where agents
have cognition and the environment does not. This approach does not represent
a stance on the mind-body problem, but is taken in order to harness existing
research on cognition. In real life, agents process information physically, but
behavioral science traditionally examines cognition as an emergent process above
this layer. To harness these findings, learning and mental processes will be treated
cognitively.
Discussing the cognition of an agent requires a working definition of how an
agent interfaces with their environment. Perception theory and control theory
provide insight into the stimulus-response aspects of agent behavior. Perceptual
theory posits that perception translates between the physical and cognitive worlds
(James, 1890). The physical world cannot be fully perceived due to physical,
cognitive, and even motivational limitations (Matthews & Wells, 1999).
Figure 3.1: Agent Perception Process
Figure 3.1 displays a diagram for the stages of perception. Stimuli represent
the parts of the world that an agent can physically detect, given their sensory
organs. Sensation represents what an agent detects from their sensory organs,
that should convey some information about the stimuli. Attentional processes
determine the set of stimuli that form sensations. Sensations must be interpreted
to form perception, based upon current sensations and stored experiences. For
an organism that learns, new perceptions will be stored as experiences and alter
later perceptions.
The semantic information of a learned meme must be learned through
perception. As a subset of learning, memes affect behavior and alter perception
and interpretation of past events. Nothing unique about memes causes these
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changes, but the effects of existing memes on later memes should be noted. In
the general case, meme information interacts path-dependently.
Figure 3.2: Behavioral Control Diagram
Behavior can be considered as a translation of cognitive impulses to physical
responses. Behavioral expression is necessary for meme transmission. Control
theory for systems applies to behavioral expression (Miall & Wolpert, 1996). An
agent forms a goal-directed system with certain goals and actuation impulses,
shown in the simplified Figure 3.2. Note that in the context of this diagram,
“expression” refers to the intended expression of an agent. This differs from
the actual observed behavior, which determines the observed expression by other
agents. Force feedback, physical interactions, and automatic responses are part
of the feedback loop noted between expression and behavior. Reflexes are one
example of behavior which exists only in this feedback loop, without regard to
goal state. This loop does not allow for meme learning but does greatly affect
behavior.
Behavior does not perfectly reflect impulses or goals. The perceptual
system can provide incomplete or incorrect information. Differences between the
perceived world and the actual world provide sources for variation in reproducing
memes. Muscle actuation introduces behavioral variation as well. Proprioception
and internal control systems for muscles do not operate precisely, creating random
variations in reproducing similar behaviors (Schmidt & Lee, 2005). Individual
differences create systemic differences in meme behavior across agents.
The block diagram in Figure 3.3 synthesizes a loop for an agent interacting
with the physical world. The stages from perceptual and control theory are noted.
For the purposes of meme transmission, consider this diagram as representing one
agent within a society that is connected by a common environment. The processes
described in this diagram can explain reproduction as defined in Section 2.1, but
with higher granularity. Established theory of social learning and information
flow will be overlaid onto this diagram.
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Figure 3.3: Agent Information Flow
3.2 Synthesis of Models
Synthesizing social cognitive theory and Shannon (1948) information theory
creates a systems model for meme reproduction. Figure 3.4 shows the processes
involved in transmitting a meme from one agent to another. The dashed arrow
in this diagram represents when processing by the original agent is complete
and a transmission to a new agent can start. Information theory provides useful
insight into the transformations of a meme’s physical information while in transit:
the changes to a meme from non-cognitive effects. Information transmission
occurs between a source and a destination, also known as the target. The source
chooses the content of the information, which is passed to the transmitter. The
transmitter sends this message by altering some part of the medium, producing
a signal. A medium is the channel through which information travels, such as
television or speech. Noise affects the signal as it passes through this medium.
The receiver monitors this medium and is affected by a signal, allowing the
message to pass to the destination where it is interpreted.
The processes transmitter, medium, noise, and receiver occur during the
“Transmission of Information” step marked in Figure 3.3. Social cognitive
theory provides a framework to understand how a meme would be reproduced
cognitively. Figure 3.5 overlays labels for the processes of social learning onto the
information flow diagram of Figure 3.3. These theories complementarily address
the meme reproduction process.
Social cognitive theory proposes a model for how humans learn information
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Figure 3.4: Synthesis of Information Theory and Observational Learning
from other members of society. The precursor to social cognitive theory was
social learning theory, which approached the problem from a behavioral view
rather than a cognitive view. Social learning theory developed out of seminal
findings of human imitation (Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1963). The memetic process
encompasses most kinds of imitation and emulation, making social learning theory
a logical component of the system.
Social learning theory lacks explanatory power for the physical transmission
of information. Shannon information theory explains fundamental processes
of information transmission between a source and receiver through a medium.
Information theory fills theoretical gaps that social learning theory does not
address implicitly. Noise and bandwidth effects provide particularly important
insight into meme mutation and selection pressures.
Social learning theory and information theory combine to create a system
within which memes reproduce and evolve. Within this system a meme differs
from other information only by its ability to fulfill the recursive reproduction
condition (Eqn. 2.1). For certain societies, this space will be tightly constrained.
For songbirds, only new songs are learned socially (West & King, 1996). For
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Figure 3.5: Agent Social Learning Loop
humans, this space could reasonably include most observable behaviors.
While humans are biologically able to socially acquire a vast variety of
information, only a subset of information disperses through society. Some memes
must be more fit than others. As in biology, the fitness of an entity depends on
its environment. Understanding meme fitness requires a deeper examination of
the reproduction process in relation to a full society.
3.3 Information Theory View of Memes
The physical transmission of a meme interacts with noise and competes with
alternative signals in the environment. Information theory must be applied to
understand the transmission of memes through signs and behavior. Shannon’s
(1948) theory addresses how information must be sent, without addressing why or
when an agent would send information. Information theory provides a framework
to analyze the effects of receiving information, sending information, and noise.
A meme transmission is a subset of generic messages within information
theory. Meme transmissions do not act as dyadic transmissions. A source
agent expresses a meme as behavior but may have no intent to communicate
with a particular agent or any agent at all. Behavior broadcasts the meme into
the environment, a physical medium for transmission. Within that medium,
other mediums may exist, such as written language and physical demonstration.
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Complicating matters, all agents actively participate in behavior and broadcast
competing signals.
Agents in a static environment with unlimited perception, memory, and
behavioral capabilities could spread information unencumbered by limitations
on information transmissions. For realistic analysis, limits exist on agents’
capabilities. Real environments dynamically change even in the absence of any
behavior. Noise and bandwidth effects impede and break the transmission of
memes.
3.3.1 Behavior as Transmission
Figure 3.6: Behavioral Transmission
Agents output behavior, which transmits information. Memes are a special
type of information, which is transmitted and rebroadcast by new agents over
time. Figure 3.6 shows how transmission might pass memes to new agents over
time. Limited control and rate of activity bottleneck the information transmitted.
An agent’s control over the environment consists of their available outputs,
such as muscle control and vocalization. An agent only controls a subset of
behavioral inputs to the environment. The rate of output transmission also holds
importance. For example, a faster writer can transmit more information per unit
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time. The product of the output vector and the transmission rate determines an
information-theoretic bound on transmission rate of memetic information.
Behavior provides the opportunity for noise in transmission. Imprecise control
of behavior introduces variation in implementation. For any behavior, physical
implementation varies based on the actor and circumstances. Behavior expressing
a meme may constitute a subset of an agent’s total behavior, creating the
potential for interference in transmission. Representing behavior asBa, the effects
of random variations (εa) and other activities (x̃a) are explicitly represented in
Eqn. 3.1.
Env∗ = Ba(Env,Xa)
= Ba(Env, xa + x̃a) + εa
(3.1)
Behavioral bandwidth for transmitting information is limited. Behavioral
interference indicates that behaviors compete for outputs, as might occur when
multitasking. For example, speaking and eating a sandwich are semantically
orthogonal but use the same muscle set. Mixing these activities degrades the
performance of both.
3.3.2 The Dynamic Environment
Once transmitted, a message enters the environment through some medium
or mediums. The environment interacts with messages dynamically through
natural physical processes, introducing random and systemic noise. Research
in linguistics (Dell, Chang, & Griffin, 1999), marketing (Costley, Das, &
Brucks, 1997), and communication (Schramm, 1963) examine the implications
of different message encodings and mediums on messages. All results pertinent
to generic physical transmissions must apply to memes, which comprise a subset
of messages.
The field of message passing cannot be done justice in a short section, so only
the most fundamental processes will be examined. For a full treatment, Heath
and Bryant (2000) provides an overview of transmission processes and protocols.
Mediums have limited transmission rates and can superimpose dynamic noise
onto a message. Message size, message fidelity, and signal to noise ratio
significantly affect the variation and replication ability of memes (HaleEvans,
2006).
Message size influences the ability of a meme to propagate. Longer messages
require greater transmission and reception times. The complete text of Hamlet
reproduces more slowly than the phrase “To be or not to be.” Long transmission
times utilize more behavioral resources. This can reduce the opportunity and
motivation to repeat a message. Production of signs such as books and mass
media mitigate the behavioral constraints, as a single reproduction lasts longer.
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For longer memes that cannot be expressed through a lasting medium such
as print or photography, transmission can be extremely difficult. The difference
between choreography and notational music highlights this issue. Sheet music
preserves the sounds of composers such as Mozart and Bach, which can be
expected to last for hundreds of years. Choreography lacks a universal format
for recording movements, forcing complex dances to be taught through direct
instruction or video presentation (HutchinsonGuest, 1989). This makes copying
long sequences of choreographic movements time consuming, meaning that
choreography is often lost once it is no longer performed (J. Anderson, 1982).
Different mediums vary by the characteristics of the noise introduced.
Degradation (εd) and competition (εc) introduce noise into a signal through
different mechanisms. Assume that the meme transmission carries the signal
as a function TR of the meme information x. Equation 3.2 expresses the received
message (Ra) by an agent a. All processes operate over time, expressed as t.
Ra(t) = TRx(x, t) + εd(t) + εc(t) (3.2)
Degradation reduces message quality due to entropy and other changes to
the medium. Degradation differs for written and spoken forms of words- the
waveform of a spoken word loses coherence more quickly than a printed word.
The rate of degradation affects how long signs continue to present the physical
information of a meme. Degradation may not represent a fully random process.
Writing your name in the sand by the ocean will certainly degrade overnight, but
not uniformly.
Competition introduces non-random noise that carries meaningful semantic
information. Competition within a medium increases noise by superimposing an
alternative signal. Competition within a medium can directly affect the physical
value of a signal. Superimposing analog electrical signals creates a new signal,
which may cancel out pieces of the original signal. Separate signals can be
disentangled by relying on orthogonality of characteristics and error correction.
FM radio employs this principle (Carlson, 1981). Simultaneous voices speaking
follow this pattern.
Signals may combine such that the original signals are irretrievable. In this
case, competition destroys components of one or both original signals. Changing
the voicemail message on a phone deletes the old message, for instance. Entropy
created by a large number of competing signals can also create this effect by
introducing enough small errors as to be irrecoverable. A sufficiently large number
of voices in a room can create this effect.
Noise and error correction introduce variation for memes. One criticism of
memetics contends that this causes memes to vary too much to retain meaning
(Atran, 2001). Considering that a word in language can be treated as a meme, this
criticism lacks general appeal. Research on information theory has shown that
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variation can be reduced through messages with less information per length and
coding methods such as parity. Discretized transmissions also have advantages
over continuous transmissions; they reduce the set of allowable states in a signal.
However, the introduction of variation does require careful definition of a meme
for empirical study- a point addressed later in Section 4.1.
Degradation and competition are two sources of noise for a meme. The signal
to noise ratio has important implications for a meme. Meme transmissions will
encounter noise and may undergo error correction, depending on the medium
and agents involved. Error correction and handling of incompletely received
messages is a significant issue which will affect some memes, but it appears unclear
what theories of human cognition imply for memes. Related work in linguistics
(completing words and phrases) and visual perception (picture completion) has
implications for this, but these are not sufficient. The most difficult question on
this matter appears to be how information is handled when it is transmitted in
multiple partially observed sessions. To this researcher’s knowledge, a consensus
mechanism of this mechanism does not exist. Accordingly, this conceptual model
lacks a specific theory for handling incomplete meme transmission, forcing the
problem to be addressed anew for any meme where this mechanism significantly
influences dynamics.
Stimulation as Reception
Stimulation determines what environmental stimuli an agent physically detects
through its bandwidth of detection channels. Sensory organs provide the set
of stimuli for an agent and are necessary to receive a meme. While important
biologically, this mechanism holds limited value for establishing the fitness of
memes within a society. The sensitivity of sensory organs can provide insight into
sources of noise and sensory error correction mechanisms. Significant empirical
work has mapped out minimal detectable stimuli for human sensations, such as
light detection and weight approximation (Levine & Shefner, 1991).
Being able to physically sense the signs of a meme provides a limited form
of pruning out transmissions. While the ability to sense stimuli is necessary,
sensation alone is not sufficient. Stimulation provides no insight into the success
of a meme with regard to its semantic information. Failing to learn the lyrics to
a song because the pitch fell outside one’s hearing range provides meager insight
into the workings of society.
Detection of stimuli conveying a meme is a necessary condition for meme
transmission. This condition is somewhat lax, however. A variety of modes of
transmission may exist and only one viable transmission mode must exist. The
syntax-semantics divide allows for multiple representations of the same content
(Halliday, 1978). Practically, this means that a possible meme can be ruled out
only when the meme cannot be transmitted using any combination of available
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behavior and perception. Boundaries separating agents, such as spatial distance
or language barriers, create this effect. Behavior, memes, and social factors will
control some of these boundaries. For example, free individuals choose the context
and persons they interact with. For the first order examination, these barriers
can be taken as external to the model. This is because at any particular point in
time, the physical barriers operate independently of their cause.
When agents interact, even in a limited manner, disproving the possibility
of a physical transmission requires the proof of a negative: that no syntactic
representation can spread the semantic information socially. Incommunicable
learning such as the experience of color (qualia) and muscle memory exist, but
these cases approach questions outside the useful scope of meme analysis. While
it is important to establish conditions which debunk the existence of a meme,
sensory constraints tell little about the vast possibilities for social learning in
a human population. At the first order, physical barriers are a straightforward
filter on the ability to detect a meme.
3.3.3 Evolutionary Mechanisms
When looking at memes, transmission of a meme supports inheritance while
noise introduces variation. The balance between these mechanisms guides a
meme’s evolution. A perfectly reproduced meme cannot evolve, a competitive
disadvantage. Conversely, a potential meme with a poor signal to noise ratio
may totally lose the original signal. The received signal might or might not
constitute a meme. Even if the received signal was a meme, no meme would
have reproduced since the new meme did not inherit from the old meme. The
game “Telephone” exemplifies this effect, where a message passed along a ring of
players seldom bears any semantic resemblance to the original message.
High information messages suffer more from noise. In information theory,
a random message holds the most information because no pieces may be
inferred from other portions of the message. Treating the meme as a message,
three implications emerge. Firstly, a lower information meme should undergo
less variation per length of message. Secondly, a meme which fits expected
transmissions will be corrected more effectively and create less variation. Thirdly,
memes may not transfer properly due to their similarity with another meme. In
this case, correcting for noise introduced with the meme will convert it to a known
meme.
Signal transmissions depend on the signal to noise ratio, noise characteristics,
and correction process. Research on noise sources, signal quality, and encoding
techniques provides insight which should be applicable in estimating the variation
of memes in transmission. Productive research on these topics at the theoretical
and practical levels can be found in diachronic linguistics literature, which
examines the evolution of words (Labov, 1994).
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Defining noise requires defining a signal, allowing analysis of the signal to
noise ratio. The nature of noise reduction and error correction processes in
organisms is not well understood, an open question relevant to memetics. From
an agent’s standpoint, a meme holds no intrinsic status as a “meme of interest.”
On the contrary, if an agent needed to expect a meme to learn a meme then
it would not be very effective. Memes differ from other information because
of how agents react to processing them, not because they have the ability to
access some special meme processing mechanisms. How an agent attends to and
acquires memes cannot differ from its normal perceptual process. The nature of
perception and attention places bounds on the fitness of memes. Motivation to
retransmit a meme also must play a role. Understanding these processes requires
understanding the organism receiving a meme, which will be framed using social
learning theories.
3.4 Memes As Social Learning
Meme theory must be considered as a recursive expansion of social learning,
concerned with individual interactions for their influence on the cultural plane.
Behavioral psychologists have identified a number of distinct mechanisms by
which animals acquire behavior from other animals (Zentall, 2007). While not
all memes involve imitation, every case of true imitation may be considered a
meme. Appendix B notes the different mechanisms identified and if such learning
constitutes a meme. Blackmore (1999) addresses imitation mechanisms in The
Meme Machine, providing a complementary account for these distinctions.
Within the context of a single meme replication, social learning theory outlines
a mechanism through which agents process and reproduce memes. The Bandura
(1986) observational learning process proposes that humans pass knowledge
through processes of attention, retention, motivation, and production. Attention
is the process that filters signals out of the environmental medium. Retention is
the process that stores a meme, allowing that information to influence behavior.
Motivation is the process by which an agent chooses which behaviors to express,
selecting between memes. Production is the process that produces behavior out
of agents’ goals. These processes dovetail with the effects of information theory,
providing a system for syntactic and semantic transmission.
Observational learning defines cognitive processes connecting perception with
behavior. Agents receive information through perception, with memes being one
type of information. The key processes of interest in perception are stimulation,
attention, and interpretation (James, 1890). Stimulation determines an agent’s
inputs, attention determines filters on inputs, and interpretation converges on a
meaning for the configuration of inputs. These processes determine what can be
detected (stimulation), what is detected (attention), and what the stimuli means
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(interpretation). Using perception and cognitive processes, an agent regulates
their behavior.
Stimulation and behavior’s role in memes has often been addressed from a
deterministic stimulus-response (S-R) behavioralist perspective. This approach
ignores the cognitive machinery that determines how and why a meme might
be reproduced. The “thought virus” view of memes adoptions fosters this
attitude, removing much of the importance of the agent (Dennett, 1995). It
is a useful analogy but not a useful explanation. Social cognitive theory acts
as a cognitive bridge between stimulation and behavior, providing a framework
for interpretation of perception and its influence on behavioral patterns. Each
process of observational learning has a key role in the reproduction of a meme.
3.4.1 Attention
Attention interacts with both the semantic content and the physical content
of a message. Attention provides a process that solves the problem of which
stimuli over time constitute a signal. To receive a meme transmission, an agent
must attend to it. In this context, passive and active attention will not be
differentiated; either may influence social learning.
Attention is a limited resource. Within a complex environment, an agent
cannot process all signals completely. The cocktail party effect demonstrates that
in processing speech, attending to one speaker significantly reduces attention to
a second simultaneous speaker (Cherry, 1953). Attending to one signal can mean
attenuating a competing signal. For this reason, attention will be treated as
a signal filter. By treating some signal characteristics as noise, others may be
analyzed coherently.
Two types of attention exist: early selection and late selection. Early selection
attention filters based upon raw physical qualities (Treisman & Gelade, 1980).
The bandwidth filter on a radio operates along this principle. Late selection
attention filters based on semantic content contained in a signal (Deutsch &
Deutsch, 1963; Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Attending to one’s name in a
noisy room exemplifies this effect. Early and late selection are not exclusive,
with psychology and machine vision utilizing a combination of filters approach
(Johnston & Dark, 1986; Backer, Mertsching, & Bollmann, 2001).
The Attentional Bottleneck
Due to the complexities of a real society, attention could be the primary mediating
factor of meme reproduction. The likelihood of a bottleneck at this stage can be
explained using information theory. This analysis ignores the effects of signal
interference, but this effect should not change the intuition gained.
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Queuing theory can be applied to generate an estimate of the total social
information transmitted. Assume a society S of N agents, with each agent a
participating in a similar behavior Ba. Signs of behavior are generated with
some arrival rate λBa . These signs exist for some variable length tBa , with mean
duration µBa . An M/M/∞ queue approximation yields the average number of
an agent’s signs in the system, shown in Eqn. 3.3.
E[]Signsa] = λBa × µBa (3.3)
N agents acting simultaneously will create N sets of distinct signs at each given
point in time. Assuming an agent physically can detect all signs of behavior, the
steady state number of signs in the system (E[]Signs]) may be stated as Eqn. 3.4.
This expression sidesteps the effects of interference, which might be represented
by shorter average durations. This amount of information does not even account
for attention to internal feedback for behavior or non-social information within
the environment.
E[]Signs] = E[
N∑
a
]Signsa] = N × λBa × µBa (3.4)
Behavior in progress provides one form of sign, so the term λBa×µBa will always
be greater than one. The number of available signs will be no less than the
number of other agents and could be much greater. While the mean duration
of a sign such as a blink or a clap may be relatively quick, written signs and
constructs survive for generations. While not all signs may be present at any one
time, they all exist in the environment and could potentially be perceived. This
accumulation leads to a vast number of signs.
In a society of five, each agent would need to perceive information at least four
times as quickly as it transmits in order to attend to all the other agents. Sign
language disappears nearly instantaneously after it is presented, staying near this
lower bound. For written language, µBa can be two or more orders of magnitude
higher than λBa . An agent would have to be able to attend all the books written
by other agents while simultaneously watching the next books being written.
Unless an agent’s sensory capabilities take in very little information, processing
every signal will be infeasible and wasteful.
The given example of reading multiple books fully as they are written could
leave you scratching your head. Why would an agent re-read an entire book
instantaneously for every second of its existence, even if it could? The novel
would no longer be novel, so to speak. For an agent that learns and remembers,
a single reading could be sufficient. Novelty is factor that influences attention.
However, novelty is only one of many characteristics affecting information for
processing.
Attentional processes should facilitate processing relevant stimuli (Wickens,
1991). Relevance of information depends on its impact on an agent’s goals and
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needs. Normatively, attended signals should be ones that improve an agent’s
ability to complete their goals. Attenuation theories propose that unattended
stimuli are tuned out, freeing cognitive resources to process the remaining inputs
(Eysenck, 1982). Identifying relevant stimuli and events poses a non-trivial
problem.
Attentional Salience
The true relevance of a signal cannot be known, so theories of attention refer
to the salience of a signal (Fazio, RoskosEwoldsen, & Powell, 1994). Salience
may be considered a heuristic for relevance of information for an adaptive agent.
Within this discussion, salience will not refer to the Bandura (1986) view of
salience as the properties of an action. Instead, this discussion uses the broader
concept of perceptional salience as used by William James (1890). Psychology
identifies signal quality (Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980), novelty (James,
1890), motivation (Mogg, Bradley, Hyare, & Lee, 1998), selection (Hastorf &
Cantril, 1954), duration (Shibuya & Bundesen, 1988), and frequency (Lee, Itti,
Koch, & Braun, 1999) as causal factors in mediating attention. Other factors have
been proposed which have merit but will not be discussed due to space constraints.
Pashler (1998) gives a more complete overview of attention literature.
Signal quality commonly refers to metrics such as signal to noise ratio.
From the source’s standpoint, signal quality indicates the preservation of a
transmitted signal. For the receiver, the attentional process must determine
which signals constitute noise. Defining signal quality in these terms would
be circular. The perceived quality of a signal will be considered the ability
to parse semantic information from a signal (Oakley, 2007). A lower quality
signal indicates a less comprehensible signal, impeding assignment of meaning.
Less comprehensible signals appear to receive less attention in humans and other
animals (D. R. Anderson, 1981).
Novelty and surprise lie at the heart of attentional theories based on learning.
In humans and animals, novel information receives more attention (James, 1890).
For an agent capable of pattern memory, unchanging patterns no longer provide
new information. For a learning agent, novel information improves awareness of
the environment.
Signal quality and novelty each support two separate factors, a syntactic
component and a semantic component. A light that begins flashing may be
physically novel but it is devoid of semantic information. Conversely, the flatline
signal for a patient in a hospital provides no syntactic novelty but its continued
presentation signifies the onset of death. Table 3.1 indicates the different types of
factors. The syntactic and semantic components will be assumed to act similarly
and independently, though evidence on this matter is not conclusive.
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Table 3.1: Semantic and Syntactic Attention
Syntax Semantics
Novelty Contrast Unfamiliarity
Signal Separability Comprehensibility
Quality
It should be noted that novelty and quality can work against each other. A
signal consisting of incomprehensible noise holds the most novelty, containing
fully unpredictable information (Shannon, 1948). Noise holds the most syntactic
information and the least semantic information. Bandura (1986, p.59) posits,
“Retention improves by transforming the meaningless into what is already
known,” indicating that familiar information will be more easily received.
Filtering out signals from these extremes forms an adaptive balance, attending
to information that has meaning without being predictable.
Motivation indicates a goal or need state for an agent. Higher motivation
increases the salience of associated stimuli (Fazio et al., 1994). For example,
hungry individuals detect food cues more readily than controls (Mogg et al.,
1998). From an evolutionary standpoint, this increased salience seems readily
explainable. Despite the obvious impact of motivation, measurement and
understanding of the processes that engender motivation are not fully understood.
Motivation will be the focus of Section 3.4.3.
Selection refers to a signal currently undergoing processing. Signals attended
at the current time will be more likely to maintain attention, giving them a higher
salience (Eysenck, 1982). A selected signal has an advantage over unselected
signals, as these receive differentially less processing. Inattentional blindness
demonstrates this effect, where selective attention blocks out otherwise salient
stimuli (Simons & Chabris, 1999).
Duration and frequency of presentation have a contextual value for mediating
attention. Increased duration of presentation gives more time for attention
to fixate on a stimuli (Shibuya & Bundesen, 1988). Increased frequency of
presentation provides more opportunities for a stimuli to receive attention,
reflecting a greater total level of contrast provided over time (Ray, Sawyer, &
Strong, 1971). Habituation works against these mechanisms, reducing the novelty
of a stimulus after many presentations (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972).
These factors have a combined effect on salience which is not well known.
This problem is endemic to experimental study, which is typically designed to
control for the maximum possible factors in order to maximize effect size. As a
result, the covariance between factors is not well understood. Within the larger
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behavioral system, these gaps in knowledge expose avenues for further research
which necessitate modeling assumptions and calibration when simulating memes,
as discussed in Chapter 5.
Attention to Sources
The syntactic and semantic content of a meme’s signs must be filtered by
attention. However, memes are socially transmitted information; they imply a
source. Due to selective attention toward different sources, memes transmitting
from attended sources have a strong advantage. Bandura recognized this
influence, focusing on the source as the “model” for behavior (Bandura, 1986).
In society, sources do not just consist of agents. Signs such as written accounts
and recordings also transmit memes.
Figure 3.7: Scopes of Attention
Communication theory approaches these issues (Schramm, 1963). Three
syntactic scopes exist which require attentional filtering: environment, medium,
and transmission. These scopes have a containership relationship as presented
in Figure 3.7. Semantic information is associated with each level: the content
source in the environment, the signs in the medium, and the semantic content
of the transmission. The existence of different scopes for attention indicates a
hierarchy of attention needed to receive a meme transmission (Oakley, 2007).
For example, imagine a crowded poster session. Within the environment of
the room, posters (mediums) must be identified before their words (transmission)
can be read, and words must be recognized before deciding which words to
read. Semantic cues guide this process. Posters presented by famous renowned
authors (content sources) will draw greater attention, as will posters featuring
more familiar language (signs) and interesting content (semantics).
From the cognitive standpoint, only assumed and perceived semantic cues
matter. Semantic cues may be missing or ambiguous. In particular, the source of
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content often involves significant ambiguity, sometimes intentionally. Semantics
can also interact: a bad idea from a brilliant person makes the person seem
less brilliant. The grounding model of cultural transmission formalizes this
interaction, proposing that message content establishes identity and identity
changes the meaning of content (Kashima, Klein, & Clark, 2007).
Perceptual processes of segmenting the environment, defining perceptual
events, and receiving semantic information each involve attentional processes
(J. J. Gibson, 1986). The tiered nature of attention has major implications for
the spread of memes, especially in an agent that can freely select its interactions.
In order to receive a meme, an agent generally must recognize and attend to its
source. Bandura (1986, p. 54) states, “People are more likely to select models who
are proficient at producing good outcomes...” and “Models who are interesting
and otherwise rewarding tend to be sought out....”
Social psychology research supports these hypotheses for human interaction
(Kelley, 1955). Similar results occur when different source characteristics are
attached to otherwise identical messages (Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996).
Trademarking and branding within marketing attempt to increase attention to
a source of products and information. Social psychology and marketing effects
apply to both attention and motivation processes. Specific social psychology
influences on meme transmission are postponed into the discussion on motivation
in Section 3.4.3.
3.4.2 Retention
Once a meme has been attended to, there must be an effect on the agent’s memory
in order to retain the semantic information in some form. Retention of social
learning necessitates some storage of the semantics related to a meme, which
can later be reflected in their behavioral patterns. Bandura (1986) concentrates
significantly on the symbolic representation of social knowledge. The social
cognitive theory focuses on this matter in a manner more specific than can
be applied to memes in general, concentrating on the representation of action
sequences.
From the meme standpoint, retention matters with regards to how different
semantic information can be retained and recalled. The effects of limitations
on retention, incomplete retention, and addition of contextual information
on memes could provide insight into some mechanisms for variation and
selection. Unfortunately, confounds exist for understanding of retention. Memory
representations cannot be directly measured or mapped (Uttal, 2001). Brain
localization techniques such as fMRI mapping approach this problem, but
currently cannot measure knowledge or infer the semantic web of an individual.
Retention cannot be measured except through changes in behavior. Brain
imaging experiments require baselines and so can only study retention when
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combined with a learning task. This means that retention, motivation, and
production of behavior cannot always be easily disentangled. For example,
proving that organisms forget information has been exceedingly difficult because
there is no way to separate forgetting from an inability to retrieve stored data
(Bjork, 2003).
Research on education and memory has implications for retention of memes.
In particular, the effect of scaffolding on social learning has had a measurable
effect on the ability to reproduce behavior (HmeloSilver, Duncan, & Chinn,
2007). Scaffolding posits that skills and information build off known information
(Vygotsky, 1980). This point was echoed by Bandura, as cited in Section 3.4.1.
For certain knowledge, this effect has intuitive value. Ten years of attending
advanced calculus lectures will not benefit a student as much as a sequenced
curriculum starting with basic math skills. For other types of knowledge, such
a relationship may not hold. For example, languages can be effectively taught
through immersion techniques (Cummins, 1998).
For limited cases involving the ability to learn visible behaviors, social
cognitive theory provides a framework for understanding retention and refining
of stored semantics. For memes in general, the effects of retention on fitness
and variation depend on open questions currently being explored in semiotics
and psychology. It is possible that different types of information could be even
stored by qualitatively different mechanisms, meaning that the content of a meme
influences retention effects. With this stated, some implications from learning
research will be examined for their implications for memes.
Common findings on retention incorporated into learning theories are the
number of presentations, usage of information, and parsing into semantics. The
number of attended presentations increases the likelihood of recall and accuracy
of recognition (Hintzman & Block, 1971). Repetition of information tends to
improve retention as well, forming the basis of rote learning. Understanding
an observed event, rather than rote memorization of physical stimuli, also helps
retention (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). Mnemonic devices provide a method for
adding semantic layers to arbitrary information to harness this effect. While
seemingly obvious, these three factors probably account for much of the variance
in retention.
Surprise-based learning theories such as the Rescorla-Wagner model posit that
learning fits an error correction model (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). The least
expected information provides the highest magnitude of learning in a standard
error correction model. Emotional tagging also appears to play a role in the
encoding and recall of memories (Canli, Zhao, Brewer, Gabrieli, & Cahill, 2000).
Reinforcement learning approaches utilize similar error-correction principles, but
with regard to rewards for behavior (Kaelbling, Littman, & Moore, 1996). Models
of this sort would predict that memes which violate existing knowledge would
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be remembered better. Evidence from cognitive biases and persuasion research
conflicts on this matter, with the confirmation bias showing a preference for
expected information (Nickerson, 1998) but depth of processing metrics showing
additional processing of unexpected information in certain circumstances (Jain
& Maheswaran, 2000).
The Rescorla-Wagner model also exemplifies associative learning. Associative
learning posits that learning consists of associations created in the mind
(Mackintosh, 1983). Stimulus-response (S-R) models commonly assume a single
layer of learning, while connectionist models consider a web of associations
such as a semantic net. The implications of associative learning structures on
meme reproduction are unclear. Associative learning implies connection strengths
between mental constructs, but the nature of the constituent constructs is unclear.
For associative learning to provide insight into memes requires assumptions about
the set of mental constructs, which cannot be readily verified.
Conversely, models such as trained neural nets avoid defining constructs
but depend on their precise configuration of weights (Hebb, 1949). This level
of analysis appears too fine grained for examining memes given the current
state of the art. By depending on combinatorial sets of weights, connectionist
approaches provide limited added insight into the level of retention beyond that
from reinforcement learning. Where a concept association model might require
assuming concepts and connections, a neural net requires assuming the number
of neurons and layers plus a myriad of weights with unclear meaning. This does
not mean to imply that neural network models of the mind are incorrect; they
aim toward an analogue of the human brain. However, they are limited in their
insight for memes. Neural networks may be useful for determining the maximum
complexity of a meme to be retained, treating them as patterns. They also
offer mechanisms for the degradation of memory patterns through washing out
of weight configurations (Sikstrom, 1999). It is possible that simpler mechanisms
could be employed to attain the same insights, however.
Schema learning theories posit two processes of retention that are of interest:
assimilation and accommodation (Axelrod, 1973; Piaget, 1955). Schemas may
be thought of as abstract patterns, such as the general qualities defining a
tree. Assimilation involves fitting a new stimulus into an existing pattern,
potentially updating the pattern. Another type of retention in a schema pattern,
accommodation, involves defining a new schema. Differentiation is one type
of accommodation, which defines a new schema by its differences from known
schemas. Differentiation might occur when learning which size objects are too
large to grab with one hand, providing a rule to segment the world into what
can and cannot be grasped. Eleanor Gibson has outlined plausible processes for
perceptual learning based upon differentiation, making it a potential mechanism
for other forms of learning (E. J. Gibson & Pick, 2000). Accommodation involves
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updating an existing schema based on new information.
Learning through these schema mechanisms would imply a non-linear
retention curve for memes. Memes too similar to an existing meme would
be absorbed through the assimilation process, potentially losing their unique
information. Conversely, a meme completely unrelated to any known information
might have no base from which to differentiate and be lost. These competing
factors have some similarity to the balance between novelty and content noted
when discussing attention in Section 3.4.1.
Schemas capture similar elements as discussed by Bandura (1986) as symbols.
They also dovetail with a concept-oriented associational approach. While
theoretically appealing, schemas bring significant assumptions which may not
be justified. Research has not proved the existence of unique schemas within
the brain. Multiple schemas could exist independently for the same semantics,
disconnected and assimilating separately. Accommodation might not occur at
all, with each new piece of information retained uniquely (Sadoski, 1991).
The effects of retention on meme reproduction stymie clear solutions.
Fortunately, the implications of retention may not be as problematic within a real
society. Firstly, the vast memory capacity of a human potentially allows for a
proportionally vast number of memes. Over the long run, common factors such as
the number of attended meme expressions probably account for the most variance.
Finally, memes of interest have the potential to be discussed and remembered with
some fidelity. If they could not, it would be exceedingly difficult to study them
academically- one scholar could not readily pass the concept to another scholar.
3.4.3 Motivation
Motivation determines which memes an agent will express. Along with attention,
motivation must be considered a key factor in determining the spread of memes.
Returning to the definition of memes from Section 2.3, motivation determines
the environment, if any, where an agent will express a meme. When and where
an agent expresses a meme can have vital consequences for its transmission.
Consider this meme related to the tragedy of the commons. Assume one
person discovers a way to anonymously steal food from the town granary, but
the people in town might still learn the process of the action from the evidence
left behind. The innovator has strong motivation against using this method in
contexts where other agents could learn the process, as widespread theft would
deplete the granary. As more people learn the practice, the motivation to hide its
details would decrease and the meme could spread freely. Motivation effects might
be particularly important for intellectual property discussions. For example, the
Coca Cola recipe fits this pattern: its value as a brand depends on the secrecy of
the recipe and the motivation for secrecy depends on the value of the brand.
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Stronger perceived incentives toward certain behaviors will influence decision
processes and even unconscious behavior. Psychology and economics literature
both address motivation, unfortunately with only limited dialog between them
(Bruni & Sugden, 2007). Research from each field will be applied to examine
how motivation mediates meme expression and how memes change motivation.
Motivational influences on memes refer to why an agent might express a meme.
Changes to motivation encompass areas such as learning, attitude change, and
persuasion.
Agents have differential motivation to express memes as a function of the
surrounding environment and their mental state, such as goals and affect.
Motivation may be split into the “what” and the “why”: motivators and
valuation. Motivators consist of states or changes which may be internal, such as
pain, or external, such as receiving money (Maslow, 1943). Valuation indicates
a cognitive process which determines the level of activation for behaviors as a
function of their associated motivators (Sugrue, Corrado, & Newsome, 2005).
Figure 3.8 breaks down motivation into components. These components are
integrated upward, forming the agent’s total motivation to express a meme.
The left branch notes properties of a behavior and its results that may be
processed as motivators, such as physical effects (e.g. outcomes). The right
branch indicates personal factors about an agent that would affect their valuation
of these motivators (e.g. desirability of outcomes).
Figure 3.8: Components of Motivation
Economists analyze incentive structures, providing a body of literature
relevant to motivation. Decision theory examines how motivation and available
options map into behavior, with utility theory most commonly explored. Utility
functions may be considered a measure of motivation under this definition,
where the inputs are motivators and the function calculates a valuation (Bell,
Raiffa, & Tversky, 1988). Valuation need not provide a calculable intermediate
value, however. Neural nets and decision field processes can perform robust
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error correction toward goal states without an explicit calculation of motivation
value (Van Gelder, 1999). Intermediate values such as utility can be convenient
for analysis and conceptualization, but this paper will avoid treating them as
describing organic thought.
Bounded rationality conditions indicate that no person could explicitly weigh
and compare all possible behaviors available to them (Simon, 1982). Even
if such a calculation was possible, the level of waste would be evolutionarily
disadvantageous. Agents simply do not weigh each behavior by enumerating its
motivators, applying a value function, and selecting the highest. Even when
humans explicitly attempt multi-attribute comparison of alternatives, they tend
to leave out attributes and show poor internal consistency (Saaty, 1996).
The lack of explicit value calculations and internal consistency raises questions
about the existence of motivators as anything but research constructs. This is
not a fatal flaw to rationality, as the lack of rational behavior for a single decision
may be the result of heuristics that are boundedly rational over many decisions.
Such heuristics will depend on activation of behavior based on internal state and
external stimuli. If an agent activates behavior based upon a combination of
internal state and external stimuli, why must a set of consistent motivators exist
across behaviors? This problem is related to the questions surrounding retention
raised in Section 3.4.2, relating to the cognitive structure of motivation.
Schema theories and generalization principles offer support for common
motivators across a variety of behaviors. In this context, reuse of motivators
provides the ability to assimilate information about a motivator in one context
and generalize this knowledge. A lack of connected motivators would cause
overfitting of motivation, making behavior and motivators hard to generalize.
For example, assume a contractor works two projects that pay in dollars and two
projects that pay in euros. If the value of the dollar drops significantly and the
contractor notes this for one job, they should generalize this knowledge to both
jobs paying in dollars. Since changing the motivator for one job affects another
job, a shared motivator appears likely. Not all motivators necessarily decouple
from behavior, necessitating distinctions between motivators.
Motivators
Separating motivators from behavior allows classification of motivators.
Psychology has analyzed motivations from a variety of standpoints including
biological drives (Hull, 1943), need hierarchies (Maslow, 1943), behavioral
tendencies (Premack, 1963), goal achievement (McClelland, 1976), and
anticipatory self-regulation (Bandura, 1986). No single set of these factors
fully explains motivation and ongoing research attempts to define new sets of
motivators.
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Depending on the semantics of a meme it can create a motivator, a change
of valuation of motivators, or a new behavior that may imply motivators. Two
approaches can be taken to specifying motivators, each with the goal of explaining
variance in motivation to express a meme. For higher fidelity simulation,
motivators may be optimized to explain the most variance. This approach
might mean generating ad hoc motivators by fitting a training data set. For
research, utilizing a set of motivators from literature has advantages. While an
optimized set of motivators might better match a particular situation, comparing
meme spread based on arbitrary motivators lacks theoretical appeal. Employing
theory based motivators also generates feedback as to their explanatory power
and shortcomings.
The social cognitive theory provides a composite view of motivation which
will be used as a starting point. Bandura (1986) categorizes motivation by
its vicariousness, externality, attribution of control, cognitivity, sociality, and
probability. These motivator classifications mix the payoff properties of a
motivator (externality, sociality, cognitivity), the potential results of behavior
(attribution of control, probability), and the method by which the motivator
was learned (vicariousness). A final factor not deeply addressed is contingent
planning, surprising considering the social cognitive theory focuses on anticipated
consequences. Table 3.2 notes parameters likely to influence meme expression.
Table 3.2: Factors of Motivators
Factor Converse Description
Externality Intrinsic/Extrinsic Environmental outcome vs Enjoy act
Sociality Physical/Social Mechanical laws vs Social response
Cognitivity Cognitive/Biological Goal achievement vs Biological drive
Control Internal/External Able to control vs Powerless
Likelihood High/Low Probability of this outcome
Contingencies Plan/No Plan Enables more behavior and motivators
Figure 3.9 represents these factors in a decision theory format (decision,
possible results, possible payoffs). An agent’s internal state and environment
could affect any of these factors and should be considered implicit to this diagram.
This conceptual representation assists discussion of each factor’s influence on
meme expression, but should not be taken as an accurate description of real
human thought processes.
Payoffs of Motivators
The payoffs of motivators provide an interesting path for analysis from the
standpoint of memes. As noted, a major question for memes is why certain agents
reproduce memes while others do not. This question of cultural and individual
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Figure 3.9: Decision Theory Mapping of Motivators
differences can be approached by examining why agents value different behaviors
and outcomes. Externality of motivation has implications for the stability of
meme expression across contexts. Sociality of motivation determines if the
physical or social environment will most influence meme expression. Cognitivity
indicates the strength of experience over nature on meme expression.
While this is an important topic that gives rise to many interesting concepts
and potential experiments for meme transmission, Section 3.4.3 on persuasion
addresses the basic discussion of motivators necessary for understanding the
mechanisms of meme transmission. For additional information, see Appendix D
for a detailed discussion on the theoretical implications of motivator types.
Expected Outcomes of Behavior
An agent’s self-evaluated ability to translate their intent into outcomes will
influence the expression of memes (Bandura, 1986). Two sources add noise in
mapping agent intent into outcomes. Firstly, behavior may have only a limited
or unknown effect on the distribution of possible outcomes. This may be due
to bounds on the precision of action, lack of information about the system,
or constraints imposed by the environment. The attribution of control for an
agent represents their perception of control over this distribution. Secondly, the
distribution of outcomes may be probabilistic or incompletely known. This may
be due to lack of information or fundamentally random elements of the system.
The perceived probability represents the likelihood of a particular outcome from
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a selected distribution. Each factor has a role in mediating meme expression.
There are a variety of ways of looking at the effects of probability and expected
outcomes. There is significant evidence that human handling of probability
is non-normative and often fairly limited. While perceptions of control, risk,
and uncertainty will have effects, these are not a primary focus of this paper.
Accordingly, detailed exploration of psychological mechanisms related to these
effects has been included in Appendix C.
As an alternative perspective, the somatic marker theory posits that decision
making occurs via two qualitatively different processes- one being a filtering
process and the other comparing outcomes based upon a form of subjective utility
(Damasio, 1994). In this view, a significant portion of motivation and selection of
actions would be driven by emotional tagging that would be highly specific to the
individual. This would have some significant implications for the motivation to
express a meme, being a sort of dual-process decision model. In particular, this
sort of theory implicates that emotional tagging forms a significant connection
between retrieval and motivation. From this perspective, the expected outcomes
may be far less important than the emotional tagging from when a meme was
learned and observed.
As such, there is significant active debate as to the relative importance of prior
emotional experiences versus the rational analysis of the expected outcomes. In
a respect, these are two different paths to a common destination. So long as
past emotional tagging is a good indicator of future outcomes, both approaches
should be expected to produce similar decisions. The two approaches diverge if
the outcomes for a decision will be significantly different than prior experiences.
The workings of this mechanism are important to understanding the
motivation process behind choosing to express memes. Somatic markers and
other experiential context cues strengthen the influence of peripheral cues:
context which is not directly related to the semantic content or outcomes of
expressing a meme. In theory, these could result in memes being reproduced
entirely based upon peripheral characteristics. People might learn memes because
of attention to a source and also express those memes entirely due to the positive
markers introduced by the source. As such, social influence could affect attention,
motivation, or both.
Dual process persuasion theories, discussed in Section 3.4.3, have differing
opinions as to the nature and relative influence of central and peripheral
information. From this scholar’s standpoint, theories of emotional decision-
making such as Damasio (1994) have strong parallels with theories of persuasion
such as ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). As such, it seems likely that second-
order effects exist which augment the attractiveness of memes independently of
their semantic content or expression outcomes. Further research on motivation
and decision-making could greatly clarify the role of these different influences on
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meme expression. While such second order effects are not considered within the
computational implementation presented in Chapter 5, they are an important
open question for considering the spread of memes.
Changes in Motivation
Feedback exists between memes and motivation. While motivation affects
meme expression, learning a meme impacts motivation. Memes carry semantic
information, forming a special type of persuasive message. Persuasive messages
can induce attitude change, emotional states, and changes in identity (Wood,
2000). Memes that shift attitudes and values can act in a facilitatory or inhibitory
manner for other memes. Blackmore (1999) uses this effect to support the
memeplexes, an interdependent collection of memes.
If a meme generates new goals or attitudes, it has changed an agent’s
motivation. Several possible avenues exist for change of motivation. These
avenues are not unique to memes but could technically occur due to any new
information. Memes could change motivation by one or more of the following
processes:
1. Creating/destroying motivators
2. Increasing/decreasing the importance of motivators
3. Associating/disassociating motivators with outcomes
Motivation researchers disagree about the degree to which motivators are
dynamic. Herzberg, Mausner, and Snyderman (1993) and Reiss (2004) assume
static sets of motivators, used to evaluate situations. In this view, memes would
be incapable of changing the set of motivators. Other researchers believe that
people learn new motivators by associating a non-motivator with a motivator,
making it a secondary reinforcer (Delgado, Labouliere, & Phelps, 2006). A final
view posits that motivators spawn arbitrarily due to cognitive patterns such as
goals, without requiring association to existing motivators (Sloman, 1998). Under
associative and cognitive perspectives, a meme can create a new motivator. Such
a motivator would influence all related behavior.
Changing the relative importance of motivators slightly could lead to equally
significant changes in behavior. Meme acquisition and expression have the
potential to change the relative importance of motivators. Acquiring a meme
could change the perceived worth of an existing motivator, such as a dieting
meme decreasing the value of fine dining. Expressing a meme could also change
the perceived worth of motivators, such as through familiarity effects (Ortony,
Clore, & Collins, 1988). With respect to memes, motivators of zero weight can be
considered to effectively not exist. In this way, changing valuation can emulate
creation and destruction of motivators.
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A meme could instead provide information which alters the association
between a motivator with either a behavior or an outcome. In this case,
the underlying value of motivators do not change but they relate to behavior
differently. A meme stating that cell phones cause cancer works in this manner.
While it changes neither the value of communication or cancer, associating cancer
with cell phones reduces the motivation to use one. Compared to directly
changing motivators, this mechanism works much more specifically.
Motivator changes may be considered as fundamental valuation changes, while
association changes only represent changes to beliefs about the world state and
its expected outcomes. The differences between them are not as clear in practice,
a problem encountered by imitation research (Zentall, 2007). Associating an
otherwise neutral event with a motivator gives that event motivational value,
coupling the value of that event to its association. This means that while a meme
may measurably alter the motivation to express another meme, the mechanism
for the motivational change could remain unclear.
Persuasion and Attitude Change
Marketing and persuasion research examines the flip side of incentives, how to
increase the attractiveness of attitudes and activities. Memes interact strongly
with attitude change. Memes can be used as a tool in marketing, to spread an
idea or behavior. Viral marketing concepts employ memes (Chielens & Heylighen,
2005). Alternatively, persuasion techniques can be used to alter the social
environment for memes. Raising the demand for wine will drive more people
to learn wine making, for example. Finally, a meme may be conceptualized
as a message in a persuasion framework. Understanding memes as persuasive
messages has interesting implications- a meme is a message capable of persuading
the receiver to transmit it. This final linkage gives traction for understanding
meme dynamics.
Persuasion research gives insight into the dynamics of meme motivation. For
a single presentation, a meme can be directly considered as a persuasive message
designed to inspire retransmission. For the considerable amount of time that
may pass between reception and transmission, persuasion allows a mechanism
for changing the meaning and value of a meme. Generic messages provide one
manner to change the value of meme expression by altering related attitudes.
Repeated presentations of the same meme are a special subset of generic messages.
This discussion of persuasion will start with appeals of different persuasion
processes, then note the different pathways to persuasion, and conclude with
the implications for meme attitudes and expression.
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Persuasive Appeals: The Tripartite Distinction
Current models of persuasion have been converging toward a tripartite model of
persuasion (Wood, 2000). The Wood (2000) tripartite distinction considers three
drives for attitude change: supporting the ego and identity, understanding the
environment, and maintaining social relationships. These distinctions correspond
with different classes of motivators noted in Section 3.4.3. Attitude change
that supports a desired identity generates an intrinsic payoff. Understanding
the environment helps an agent obtain extrinsic payoffs. Maintaining social
relationships helps an agent elicit social rewards. Appendix D provides a
representation and additional discussion of the motivators involved in attitude
change under the tripartite view.
One method to affect the value of a meme relies on changing its implications
for personal identity. This form of persuasion attempts to explicitly change the
intrinsic value of behavior and ideas by associating them with a particular concept
of identity (Wood, 2000). In order to improve motivation to express a meme, it
may be framed as an expression of person’s identity or a preferred identity that
they wish to possess. In this context, meme expression defines who a person
is and how they should feel afterward. Moral appeals and the opinions of role
models employ this form of attitude change.
Two types of identity must be managed: self-identity and the identity
impressed on others (Chaiken, GinerSorolla, & Chen, 1996). Self-identity
connects with ego, as an person selects memes in order to express their
personality. Managing impressions works differently, as a person may choose
expressions that project a desired image. Since the actual opinions of other
people are unknown, this identity still relates to the ego but is mediated by
the inferred beliefs of others. In example, the difference between managing
identity and impressions is one of the factors used to distinguish between guilt
and shame (Elison, 2005). Note that neither desire needs to correlate with
tangible consequences, even social ones. A person’s preferred identities may be
incompatible with their social rewards but still provide intrinsic value.
Motivation to express a meme can be altered by changing a person’s view
of the ground truth of the world. Rather than attempting to associate a meme
with a construct such as popularity, this persuasion process changes context
or implied consequences. Factual appeals succeed when they connect with
a person’s concerns for informational accuracy. New information provides a
fundamental process for learning, making such attitude change normative (Petty
& Cacioppo, 1986). Providing related information and appeals to reason follow
this pattern. By changing the expected consequences, the motivation to express
a meme can be altered. Changes to implied social rewards are an important
subset of such consequences. These three types of appeals can influence an agent
by multiple pathways, either by the direct content of a message or through the
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context.
Pathways to Persuasion: Dual Process Theories
Dual process theories highlight two different pathways for persuasive information,
central and peripheral. The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) theorizes a
process by which this occurs (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). While ELM is an
older dual process model, it provides a good starting point for analysis as it
captures the core insights of dual process persuasion. Dual Process Theories in
Social Psychology by Chaiken and Trope (1999) provides updated and alternative
models which may be useful in examining specific problems.
Dual process persuasion reconnects with the literature on filtering introduced
in the discussion of attention in Section 3.4.1. Dual process theories of attention
utilize similar concepts, filtering by semantics or by physical characteristics
(Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Attention is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for processing. A difference between levels of processing and levels of attention
implies attended but unprocessed information. The distinction may depend
on the time horizon in question, as attended and stored information might be
processed later. For example, a very busy person may overhear a joke but only
process it and laugh when their task is done. Experimentally differentiating
unattended from unprocessed information may be intractable- the observed
behavior will be identical.
ELM states that the central pathway for persuasion requires cognitive
processing of information, while peripheral information is processed by low
cognition heuristics (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The central pathway can
consider the accuracy of information and its contingencies through deep
processing. Central pathway information requires genuinely appealing semantics
and implications. Peripheral information provides cues for opinion and action.
While peripheral information may be pertinent, extraneous information also
affects this channel. The halo effect is an example of a peripheral cue, allowing
an attractive message source to boost the appeal of a message (Kelley, 1955).
In order for a meme to reproduce, a person must process sufficient information
to replicate the meme. This attention constraint requires that central processing
of meme signs must occur at least once before a meme can be reproduced. The
signs of a meme must transmit through a medium and the medium is part of the
larger environment. This means that contextual information surrounds a meme
within the medium and environment. Contextual information will be processed
within both the central and peripheral pathways. Contextual information and
peripheral processing of meme signs have a major role in motivation, showing
why a meme should be expressed.
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Table 3.3: Pathway Effects on Meme Learning
Content (Meme Signs) Context (Source, Environment, Outcomes)
Central Meme Semantics Outcomes of Expression
Peripheral Syntax, Exposures Cues for Expression
Table 3.3 notes the type of information acquired by each pathway. The signs
of a meme provide the core content. Central processing of meme signs allows
learning of meme semantics. As noted earlier, re-expression can only occur when
meme signs are centrally processed. During central processing, the core semantics
of a meme will affect motivation. A chain letter stating “Send this to ten friends
and you will have good luck” employs pure semantic persuasion. One segment
of the memetics community studies the effects of semantic effects on replication,
such as hooks and implied rewards (Bjarneskans, Grønnevik, & Sandberg, 1996,
Fig. 2).
While the semantic information must be obtained to reproduce the meme,
the semantics of a meme are constrained by their credibility. If a meme implies
payoffs for expression, these payoffs might not be grounded in reality. A meme
can contain lies, inaccuracies, and hidden assumptions. This is not necessarily
a hindrance. Research shows that the persuasiveness of a message depends on
its appeal, not its factualness (Wood, 2000). Bounded rationality makes this a
necessity, since no human knows the true “factual” state of the world (Simon,
1982).
Credibility and discrepancy with existing beliefs act as moderators for the
semantic appeal of a message. The counterpart of discrepancy, novelty, has
been discussed previously in Section 3.4.1 on attentional salience. Findings
discussed by Sternthal, Dholakia, and Leavitt (1978) note similar effects on
message processing: low discrepancy messages suffer from low processing and high
discrepancy messages are disregarded. High credibility counteracts the tendency
to disregard high discrepancy messages (Sternthal et al., 1978). Perceived bias in
sending a message reduces the fitness of the message, possibly due to a negative
effect on credibility (Kelley, 1955).
Peripheral processing of meme signs works through an awareness of the
message outside of parsing the semantics. Information with lower relevance will
tend to be taken at face value, through heuristic cues (Oldmeadow, Platow,
Foddy, & Anderson, 2003). Syntax and exposure effects act through peripheral
cues. The syntax of a message provides peripheral cues that may alter its appeal
(Howard, 1997; Sparks & Areni, 2008). Returning to the chain letter meme,
introducing a spelling error could alter the fitness of the meme without changing
the semantics. Exposure effects include the influence of independent sources
and the repetition effect. Research shows that repeated exposures increase the
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cumulative attitude change from a message (Ray & Sawyer, 1971; Ray et al.,
1971). Likewise, multiple independent sources of repetition have greater effect
than a single source (Harkins & Petty, 1987; Schunk, 1987). The emergent
phenomenon from this form of persuasion is known as the bandwagon effect
(Leibenstein, 1950). Fads are a type of meme that rely on this type of persuasion.
The context consists of situational factors involved in meme expression.
During meme expression, an agent interacts with the environment and some
outcomes occur. The source agent, the environment, and the outcomes relate to
the specific instance of meme expression. Every time an agent observes a meme
expression, the appeal of expression will be affected by these contextual factors.
The cumulative sum of exposures will determine the appeal.
The environmental context and perceived outcomes are connected. From a
normative sense, an agent should be learning how meme expression in a certain
environment relates to valued outcomes. This is an input-output relationship,
as noted in the meme reproduction expression (Eqn. 2.1). The environment
and outcomes may be either physical or social. Central pathway processing
involves subjective estimation and valuation of the results of meme expression
across different circumstances. The observed outcomes provide information
about the payoffs of meme expression. Persuasion occurs because an agent
observes desirable or undesirable outcomes from expression, as parameterized
by environmental states and perceived capabilities of the source.
Peripheral processing of the environment and outcomes will generate cues for
meme expression. Environments where meme expression occurs commonly can
provide cues to express the meme in that setting, a form of occasion setting.
Similarly, meme expression may become associated as a cue for certain observed
outcomes purely as a result of repeated pairing. Environment and outcome cues
can change the appeal of a meme by associating it with certain environments
and results in a general sense. For both peripheral and central processing of
these context effects, persuasion occurs through vicarious experience. According
to Bandura (1986), the learning from observing a meme expressed by another
person should be similar to that obtained by expressing the meme personally.
The source of meme expression provides a very different and important
vector for attitude change about a meme. This portion of the context probably
appeals to the intrinsic value of meme expression through social psychology
factors. Central processing of the source’s abilities provide information about
the desirability and transferability of an observed behavior. The source increases
the desirability of expression when they appear to have greater competence for
deciding on behavior (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). A source’s expertise can fit
this mold. As the source’s expertise in relevant decision making increases, the
source’s performed or prescribed behavior becomes more appealing (Cialdini &
Goldstein, 2004).
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Transferability relates to the ability of observed outcomes to generalize from
the source to the receiver. By knowing the source, an observer can correct for
their differences compared to the source when anticipating the outcomes of meme
expression (Bandura, 1986). Source expertise in production ability might reduce
a meme’s fitness via this mechanism. For example, the average person will not feel
competent to imitate the movements of a trained ballet dancer. Persuasiveness
due to transferability interacts with self-efficacy and locus of control, since this
affects attitudes about the control of outcomes (Schunk, 1987).
A second central processing persuasive factor is the connection between the
source’s meme expression and their self identity and social identity. Imitating
agents with desirable social characteristics provides intrinsic motivation because
it reflects desired identities. Role models and reference group members hold
additional persuasive influence (Kameda, Ohtsubo, & Takezawa, 1997). If meme
expression appears connected with maintaining a certain social identity, this will
affect its motivators. Improved social relationships and status imply contingent
social payoffs, making this at least partially extrinsic. Berger and Heath (2007)
note that people actively diverge in behavior primarily to prevent misclassification
in society. This divergence has been shown to be a function of the perceived
dissimilarity of other individuals. Both paths may be likely in this case- people
consciously and unconsciously value behaviors that project their desired social
identity and avoid those which might cause them to be wrongly identified.
The peripheral cues of the source are at least as powerful as the central
ones. Conformity, in-group bias, similarity, authority, and the halo effect alter
the perceived value of imitation. These social biases exert a persuasive force
which will be referred to as social influence. Social influence depends on an
agent’s intrinsic motivation to imitate other agents. In general, humans appear
to have a drive to imitate other individuals, known as herding behavior. The Asch
(1955) study showed that the level of social influence increases with the number
of individuals performing a certain behavior. Tajfel (1982) qualified this result
by establishing that members perceived to be in the same group (an in-group)
have a higher influence than outgroup members. Perceived similarity can also
be a persuasive factor, with similarity positively correlated with persuasiveness
(Platow et al., 2005). Too much similarity has also been proposed as a reason to
diverge however, which means this may form a bell shaped curve or an uncanny
valley effect (Snyder & Fromkin, 1980). Authority can also exert a powerful
influence, even without any coercive power (Milgram, 2004). The halo effect
indicates that attractive and likable individuals have a higher influence (Kelley,
1955). These factors indicate that memes expressed by numerous likable members
of the same group will tend to be attractive, even if the outcomes of expression
appear negative. The effect of social biases as peripheral cues is not prevalent in
meme-centric literature, but these effects have serious implications for the spread
CHAPTER 3. THE MEME PROCESS: A SYSTEMS MODEL FOR MEMES 52
of memes. In particular, these source effects on meme indicates a strong influence
related to the initial population expressing a meme.
ELM provides a good framework for examining the persuasive influence of
memes, but it is not the only dual process theory. Alternative and updated
dual process models may be found in Chaiken and Trope (1999). Examining
the implications of other dual process theories may lead to additional insight
into why certain agents are susceptible to certain memes. While ambiguities and
controversies exist in motivation literature, motivation and persuasion cannot be
sidestepped for serious discussion of memes. The interaction between motivation
and meme expression will be used as the core of a model for meme replication
expressed in Section 5.
3.4.4 Production
The production process of a meme involves a change in behavior based upon
the semantics of the meme. Production involves expressing a meme, creating
signs that might be observed by other individuals. Production can be a hurdle
to replicating a meme, if certain populations are physically unable to express
a meme. When production occurs, it introduces some variation in memes due
to irregularities in the situation and muscle control. Production also offers two
systematic opportunities for mutation in memes: differences in individual ability
and multiple forms of expression.
Barriers to production may occur due to environmental factors. Certain
behaviors interact with tools or other individuals. Such requirements constrain
expression of memes. For example, participation in a three legged race requires
a second person and sufficient space to run. The situational requirements for
meme expression are interesting as they establish spots and contexts where memes
spread. Identifying these contexts provides important information if one seeks to
monitor or influence the spread of a meme. Spot oriented modeling seems suited
to studying these barriers, such as those used in the Novani, Putro, and Deguchi
(2007) pathogen model.
The barrier may be the result of different individual characteristics. These
restrictions mirror the barriers noted for reception in Section 3.4.1. Expressing a
meme may require certain physical capabilities that are not universal. A person
without arms will be unable to imitate clapping, for example. These restrictions
are specific to each meme expression. Within demographics, these physical
differences may play a minor role. Children and adults of different developmental
levels may have significant differences that affect production however. Bandura
(1986) and Piaget, Tomlinson, and Tomlinson (1929) both imply that younger
children may lack necessary faculties to imitate certain behaviors done by older
individuals.
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Differences in individual abilities do not always block meme production.
Humans have a considerable ability to adjust for differences when replicating
behavior. This returns to the concept of transferability noted previously in
Section 3.4.3. A person may express a meme, but it is adjusted for their
individual abilities. The difference may be trivial for observers, in which case
the transmissions will be functionally equivalent. Some differences will result in
different perceived semantics, however. These differences introduce variation and
mutation, creating a variant of the original meme.
Returning to the concept of having no arms, Marty Ravellette was a man
with no arms who drove a car and performed other tasks using his feet (Hayes,
2003). Reconsidering clapping, it is likely that Ravellette learned the cultural
behavior of clapping from other members of society but produced it with his feet
rather than his hands. This is a significant mutation. If Ravellette had been
introduced into a society unfamiliar with clapping, foot clapping could spread as
a meme. Such a population is not as uncommon as one might think- children
are regularly learning cultural behaviors. While not all differences in abilities
are this extreme, even small differences in capabilities can introduce systematic
mutations in meaning through many replications.
A second type of variation for memes results from multiple different
expressions of meme information. Bandura (1977) considered observed behavior,
spoken descriptions, and written descriptions as three fundamentally different
ways to transmit a behavior. A study by Zukow-Goldring and Arbib
(2007) on affordance learning classifies these differently. Scientists taught
affordances by giving scripted verbal instructions, interactive verbal instructions,
guiding subjects’ hands through the behavior, and performing the behavior for
observation.
Examining these two sets of classifications, three factors seem to parameterize
expressions: abstraction, interaction, and concurrency. Table 3.4 notes the
types of expressions capable of transferring the meme information. Abstraction
indicates if a meme is expressed directly or conveyed symbolically. Concrete
replication means directly performing behavior related to a meme, such as using
a technology or following a social norm. Symbolic replication would include a
lingual description, such as instructions or a manual. Some memes do not have a
concrete equivalent and all of their expressions are symbolic, such as a metaphor.
Interaction refers to the ability of an observer to provide input into a meme
expression. One example of interaction is a second agent asking for greater detail
or a rephrasing of a concept. A second type of interaction relies upon a second
agent to act in a particular way to complete a meme, such as a knock-knock joke.
Memes that spread through direct instruction and engagement are interactive,
while those learned by passive observation are non-interactive. While concurrency
is left out from this table, each meme theoretically has a concurrent and non-
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Table 3.4: Types of Meme Transmission
Abstract/Symbolic Concrete
Non-Interactive Description Observed Behavior
Interactive Dialog Collaboration / Assistance
concurrent form. Concurrency refers to if a meme is expressed at the same time
that an agent attempts to emulate the expression. An instruction taught using
“repeat after me” takes advantage of concurrency. Some types of instruction,
such as guiding a child’s hands, require concurrency. These types of meme
expression noted in Table 3.4 have different implications with regard to the type of
variation introduced. Concrete expression allows an observer to view the complete
expression of a meme, situating the behavior in the real world. In theory, this
provides the full information required for replication, but in practice an observer
may not attend to the right details or be unable to sense important information.
Additionally, variation from individual differences will be introduced. Since the
transmission is direct, these errors in transmission will be primarily syntactic.
Conversely, an abstract expression will tend to follow a code or language of
symbols that reduces misunderstandings due to syntax. However, reducing a
complex behavior into a symbolic notation allows for ambiguous statements and
descriptions. Resolving these ambiguities could result in differences between the
source’s description and the receiver’s understanding. For this reason, semantic
variation appears more likely for symbolically expressed memes.
Interaction allows for communication protocols and other systems that reduce
variation (Schramm, 1963). Requests for repetition provide a mechanism to
reduce syntactic mutations, while requests for rephrasing can reduce semantic
errors. Instruction and academics rely upon interaction to ensure that
information is faithfully transmitted. If students were only given books or
rote lectures, small errors could accumulate over generations and undermine the
curriculum.
Production of memes plays an essential role in the evolution of memes.
Variations can be introduced due to syntactic errors and semantic ambiguities.
The production process for a meme, including any symbolic notational system,
will regulate the extent and nature of meme mutation. Linguists and semiotic
researchers study the mutations introduced within language and common
symbolic systems (Christiansen & Kirby, 2003). For concrete expression, the
errors introduced may be specific to an implementation. While the later section
on model implementation does not focus on production processes, this is a
sacrifice made to focus the model on a particular set of parameters. Production
processes warrant study and hopefully memes will be explored further within this
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subdomain.
3.5 Conceptual Model
Pulling together the theory from the prior sections, a full model for memes
comes together. This conceptual model uses the synthesis of observational
learning (Bandura, 1986) and information theory (Shannon, 1948) to organize
the mechanisms that guide meme evolution. This conceptual model has two
parts: the cognition and the transmission. The cognitive models are consistent
across situations, because they relate to human thought processes. While
they are parameterized by individual differences and learning, the underlying
psychological mechanisms have been found to be consistent across individuals
and experiments. The model for transmission is different, varying as a function
of the message, the noise, and the medium.
Figure 3.10: Meme Conceptual Model
A B
Figure 3.10 shows the layout of theoretical concepts as they related to memes.
Part B displays the persuasion conceptual model, which is too detailed to be
contained with the main figure. Each of the concepts mentioned maps to one
or more theories from social science mentioned in the previous section, including
the container concepts. The implementation described in Chapter 5 is derived
from this conceptual map and its related theories, connecting them together
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into a workable model. The theories pertaining to retention and production are
implemented only in a rudimentary fashion, since their dynamics are not vital to
the scenarios examined. However, they are still important parts of the conceptual
model for memes that deserve further study.
This systems approach to modeling memes provides a useful way to explain
reproduction, variation, and selection. However, this model cannot be useful
unless it can be applied to real world problems. To usefully apply the model
to memes, there must be a way to connect memes to empirically measurable
properties. The following section addresses this, focusing on the observability of
memes.
Chapter 4
Observability of Memes
The downside of examining memes as a form of semantic information is that
learning this information is not necessarily observable. To definitively prove
a meme exists, the process of recursive reproduction described in 2.4 must be
measured. Transmission is not the only process which can be examined for
memes, but it is the most fundamental for measurement. If memes cannot be
identified and measured, it is not possible to measure their mutation or their
competition.
Once this process is well understood for a meme, it is straightforward to
study competition between memes by measuring more than one at the same time.
Studying variation requires identifying memes and tracing their variants, which
also requires an understanding of the transmission processes. For the ultimate
goal of measuring the evolution of memes, it is necessary to measure all of these
processes. However, since transmission is not yet well understood, it would be
premature to suggest analytical methods for these more complicated processes.
This section will start by discussing different approaches to measuring and
observing memes. Ultimately, all measurement of memes depends on measuring
behavior or changes in behavior. After this is established, a particular type of
meme that is amenable to measurement will be described. This meme, known
as a socially learned affordance, is information about a possible action in the
environment. This meme, unlike many memes, has a direct behavioral expression
that can be measured.
4.1 Measuring Meme Transmission
Memes cannot be useful within scientific discipline without methods of
measurement. Prevalence and transmission provide useful information for the
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study of memes. Prevalence of meme-related behaviors can provide a metric
for the prevalence of a meme through positive or negative correlations. Meme
transmission gives the ability to discern the existence of a meme from other
types of learning and behavioral change. Meme transmission can be examined
as a pathology and is sometimes simulated using vector-host models (Aunger,
2002).
Table 4.1: Meme Transmission Processes for Measurement
Reproduction
Behavior Reproducing Equilibrium
Activated
Diffusion of Behavior
(Adoption, Innovation)
Entrenched Behavior
(Normal Response)
Inhibited
Displacement of Behavior
(Abandonment, Closeting)
Entrenched Aversion
(Taboo, More)
Two traits affect the applicability of these metrics: dynamics of reproduction
and behavioral activation. Table 4.1 notes categories based upon these
parameters. The reproduction dynamics indicate whether a meme is currently
reaching new people or if all agents in the sample already know the meme.
The behavioral activation indicates if the meme works by increasing particular
behaviors, as opposed to only inhibiting particular behaviors.
For any given population, a meme can either be reproducing or at equilibrium.
If a meme is reproducing, some individuals have the opportunity to spread the
meme to some other individuals who could also spread the meme. Equilibrium
occurs when all possible receptive individuals already possess a meme, preventing
reproduction. A carrier of a meme may update the information related to a meme
when a new meme is presented. This process will not be considered reproduction,
but still indicates meme activity. Saturation is a special case of equilibrium where
all possible agents have received a meme. When a meme saturates the population,
reproduction becomes impossible. Fully entrenched memes cannot reproduce.
Measurement of memes also depends on how they activate behavior. Every
meme must create some change in agent behavior in order to reproduce.
Behavioral activation can be excitatory or inhibitory. An excitatory meme
increases the use of a particular behavior, such as a catch-phrase. If a meme
is associated with a unique behavior, that behavior might be considered the
behavioral expression of the meme. On the converse, an inhibitory meme spreads
through the conspicuous absence of certain interactions. Memes can also use
both mechanisms, exciting some behaviors and inhibiting others.
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4.1.1 Measuring Diffusion of Behavior
Memes are most amenable to analysis when they are reproducing. Reproducing
memes actively spread or die out in a population. Changed behavior and
awareness of new behaviors provide reasonable metrics for meme reproduction.
Transmission cannot be definitively measured unless reproduction occurs. When
diffusion of a meme through a population causes individuals to do certain
behaviors more often, this gives the best opportunity for measurement.
Firstly, this condition allows a researcher to observe reproduction of the meme.
Such a learning measure requires two components. The first measure should infer
if a person does not know the meme without teaching the person the meme.
Using sequential measurements of this sort, a researcher can determine when an
agent learned the meme. The second component is measuring expression of the
meme. Meme expression would be the behavioral patterns increased by knowing
the meme. Such expressions are the opportunities for other agents to learn the
meme. By measuring expressions, a researcher can determine when a person
starts transmitting the meme for others to learn. If this process is measured
from start to finish, the existence of a particular meme can be empirically verified.
Additionally, this approach helps define the semantic information of the meme
since learning is measured separately from expression.
If learning cannot be directly measured, examining memes is more
complicated. Direct measurement of learning may not be possible due to the
possibility of learning the meme during the process. One cannot simply ask,
“Did you hear about the new iPod Nano sale?” since this question causes the
person to learn about the sale. Since indirect measurement is necessary, it may
be unreliable or cost-prohibitive for a large-scale study.
As an alternative to measuring learning, a measurement of diffusion can be
examined by measuring active expression of memes alone. By measuring when
agents are exposed to a meme and when they express the associated behavior,
causality can be inferred between exposure to the meme and the first time an
agent expresses a meme. If an agent is unlikely to perform a behavior for their first
time until they are exposed to a behavior, this indicates that a meme is present.
In this way, the time of an agent’s first expression of a meme can be a metric
for learning. However, since this approach does not directly measure learning it
cannot definitively prove that a meme exists. This measurement approach only
shows that people act as-if a meme exists. Also, it gives far less information
about the exact meme involved. Since the same behavior may transmit different
information due to the context, this approach gives less information about what
has been learned, if anything.
Simple measurement may also be impossible since a meme may increase the
distribution of certain behaviors, such as the frequency that they occur, rather
than the specific behaviors that occur. Such memes will be more complicated to
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study, since statistical tests must be applied to infer that behavior has increased
by a statistically significant margin.
Even with these caveats, measuring memes reproducing by activating new
behaviors or patterns of behavior is the most straightforward case. This case
allows measurement to show that reproduction occurs and allows insight into
what information is spread by the change in behavior. As such, these memes give
the best opportunities for studying meme transmission and prevalence.
4.1.2 Measuring Displacement of Behavior
Measurement of such memes can be measured by the expansion (diffusion) and
contraction (displacement) of behavior (Heylighen, 1998). Displacement is used
in place of the more common term, abandonment, because a meme may force
a behavior to be practiced in secret. For memes, this is functionally equivalent
because a person’s social behavior would imitate abandonment.
Measuring memes through displacement is slightly more complicated than
measuring them through diffusion. When learning a meme increases a certain
behavior, new carriers will tend to take the behavior. If learning a meme tends
to suppress or extinguish a behavior, a researcher must look for a decrease in that
behavior or examine the last time that a person uses such behavior. In this way,
it is straightforward to examine persons who have probably learned the meme.
They previously used the behavior regularly, but after learning the meme use it
less.
The additional difficulty comes from measuring exposure to the meme. If
the meme inhibits a behavior, there are no distinct new behaviors to observe.
Instead, reproduction requires that a behavior is expected to occur but did
not. This means that a researcher has to know the contexts where the inhibited
behavior typically occurred, prior to a person learning a meme. This means that
a researcher needs a third measure: one to determine the contexts where a person
takes the inhibited behavior. If these contexts are unknown, it is impossible to
tell if an agent’s use of a behavior has been inhibited. It is only possible to
measure inhibition if the previous base rates were known.
If this difficulty can be overcome, the reproduction of inhibitory memes can
be studied very similarly to the reproduction of memes that increase certain
behaviors. In both cases, reproduction of memes means that it should be possible
to prove that a meme exists and to examine its spread through society.
4.1.3 Measuring Entrenched Behavior
Once a meme has become universal, if measurable behaviors exist then a meme
should be considered to be active at equilibrium. Memes of this nature will
continue to “preach to the choir.” Equilibrium occurs when all possible receptive
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individuals already possess a meme, preventing reproduction. A carrier of a meme
may update the information related to a meme when a new meme is presented.
This process will not be considered reproduction, but still indicates meme activity.
Saturation is a special case of equilibrium where all possible agents have received a
meme. When a meme saturates the population, reproduction becomes impossible.
Fully entrenched memes cannot reproduce.
Entrenched memes are a tougher target for analysis than reproducing ones.
Without being able to observe the transmission of information, it is difficult to
determine its origins. This makes an entrenched meme difficult to distinguish
from a reaction to shared environment or genetic factors. Cross-cultural and
historical analysis methods from anthropology provide some insight into these
problems but are not useful when the observer’s perspective misses important
information (Ruby, 1982). Assuming the existence of a meme can shed light on
a blind spot but runs the risk of forming false hypotheses.
Testing for the existence of a meme can be important contribution to science,
however. Giddens (1986) theorizes that a significant portion of human behavior
is constrained by structural characteristics of the society, where unconscious
assumptions about the context drive behavior. In some cases, these rules may
benefit society by improving the outcomes of unintended consequences. In other
cases, these blind spots may be the result of path dependent effects, rather than
true reflections of predisposing factors (Margolis & Liebowitz, 1995).
Blind spots tend to be supported by “just-so” hypotheses, which can be
exposed by identifying the mechanisms for adoption. Bans on women in the
US army historically followed an entrenched meme of this nature. Females were
deemed unfit as soldiers because women historically had not been soldiers. This
ban began to break down in WWII with the development of the Women’s Army
Corps and official restrictions on women in combat were lifted in 1994 following
the Gulf War. Role models and counterexamples break down cultural blind spots
and inhibitory memes, a key element of social movements (Brown et al., 2004).
Pluralistic ignorance is an example of a meme which can be displaced in this
way (Prentice & Miller, 1996). During this process, the decline of a meme can
be measured as a counter-meme. In this way, memes can be thought of as one
mechanism fitting into the process of structuration (Giddens, 1986).
At equilibrium, new behavior cannot easily be measured. In active
equilibrium, memes can be measured through behavioral expressions that would
potentially spread a meme. However, widespread expression of behaviors may
have alternative explanations such as individual learning from non-social cues.
The problem is similar to measuring the potential for flu contagion in a epidemic
by counting the number of coughs. Coughs will spread the disease to new hosts,
provided a flu virus causes the coughing. Without proving that a current host can
spread the coughing to a new non-coughing host, no proof exists for the existence
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of the virus. The excessive coughing could be the result of air quality or genetic
factors within a society.
Aggregate measures of behavior may be useful for examining meme prevalence
but cannot prove the existence of a meme. In practice, a meme can never be
in full equilibrium however. Since new infants are blank slates with respect to
memes, children are always entering society who are unaware of particular memes.
As such, it should be theoretically possible examine children to determine if a
behavior emerges from learning a meme or if it is simply a result of individual
learning within a shared environment. Appendix B notes some of the ways that
imitation can be distinguished from other mechanisms that alter behavior.
Measurement of reproduction over a limited and vulnerable sample, such as
children, may not always be practical. As an alternative, it may be worthwhile
to search for meme variation. An entrenched meme may have multiple variants,
under a more fine-grained level of analysis. As such, in some cases it may be
possible to break the analysis of an entrenched meme into a problem of examining
a set of similar memes that actively reproduce. However, this requires examining
the differences in learning and expression that are specific to each particular
variant. This reduces to an issue of speciation, explained in more detail in
Appendix A.
In general, limited analysis can be performed of memes that are at
equilibrium. Only the prevalence of meme expression can be reliably measured.
As such, the preferred solution to examining memes in this case would be to
attempt to re-formulate the analysis to look at population subsets where the
meme is not at equilibrium or to change the level of analysis of the meme to look
at sub-variants that are not at equilibrium.
4.1.4 Measuring Entrenched Aversions
Memes can have an active equilibrium or passive equilibrium. Active equilibriums
display behavior excited by memes, as described in the prior section. Memes at
passive equilibrium represent inhibitors or have conditions for exciting behavior
that are contingent on encountering a non-carrier. For example, a meme against
smoking could inhibit smoking and include a verbal reaction when in the context
of a smoker. Measuring memes at passive equilibrium is the hardest case.
Memes in passive equilibrium are harder to measure as they represent
inhibitors. The prevalence of inhibitory memes may only be possible to measure
through perturbation- aversion against certain behaviors. An excitatory meme
spreads a behavior which would otherwise be less likely to perform by chance,
since then the behavior will be learned socially rather than independently.
Conversely, an inhibitory meme may not spread unless the associated behavior
can be readily deduced- the person needs to know that the behavior exists before
they can inhibit it.
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Measuring inhibitory memes at equilibrium may only be possible through
cross-cultural comparison. Western practices inhibit eating spaghetti raw. Left
to discover spaghetti when hungry, a person might easily begin to start chewing on
it. For a person encountering spaghetti within Western culture, the conspicuous
absence of people eating spaghetti raw can spread such a meme. The new person
will avoid the spaghetti and can similarly propagate the meme as a result. For
a less obviously edible food such as cacti, inhibition of behavior might not be
sufficient to propagate the information.
Children can initially fail to understand inhibitory memes. Martin Luther
King Jr. related a powerful example of this in his autobiography:
The climax came when he told me one day that his father had
demanded that he would play with me no more. I never will forget
what a great shock this was to me. I immediately asked my parents
about the motive behind such a statement (King, 1998).
Likewise, child abuse victims often take many years to realize that their
experiences violate cultural norms (CrossonTower, 1999). While this paper
focuses on memes that may be actively measured by reproduction or activity,
analyzing and manipulating inhibitory memes has broad implications for social
justice.
Measuring a fully entrenched inhibitory meme may be impossible in some
cases. With no obvious signs to indicate that expression occurs and no clear
indications that learning occurs, there is very little to measure. Inhibitory memes
cannot be measured for prevalence, though their associated behaviors may be
examined for relative prevalence between different cultures. However, inhibitory
memes may still be amenable to study in smaller populations by using cross-
cultural comparisons or learning among children.
4.2 Socially Learned Affordances
One type of meme that is particularly amenable to measurement is a socially
learned affordance. In perception theory, an affordance is a relationship between
an organism and a part of its environment that allows a particular type of
action (J. J. Gibson, 1979). For example, a human has the affordance to
swing a hammer. A goldfish does not have this affordance, as it has no hands.
The ecological approach to perception posits that the environment is perceived
in terms of the affordances that it offers, referred to as direct perception.
Affordances always exist- they represent the potential for action.
Affordances are not always known, however. For example, a hidden light
switch always offers the affordance to be turned on by pressing it. However, until
the switch is identified it represents a “hidden affordance.” A hidden affordance
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is a potential for action that an organism is not aware of yet. Likewise, a fake
switch may not offer an affordance but could be misidentified, a “false affordance.”
As shown in Figure 4.1, Gaver (1991) framed this issue using two orthogonal
aspects: 1. Is an affordance available? and 2. Is the affordance perceptible?. By
learning an affordance, an agent moves from having a hidden affordance to having
a perceptible affordance (known affordance). In this way, an agent becomes aware
of a new action opportunity. Social learning is one way for this learning to occur.
Figure 4.1: Relationship Between Affordances and Perception. Adapted from
Gaver (1991)
Social learning is important because the space of possible actions for human
interaction is vast. Even easily inferred actions can remain unknown, simply
due to competition for attention. Learning by observation greatly reduces this
space, exposing an agent to the affordance in practice. Observing such an action
can allow an agent to discover an affordance. If affordances are inferred by
direct observation, this corresponds to learning by imitation. Alternatively,
affordances can be learned indirectly through verbal descriptions and other social
mechanisms.
This behavior fits the basic requirement for a meme: it is information
that replicates socially. Affordances also fulfill the requirements for evolution.
Reproduction can occur socially, as by imitation. Variation is introduced when
performing and observing the action. Competition occurs between observing
affordances and attending to other environmental information.
The possibilities to open a door, buy a product, or clap hands are all
affordances. Affordances have varying degrees of variation. An affordance such
as using a doorknob is unlikely to have much persistent variation. Conversely,
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imitating a dance sequence will be prone to significant variation. As a result,
affordance learning gives the opportunity to study evolving and non-evolving
memes.
Affordances are amenable for study because they are readily observable. Since
affordance learning allows an agent to recognize new opportunities for action, it
will typically activate behavior. Since agent learns about the behavior itself, this
grounds the learning in a directly observable phenomenon. As such, a socially
learned affordance can be used as an observable meme. Novel actions, such
as learning a new computer GUI, or strategies, such as learning a new chess
maneuver, can be examined as part of this category.
The semantic information of an affordance is observable- by intentionally
performing the action, an agent demonstrates their awareness of the affordance.
Affordance learning requires that an agent becomes aware of a new action
possibility. This possibility may be a specific action available on a specific object
in its environment, or a more general learning about the possibility to perform an
action when certain conditions exist in its environment. Either way, such learning
is a necessary requisite for the agent to intentionally perform the action. When
agent performs an action, they demonstrate that they have learned about that
affordance.
However, this does not prove that the affordance was learned socially. This
is because we cannot directly measure learning or knowledge. This is a common
issue with learning research- even if learning appears to have occurred, multiple
kinds of learning could be responsible for the same behavioral changes. Even in
the most direct form, imitation, researchers must take great pains to ensure that
behavioral changes are caused by learning an action rather than mimicry or by
increasing the attractiveness of an already-known action Zentall (2007).
Even if one can prove the diffusion of a behavior- this does not prove the
learning of the affordance for that behavior. Even if the existence of a meme can
be demonstrated, where recursive social learning leads to the diffusion of an action
for the first time, this does not guarantee that any affordance was socially learned.
For example, imagine a species who knows how to eat berries (an affordance) but
naturally fears that red berries are poisonous. If an innovator ate red berries
and had no negative outcomes, other members of the species might observe and
lose their fear of berries. This would cause a diffusion of behavior, without a
diffusion of an affordance. The meme in this case would be the knowledge that
red berries are non-poisonous. For this reason, a field study will at best be able
to use diffusion of behavior to indicate that some meme exists- not be able to
prove that the affordance was the meme.
Despite this limitation, treating the spread of behavior as-if it were the spread
of affordance awareness is a useful approach. This approach can demonstrate that
a meme appears to exist, where that meme is either awareness of the affordance or
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some piece of information that significantly increases the salience or attractiveness
affordance. If the study population appears unlikely to have prior awareness of the
action (i.e. they never performed that action before), this implies that affordance
learning is the most likely mechanism. In this case, assuming behavior spread due
to affordance learning may be a reasonable assumption. Moving from reasonable
assumptions to proving affordance learning requires deeper measurements. To
measure the type of semantic information transmitted requires complementary
measurement approaches that help rule out other types of learning that increase
the salience or attractiveness of the affordance. With that said, in many cases a
reasonable assumption may be sufficient for the problem at hand.
Socially learned affordances offer a straightforward way to examine meme
reproduction. If a subset of a population is unaware of an action but can learn
it by observing the action being committed, then this is sufficient for a basic
model of meme transmission. Models of technology diffusion have employed this
principle (Windrum, 1999). Diffusion of innovation may be considered a form of
affordance learning, since new adopters must first become aware of the ability
to use a product. However, the usefulness of the model depends greatly on its
mechanisms. When the discovery process is handled by a simple model (such
as a sigmoid equation), the mechanisms may capture only rates of learning. A
diffusion model using cognitive agents does not just tell how fast diffusion occurs,
it gives insight into who will learn it and why. In the next section, an agent-based
model for simulating socially learned affordances is presented which utilizes key
cognitive mechanisms described in Chapter 3.
Chapter 5
Model Implementation: Agent
Based Approach
Memes reproduce as part of a complex adaptive system. A complex adaptive
system consists of subsystems and relationships, capable of creating emergent
behavior (Holland, 1998). Agent based simulation is an effective method for
examining emergence in this situation. It enables simulation, analysis, and
validation beyond what is possible in a classical mathematical analysis. This
allows simulating a variety of circumstances and dynamics that do not necessarily
have closed form solutions. A second advantage is correspondence: cognitive
agents are an analog for the meme system, allowing implementation of theory
that can be explained and revised.
While the theoretical exploration examined meme evolution in general, the
computational implementation focuses on a limited category of memes. Firstly,
this implementation is tailored to model transmission of a specific type of meme,
a socially transmitted affordance. While this is a subset of memes, it provides a
starting point for studying meme reproduction- the fundamental mechanism of
memes. Secondly, this implementation assumes high fidelity copying of socially
learned affordances (no variation), without copying errors or transmission errors.
Meme variation mechanisms were not implemented for two reasons. Firstly,
the processes that drive variation of socially learned affordances have not been
studied extensively- more empirical study is required to model these descriptively.
Secondly, variation and mutation of memes were not important processes for
the scenarios modeled using the computational model, as described in Section
6. This means that the implemented model is incapable of representing full
meme evolution, and that many of the theoretical contributions from Shannon
(1948) Information Theory are underutilized by this implementation. As such, it
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should be stressed that this computational model is a limited form of the larger
conceptual model for memes described in Chapter 3.
The implementation of the model is an agent based simulation, a subset of
computational models. Computational models are themselves a subset of math
models, enforcing explicit representation of a model. The key advantages of a
computational model are explicit representation of data, simulation, and testing
against empirically collected data sets. For standard pen and paper mathematical
model, these methods are extremely limited since they require explicit derivation.
For open form or chaotic models, computational simulation may be the only
way to examine a non-trivial form of the problem. The main disadvantage of
a computational simulation is that a computer simulation must ultimately be
discrete and Markov in its implementation.
The system for meme reproduction is an environment containing multiple
agents, each capable of behavior and observation. This setup requires models
for the environment and agent cognition. The environment, depending on its
complexity, may require multiple models for interaction and dynamics. Human
cognition involves submodels such as emotion, attention, stress, and decision
making. Models of cognition may make use of many constituent models, such
as decision making strategies that rely on selecting between heuristic strategies
(Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). However, design practices must be followed to
prevent models from losing their connection with theory.
Table 5.1: Mappings from Conceptual Model to Computational Model
Time
Correspondence Instantaneous Dynamic
Single Module Direct Metric
Many Modules Composite Emergent
These practices are explored in depth in Appendix E. This explains the
rationale for a model of models approach, mapping conceptual models to
computational models, and agent based modeling. A primary take away from this
tangent is the types of mappings of literature concepts to computational models.
Table 5.1 notes types of implementations possible. A direct implementation
realizes a conceptual model as a cohesive module in code. A composite
implementation realizes a conceptual model from parts of multiple modules.
While it may not be possible to directly correlate any cohesive piece of code to a
composite implementation, all mechanisms and data for the model exist at each
point in time. A metric implementation represents a conceptual model through
its dynamics over time, such as a how a cellular automata can represent market
equilibria. An emergent implementation does not exist at any given point in
time, but is evident in the dynamics of the computational model over time. Each
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implemented model fit one of these forms, with the model for meme transmission
being an emergent model out of these.
5.1 Agent Based Simulation
Memes will be studied by implementing an agent based simulation where socially
learned affordances can be studied as memes. Socially learned affordances were
chosen due to their observability, as noted in Section 4.2. Building an agent
based simulation requires three basic designs: the agent, the scenario, and
the simulation. The agents for this simulation are cognitive agents, requiring
extensive design work. This is very different than the agents used for a typical
cellular automata, such as Miller and Page (2004). The scenario is the full
environment, consisting of the arrangement of agents and other entities. The
scenario contains all the information necessary for simulation at any one time,
including the mechanisms for interaction between entities. The simulation
handles sequencing and updating of the scenario to move through time.
The agent based framework used for simulation is PMFServ. PMFServ is
a modeling and simulation framework incorporating cognitive agents through
a model of models approach. A PMFServ standard agent has models for
perception, physiology, stress, emotion, personality, decision making, and basic
social psychology (Silverman, Johns, Cornwell, & O’Brien, 2006). These models
are based on respected social science theory such as the Janis and Mann
(1977) coping style model. Variants of the standard agents have been used
for crowd simulation (Cornwell, Silverman, O’Brien, & Johns, 2002), factional
group simulation (Silverman, Bharathy, Nye, & Smith, 2008), and strategic leader
simulation (Silverman et al., 2007). Agents in PMFServ can be extended by
adding additional models and connecting them with existing models.
The PMFServ framework also allows for non-agent entities such as objects
and groups. Objects are inanimate, but may be perceived and acted upon
by agents. Groups allow explicit representation of membership and authority
structures, which can be important simulations accommodating social identity.
The FactionSim model family uses these capabilities, which are explained in detail
in (Silverman et al., 2008). Figure 5.1 shows the FactionSim design, accompanied
by the modeling methodology. FactionSim treats groups using a containership
pattern, where an agent is either in a group or out of a group. It is an external
social identity, as opposed to an agent’s internal preference.
A PMFServ scenario contains a collection of agents, objects, and groups.
These objects are designed to represent the environment in PMFServ, allowing
opportunities for interaction. The simulation is used to coordinate their
interactions over time. These will each be discussed in depth.
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Figure 5.1: FactionSim Diagram and Methodology
5.2 Cognitive Model Architecture
The Bandura (1986) model of observational learning was the central theory for
the conceptual model for cognition. This can be mapped to a computational
model for agents, known as the OODA loop. An OODA loop agent follows
a stimulus-behavior pattern whose steps include observing, orienting, deciding,
and acting (Tweedale et al., 2007). Revising Figure 3.5, the system may instead
be expressed as in Figure 5.2. OODA loops have received significant attention
in studying individual and organizational behavior, particularly decision making
(Tweedale et al., 2007). The block diagram deviates from a classical OODA
loop terminology, which may make mapping these two systems ambiguous. The
OODA steps are noted with grey labels within Figure 5.2. Memes in an OODA
loop framework rely upon an agent acting out a meme. Other agents may observe
the meme. Some of these agents may orient to this meme through a learning
process. Given a certain orientation to events, an OODA agent will decide to act
such that the meme will be transmitted once more. OODA agents are of interest
for simulation, since software practices and frameworks exist for implementing
OODA loop agents. PMFServ implements OODA loop agents, which can be
extended to fulfill the requirements for meme reproduction.
The PMFServ agent has cognitive models which handle perception of events
and decision making. It also has an advanced subjective utility function, based
upon a hierarchy of importance weights known as a GSP tree. The GSP, short
for Goals, Standards, and Preferences, is the personality of an agent. Each tree
is a hierarchal set of nodes, where the weight assigned to each node determines
its relative importance for decision making. In theoretical terms, this tree may
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Figure 5.2: Agent OODA Loop
be considered to use Bayesian or importance weights- depending on the usage.
Differences in the structure and weights of this tree change an agent’s valuation
of actions and outcomes, explained in greater detail in Silverman et al. (2006). A
standardized tree structure is provided, which is based upon factors based partly
on trait theory from Hermann (2003), House (2004), and other researchers.
The PMFServ framework marks up actions with their motivators, referred to as
“activations” for behavior. The tree structure is flexible enough to implement
biological, cognitive, material, and social motivators. Valuation of actions is a
function of the GSP and motivators for an action. In PMFServ, these motivators
are referred to as “activations” for behavior and may be positive or negative.
Each activation corresponds to a GSP node. The functionality provided by the
GSP tree and subjective utility are sufficient to handle the valuation necessary
for the motivation step of observational learning.
The standard agent in PMFServ has been made capable of spreading memes
by adding new models and extending existing models. Meme processing required
new cognitive models for attention and learning. It also required extensions to
the perception and social modules. Figure 5.3 shows a diagram of the PMFServ
module structure, with the extensions required for memes highlighted. The
attention, perception, and social influence model implementations are intended
to be general enough to work for a variety of different types of memes.
The connections between these models are noted in Figure 5.4. The major
additions will be discussed in the following subsections on attention and social
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Figure 5.3: Meme-Capable PMFServ Agent
influence. It should be noted that for most of these theories, quantitative
curves have not been derived. Most of these social science models state two
possible conditions, with different behavior, or a curve which lacks exact definition
or scaling. For this implementation, unspecified functional relationships for
conceptual models are implemented using the simplest polynomial possible.
However, the model design ensures that these functions are easily substituted
for more complicated relationships.
Not all aspects of the conceptual model have been added to this
implementation. A conscious decision was made to focus on the attention
and motivational aspects of meme transmission, as opposed to the memory
or production aspects. Figure 5.5 designates aspects of the conceptual model
that have been added to the PMFServ cognitive model in order to model meme
transmission.
5.2.1 From Event Processing To Social Learning
The new cognitive components have been added into the PMFServ architecture
and interact with the objects and data utilized by this architecture. In PMFServ,
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Figure 5.4: Cognitive Model Connections
agent actions generate events. A typical event in PMFServ includes at least an
actor (agent initiating the event) and an action that the actor is performing. It
may also include additional information such as a target of the action or results
from the action. For a standard PMFServ agent, all observed events are processed
fully and the agent’s emotional response to them is stored.
Table 5.2: Standard PMFServ Event
Actor Action Target Result
The new cognitive components allow agents to filter the events that they
perceive based upon attention constraints, typically a more realistic scenario
for simulating humans. This filtering is done based upon an attention salience
factor whose calculation is based on the actor, action, and the agents’ emotional
response to the event. All events observed simultaneously will be processed by
the attention model as a group, which will affect the probability of each event
being attended. This is primarily because agents are only able to attend to a
limited number of events simultaneously and will tend to miss more events in a
busy environment.
If an event is attended, it will reach the learning and memory models.
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Figure 5.5: Meme Conceptual Model (Implemented)
A B
These models determine if information about the event is retained and which
information is retained. Learning is determined by a fully random learning factor
which randomly decides which events are stored. The memory model stores
all such events in an associative memory structure which can keep track of the
number of exposures to any particular entity, such as an agent or an action. The
memory model can also keep track of the number of exposures where certain
agents or actions were observed together.
Storing copies of actions is important to this model, since the perceptual
system is set up to only look for actions which are in memory. This represents
the need to remember that one can perform an action before perceiving it as an
affordance in the environment. In the current model, such learning can only occur
due to observational learning. In real life people sometimes infer the existence of
novel actions, but that functionality was not necessary for the memes of interest
in this project.
By extending the agents’ cognitive model for processing events and noticing
affordances, PMFServ agents have been made meme-capable. If an agent with
knowledge of a new action performed that action in front of other such agents,
the action could be learned by those agents and imitated. Each new cognitive
component added to the PMFServ agent cognitive model extends the agent’s
ability to analyze events, actions, and agents in their environment.
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5.2.2 Social Influence Module
The social influence model set is the first major addition. These models store
and calculate social relationships between an agent and its peers. Each submodel
calculates a metric for social influence, each of which is used by the motivation
mechanism for attention. This allows agents to pay more attention to agents with
a high degree of social influence upon them, an important factor in how memes
spread within a society.
All factors contained in the social module are relationships toward other
agents. The PMFServ standard relationship model implements social factors for
valence and agency. Valence is the like or dislike toward another agent. Agency
is the level to which the other person is perceived as human and an actor in the
environment. The social identity model is a separate model which keeps track of
group affiliations, strength of membership, and roles in groups.
Table 5.3: Theories Implemented in Social Influence Module
Theory Source Implementation
Dual Process Persuasion Petty and Cacioppo (1986) Composite (Partial)
Conformity Asch (1955) Direct
Similarity Platow et al. (2005) Composite
Halo/Valence Kelley (1955) Direct
Authority Milgram (2004) Direct
In-Group Tajfel (1982) Composite
Reference Group Kameda et al. (1997) Composite
Transferability Bandura (1986) Direct (Partial)
The social influence theories used to design the social influence model set are
noted in Table 5.3∗. Each of these factors are used as inputs to the attention
model, explained in Section 5.2.5. These factors are also used to help mark up
an agent’s perception of the environment, by adding activations as a function of
social influence factors. The mechanisms for applying these additional activations
are applied at the scenario level, as part of the perceptual mark ups. This
allows them to be processed using the standard decision making algorithm. Each
component of social influence will be discussed briefly to explain its contribution.
Dual Process Theories of Persuasion
The dual process persuasion theory has been used as a guideline in the design of
event processing but has not been directly instantiated with detailed dynamics
of specific dual process models as discussed by Chaiken and Trope (1999).
∗A credibility component was also designed but was not used during the design process
because insufficient data was available to initialize this model.
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The dual process theory has been applied to help differentiate between central
and peripheral factors, a key aspect of Petty and Cacioppo (1986) Elaboration
Likelihood Model (ELM). Within the context of processing an event, central
processing evaluates the actions and outcomes involved. This is because an
event’s action is activity (signal) that an agent sends into the environment.
Aspects of the agents involved may also be considered, but will not be considered
in isolation. Peripheral factors within the PMFServ cognitive model are those
which depend only on the relationship between the perceiver and the observed
agent.
The social components are primarily peripheral factors, with respect to
attention and persuasion. Conformity, similarity, valence influence, authority,
ingroup membership, and group reference value are peripheral cues used by
the agent cognitive model. Purely central cues include novelty and repeated
exposures. These cues will be discussed in the section on the attention
module (5.2.5). Motivated attention, selective attention, and transferability have
peripheral and central components, so these are counted as central processing.
While these classifications are not stated at the code level, they provide interesting
semantic considerations for how these components contribute to the cognitive
model.
Conformity Influence Model
The conformity model has its theoretical roots in the seminal work done by
Asch (1955). Later work by Tanford and Penrod (1984) proposed the Social
Information Model (SIM), a probabilistic conformity influence function. Using
this function, a curve was derived for conformity influence based upon upon the
number of conforming agents and the number of dissenting agents. This two-
input function was used as the basis for the conformity influence model added to
PMFServ. The Tanford and Penrod (1984) analysis produced a curve as stated
in Equation 5.1, where S is the number of influence sources and T is the total
number of targets (naive agents that are not influence sources).
ConformityInfluence(S, T ) = e−4∗e
−S1.75
T (5.1)
The implemented conformity model uses this equation verbatim. However,
the context of its usage is slightly different than that of the original SIM model.
While that model assumed a set of confederates, these models assume agents
act based upon their own opinions but still exert influence. As such, any set of
agents engaged in a particular activity form a group of influence sources (S). The
remaining agents involved in other activities are the target group (T ).
As such, agents can calculate the conformity influence of any activity in the
simulation as a function of the number of agents it sees engaging in the action
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versus those who are not engaged in the action. This conformity term is then
passed to other models such as attentional salience, to determine how an agent
learns and behaves.
Similarity Influence Model
The similarity model calculates a social influence factor based upon how much
an agent feels it has in common with another agent. The influence of similarity
on attention and influence has been an influential topic in the domains of social
psychology and social network analysis (Platow et al., 2005). In a real social
environment, this type of influence is quite complex due to the subjectivity and
iterative nature of determining who is similar to oneself. Perceptions of similarity
are based off of behavior, social cues, and secondhand knowledge.
Normatively, similarity between beliefs helps agents determine who is likely
to want to engage in similar behavior, such as common interests. Work using
PMFServ has approached this issue, by attempting to build models of others’
beliefs using parameter estimation approaches (Johns, 2007). However, this work
used primarily normative approaches such as simplex optimization and would not
be appropriate for this project, which attempts to descriptively model humans.
However, modeling how humans estimate similarity in a descriptively detailed
way is a complex issue. Social cues such as clothing, speech, and other commonly
studied metrics are too fine grained for the scope of this project.
PMFServ contains a second model for estimating similarity, known as GSP
congruence (Silverman et al., 2006). This model assumes that agents accurately
perceive the similarity of other agent’s personalities with respect to their own. As
noted, the GSP model in PMFServ is a hierarchal set of weighted nodes. In order
to calculate GSP congruence, the two agents’ GSP trees are transformed into
vectors of normalized linear weights. Each element of these vectors represents
specific personality trait. GSP congruence is calculated as a distance between
these vectors. The standard GSP congruence function is shown in Equation 5.2,
where
−−−−→
WGSP1 is the perceiving agent’s GSP vector,
−−−−→
WGSP2 is the observed agent’s
GSP vector, and N is the number of elements in
−−−−→
WGSP1.
GSPCongruence(
−−−−→
WGSP1,
−−−−→
WGSP2) =
∑N
i=1(
−−−−→
WGSP1[i]−
−−−−→
WGSP2[i])
2∑N
i=1(
−−−−→
WGSP1[i])2 + (
−−−−→
WGSP2[i])2
(5.2)
By allowing agents to detect this factor without noise, the model assumes that
the agents generally estimate an accurate perception of similarity. This is done
by allowing agents to directly access another agent’s GSP (Goals, Standards,
and Preferences) in order to calculate a similarity metric. This model is typically
applied where agents are expected to have a priori knowledge about other agent’s
personalities, such as agents who have know each other well. Even where agents
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are not familiar, it provides a useful first order estimate of the perceived similarity
which is appropriate when people can quickly generate accurate perceptions of
similarity.
The similarity influence model builds off of the GSP congruence model, using
GSP congruence as a similarity term. This model also operates as a wrapper to
allow subclassing the similarity influence functionality, as not to make it wholly
dependent upon the specific implementation of GSP congruence.
Halo/Valence Influence Model
The valence influence model represents the social influence caused by general like
or dislike of another person. This is related to the “halo effect,” such as where an
attractive person appears more competent (Kelley, 1955). Experiments such as
Hilmert, Kulik, and Christenfeld (2006) have experimentally shown that valence
can affect social influence. Since PMFServ already has a model for maintaining
valence, the valence influence model consumes and exposes this parameter so
that it can be exposed as an influence value. Since valence ranges from [-1,1] in
PMFServ and all influence values are fitted into a range of [0,1], a small transform
is applied to valence values to rescale and shift it into the appropriate range.
Authority Influence Model
The authority influence model represents the additional influence conferred by
a position of authority. The effects of authority on behavior have been well
documented by Milgram (2004) and Mantell (1971). PMFServ has the ability
to represent the authority of agents within the groups which they belong to
(Silverman et al., 2006). This value fits within the appropriate range and has
the appropriate semantic meaning, so the authority influence model wraps and
exposes this authority influence metric so that other models can take this into
account.
In-Group Influence Model
The in-group influence model represents the social influence based on belonging to
a mutual group or clique (Tajfel, 1982). PMFServ has a structure for representing
group membership, which allows members to be part of a group. Similarly, groups
can be arranged in hierarchies that confer membership into supergroups. The
current implementation of in-group influence counts an agent as belonging to the
same in-group only if they share the same primary group. This means that while
in-group influence is technically a value with a range of [0,1], it actually functions
as a boolean value.
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Reference Group Influence Model
Reference group influence represents the influence based on an agent belonging
to a group against which an agent compares themself, such as a desirable group
(Kameda et al., 1997). PMFServ has an analogous factor within its model set
that is an agent’s “internal membership” with a group (Silverman et al., 2006).
Internal membership measures how much an agent desires to participate and
support a group. Since this measure is explored within other papers, it will not
be covered in detail here.
Reference group influence uses a variant of PMFServ internal membership
that has been scaled to fit into a range of [0,1]. This model can report back
the desire to belong in any given agent’s group (if they belong to a group).
This approach to reference group influence has a few important dynamics of
note. Firstly, the value can cover anywhere in the range of [0,1], unlike in-
group influence. This value is also independent of in-group influence, in general.
However, the calculation of internal membership bases some of its parameters
upon the perceived leader of the group being considered. This leader is either
a specifically designated agent, or the agent with the highest authority. In
particular, the GSP congruence of the leader is used as a metric similarity with
the group as a whole. This means that reference group influence and similarity
influence will have some covariance when an agent considers a leader, since the
leader’s parameters represent himself and are partially representing his group’s
influence.
Transferability Influence Model
Transferability influence refers to the additional influence conferred by an agent
who has similar capabilities and does actions that one could imitate. Often, this
trait is studied in children at different developmental stages. Children have a
preference to attend and imitate those of similar ability level on tasks (Bandura,
1986).
The transferability influence model allows agents to process an observed event
and determine if they could do the same action at the current time. This
determination is only based upon the agent’s current affordances at the particular
moment, not any past or potential affordances. This implementation has the
advantage of easily classifying events into those which they could imitate and
those that they could not. However, it is conservative since agents will not assess
an action as transferable (imitable) if it is not currently available- even if they did
that action previously. With that limitation in mind, this implementation still
allows the agent to consider important information about their ability to imitate
an activity and consider that when processing events.
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5.2.3 Memory Module
The memory module implemented for this project is a simple associative structure
that implements encoding, storage, and retrieval processes. Table 5.4 notes
the theories used to construct the memory module. Associative memory works
by strengthening connections between elements stimuli or constructs due to
repeated pairing (Mackintosh, 1983). Association can be considered the strength
of connection between two elements in memory. The memory module is also
intended to model familiarity, which is generally trained using repeated exposures
of the same stimuli or object. In this way, familiarity can be thought of as the
strength of a particular element in memory.
Table 5.4: Theories Implemented in Memory Module
Theory Source Implementation
Associative Learning Mackintosh (1983) Direct (Partial)
Exposure Familiarity Rate Bornstein (1989) Direct
Emotion Tagging of Memory Canli et al. (2000) Direct (Partial)
This memory model implements both of these processes using a very simple
storage mechanism that keeps a record of the events that it has learned. During
the encoding process, each event is broken down into its constituent parts (i.e.
action, actor, target, result). Every encoded event has a unique set of entities
occupying each role. The model keeps a count of how many times each unique
permutation has been stored. Using this data model, it is possible to calculate
the number of recorded exposures to any individual entity (ex. an agent), the
number of recorded exposures to any unstructured set of entities (ex. agent1
seen with agent2), or the number of recorded exposures to any structured set of
entities (ex. agent1 hit agent2).
Memory Encoding
The perception process passes currently observed events to the memory model for
encoding. Before any events are passed to the memory model to be registered,
they must first pass through the attention model (explained in Section 5.2.5).
Attended events reach the memory model, which first passes them to the learning
model. The learning model determines which events an agent stores and what
it stores, which is explained in Section 5.2.4. As a result, the learning model
handles much of the encoding process. After passing events through the learning
model, the encoding process adds additional metadata that tags the event with
an emotional valence and initializes a time value that tracks the age of the event.
Emotional tagging was added to assist with recall functionality, and evidence
suggests that such tags are an important mechanism in memory (Canli et al.,
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2000). After encoding the event information, the storage mechanism handles the
encoded information.
Memory Storage
At the conceptual level, the memory storage mechanism of the memory model is
very simple. Encoded information is stored inside a single entry for each unique
set of event information (which will be referred to as a memory pattern). The
content of each memory pattern entry is defined by the learning model. The
learning model stores the data contained in a standard PMFServ event: actor,
action, target, and result. For a valid entry, at least one of these fields must
contain data, but not all fields have to be defined. This allows the learning model
to store partially processed events where only part of the event was encoded for
storage as a memory pattern.
For each memory pattern, the memory model stores a number of exposures,
a valence, and an age. The number of exposures for an event increases by one
each time an event is stored that matches this memory pattern. When this
occurs, a valence is calculated for the event based upon its activations (emotional
outcomes). This positive or negative valence is added to any prior valence toward
the pattern. Finally, whenever a new exposure is added to the memory pattern,
the age of that pattern is reset to zero. As simulation time passes, this age is
incremented to keep track of the length of time since a particular pattern was
observed. This provides a recency metric for the memory model to use for recall.
Memory Retrieval
The memory model supports two types of retrieval which can be used by an agent:
familiarity and unprimed recall. Familiarity represents an agent’s sense that an
object or action is well known. Within the implemented model, familiarity is
calculated as a function of the number of stored exposures to an entity, counted
across all memory patterns containing that entity. The familiarity calculation
does not consider the role of an agent within a memory pattern, as research
does not seem to indicate that such a distinction is important. The familiarity
equation is stated in Equation 5.3. The input to the equation, Entity, is an
action, agent, or other entity contained within a learned pattern. NE is the
number of exposures to that entity and rf is a familiarity rate that determines the
steepness of the curve. Within the current implementation, rf is set to 0.2 as this
allows familiarity to reach 95% after 15 exposures. Empirical research indicates
that the exposure effect hits its maximum after between 10 and 20 exposures, so
this seemed to be a reasonable familiarity rate (Bornstein, 1989). Familiarity is
used by the novelty model, which has important effects on attention.
Familiarity(Entity) = 1− e−rf∗NE (5.3)
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Unprimed recall deals with the process of an agent producing a pattern in
memory without any particular cue to tell the agent what to think of. This is
the opposite of primed recall, which would be where a cue is given and an agent
produces a response. Unprimed recall is handled by setting up a function that
establishes a recall weight, based upon the valence and age of an event. Equation
5.4 shows the recall weight function, where V al refers to the valence of a pattern
and Age refers to the amount of time units (in simulation steps) that has passed
since the that event was last stored. Of all patterns, the one with the highest
recall weight will be recalled during unprimed recall.
RecallWeight(V al, Age) =
|V al|
1 +Age−e
(5.4)
The unprimed recall equation is not directly used by any other models, but
can be used during agent actions. It is designed to recall a recent, emotionally
charged event. It incorporates some of the insight about emotional tagging on
retrieval (Canli et al., 2000). However, the specific values of the recall weight
function have no theoretical validity and are simply a heuristic for selecting a
memory in an unprimed context.
5.2.4 Learning Model
The learning model is rudimentary and designed only for basic learning of
affordances by random discovery or observation. The conceptual models for
retention are not vital for this study of affordance discovery. This learning
model is sufficient for these scenarios, since the outcomes of the affordance will
be constant and transparent to the agent. The expression model has been kept
simple also, assuming that the only form of transmission possible is performing
the afforded action.
The conceptual models involved in the learning model are noted in Table 5.5.
Perceptual learning is not as richly modeled as stated in E. J. Gibson and Pick
(2000). This implementation of differentiation learning only recognizes unknown
actions from known actions, while accommodation processes only check that an
agent can perform an action. These are sufficient this study of memes, however.
Table 5.5: Theories Implemented in Learning Model
Theory Source Implementation
Affordances E. J. Gibson and Pick (2000) Direct (Partial)
Repetition Effect Ebbinghaus (1913) Emergent (Partial)
The learning model receives knowledge of events passed to it by the perception
model, which filters events using the attention model. The learning model
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processes events and determines what is learned from each event. This model
takes a simple approach of giving each event an independently random chance of
being learned. The model is given a static, global learning probability for each
event. If an agent learns an event, they learn the actor and the action from
that event. This keeps the learning model simple and allows attention to drive
the dynamics for retaining memes. However, the learning model can still handle
dynamics such as the Ebbinghaus (1913) learning curve as needed.
The learning process maintains a memory of affordances within the scenario.
These affordances provide types of possible actions for an agent. By limiting
agents’ actions to the affordances that they are familiar with, agents can socially
learn that they are afforded certain actions. This learning allows memes to
reproduce within the scenario.
5.2.5 Attention Module
Returning to the conceptual model, it is clear that perception is a key gateway
within the model. The standard perception model handles awareness- a listing of
entity and affordances. An agent’s stress level, physiology, emotions, and learning
all affect this vital process. By default, a PMFServ agent perceives all the entities
and affordances in its environment and evaluates them. The attention model
places a filter over this process, limiting the number of entities and actions that
can be evaluated. It also calculates an attentional salience factor. This salience
function calculates the level of attention focused on some other agent performing
an action which has certain results. This salience determines the probability that
an event in the environment will be noticed. A noticed action has the ability to
generate emotions and to allow an agent to learn a new affordance.
Table 5.6: Theories Implemented in Attention Model
Theory Source Implementation
Affordances J. J. Gibson (1986) Composite
Novelty James (1890) Direct
Repeated Exposures Ray and Sawyer (1971) Emergent
Selection Simons and Chabris (1999) Direct
Motivation Fazio et al. (1994) Composite (Partial)
Salience Treisman and Gelade (1980) Composite (Partial)
The attention model is a composite of smaller models implementing the
subcomponents of salience. The constituent attention theories for this model
are displayed in Table 5.6. Salience determines the likelihood of observing an
event, relative to other events occurring simultaneously. Submodels for attention
calculate the motivation, novelty, and selection factors for an event. Each of these
models is implemented only to handle attention to semantics- it is assumed that
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the physical properties (syntax) are equally noticeable. Models for signal quality,
duration, and frequency are not implemented at this time.
Novelty Model
Novelty is a theoretical construct that indicates how “new” a stimulus appears
(James, 1890). Novelty and familiarity would seem to have an inverse connection,
with respect to exposures (Johnston, Hawley, Plewe, Elliott, & DeWitt, 1990).
To harness this, the novelty model accesses a record of the number of exposures
for each action and agent over time and calculates a novelty factor based on the
level of familiarity. The novelty model accomplishes this by reading from the
memory model, which has functions to count the number of exposures and to
calculate a familiarity value. This familiarity value will be explained later in the
section on memory models, Section 5.2.3. For any given event, the novelty is
calculated as the RMS of the familiarity values of the actor of the event and the
action of the event. The novelty calculation for an event is shown in Equation 5.5,
where fActor is the familiarity of the event’s actor and fAction is the familiarity of
the event’s action according to the memory model.
Novelty(Event) =
√
0.5((1− fActor)2 + (1− fAction)2) (5.5)
This representation was chosen because it allows a high degree of novelty
if either component is novel. This dynamic was chosen because it allows
representation of processes such as dishabituation, where adding an additional
stimulus can restore responding to a habituated (familiar) stimulus. In this
context, the response of interest is active attention. This implementation allows
a return to novelty when a highly familiar person suddenly engages in a totally
new action. Conversely, if a straight average was used, then a completely familiar
person could be at most 50% novel. Alternatively, taking the maximum novelty
component would go too far in the opposite direction: giving no additional
novelty to a new person doing a new action as opposed to a new person doing
an old action. While a root mean square may not be the best representation for
combining these terms, it parsimoniously represents these important dynamics
within the simulation.
Repeated Exposures Model
Numerous studies have shown the cumulative impact of multiple exposures and
repetition on the cumulative likelihood of attention and impact of persuasive
messages (Ray et al., 1971; Ray & Sawyer, 1971). From Ray and Sawyer (1971),
it can be observed that across experiments the recall probability of a message
tends to have its highest increase with the first exposure. The next 5 subsequent
exposures to an advertisement have less impact and tend to either have equal
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impact (linear curve) or decreasing impact (sigmoidal). The next exposures
tend to either result in nearly full recall (hit the upper bound) or have minimal
contribution to recall. The Ebbinghaus (1913) learning curve takes on a sigmoid-
type function, so this is assumed to be the family of curves that repetition takes
on with respect to recall (due to some combination of attention and learning).
The persuasive impact of messages is a more complicated issue because it appears
to be a function of the persuasiveness of the message. Some messages appear to
have little impact, regardless of the number of exposures, while others increase
as a function of exposures. This seems to indicate that the impact of repeated
exposures is dictated by processing of the content, and not necessarily due to
familiarity with the message.
While these represent an increased cumulative impact, empirical studies do
not indicate repeated exposure effects that cannot be otherwise explained by other
cognitive components. The persuasion of a message appears to be largely dictated
by its content and processing, while learning it is modeled by other parts of the
agent cognitive model. As such, no explicit repetition model was implemented
since its key dynamics are present in the memory model and the novelty model.
The memory model captures a record of attended and stored exposures for each
agent. The novelty model provides a decreasing impact for each additional
exposure, capturing one typical dynamic of repetition on learning. Through
these dynamics, the effects of repetition should emerge: greater total familiarity
with the presented message and decreased impact of additional exposures.
Selective Attention Model
Selective attention is a construct that refers to the additional probability of
perceiving events performed on an object that an agent actively perceives, as
opposed to other peripheral events (Simons & Chabris, 1999). Selective attention
is implemented by having agents keep a record of the objects and agents they are
actively attending at the current time. PMFServ agents are able to actively take
actions on other agents, including actions of active perception (watching). As
such, the selective attention model records all entities that an agent is currently
engaged in action upon. This means that selective attention is focused on any
targets being watched or acted upon by an agent. This allows agents to choose
who will be the target of their selective attention, as is observed in the cocktail
party effect (Cherry, 1953).
SelectiveAttention(x) =
{
1
N if x ∈ XTargeted
0 if x /∈ XTargeted
(5.6)
If an agent is allowed to engage in multiple actions simultaneously, their total
selective attention is spread evenly across those objects. Equation 5.6 displays
the selective attention focusing calculation, where XTargeted represents the set
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of all entities targeted by an agent’s actions, N is the number of entities in
XTargeted, and x is some entity from the simulation. At present, no mechanism
exists to preferentially apply selective attention to certain agents or objects. In
the simulated scenarios explored later, agents are only able to engage in one
action at a time so selective attention will always be fully focused on one entity.
Motivated Attention Models
Motivated attention is a construct that refers to the additional attention given
to events that correspond with the needs, wants, and other motivations of an
agent (Fazio et al., 1994). Motivation is the most complex submodel of salience.
It calculates a motivation factor based upon the characteristics of the action as
compared to the agent’s current state. Motivation has two components in this
implementation: outcomes (central) and social (peripheral). The outcomes from
the action can be motivating, such as seeing someone eat when you are hungry.
The social component would be the motivation to watch someone eat because
you enjoy their company. Outcome motivation is calculated as a congruence
between the agent’s current needs on their GSP and the activations from
performing the action. The social components use social influence terms which
have already been discussed earlier (conformity, similarity, valence, authority,
in-group, reference group). All factors of motivation are taken as having an
independent impact, following the design decision to keep the model simple where
empirical interactions are unknown.
The central motivational cues are handled by allowing agents to analyze the
outcomes of events which have occurred. As noted earlier in Section 5.2, agents
evaluate their potential actions based upon “activations” that determine the
attractiveness of that action, as mediated by their values and beliefs. To calculate
a factor for motivated attention, an agent processes an event that results from
some other agent’s action. In processing this event, the agent calculates the
subjective emotional utility for themselves had they been the actor in that event
and the outcomes were the same. So, for example- if agent B is eating a sandwich,
the motivational salience for agent A is a function of the subjective benefit (or
harm) for agent A eating a sandwich. This motivated attention does not consider
if the action or outcomes of the observed action are possible.
Equation 5.7 displays the central motivated attention calculation for an agent
observing a given event (Note: the ‘sgn’ symbol represents the sign function,
producing -1 for negative values and 1 otherwise). SEUEvent represents the
subjective expected utility of activations that the perceiving agent would receive
had they been the actor in that event and the outcomes were the same. Two
adjustments are made to the raw utility value in order to calculate the motivated
attention factor. One adjustment rescales the value from between [-1,1] to fit into
[0,1].
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MotivatedAttention(Event) = 0.5∗ (1 + sgn(SEUEvent)(|SEUEvent|0.25)) (5.7)
The second rescaling factor takes the fourth root of the absolute SEU value.
This factor was introduced during model calibration due to the very small range
over which SEU can realistically operate within PMFServ. An SEU of 1.0 would
indicate that an agent went from a completely neutral state to a state of full
satisfaction of all its goals, standards, and preferences. In practice, such a huge
swing would almost never be observed. This calibration tweak was introduced to
spread the range of motivated attention so that smaller changes in SEU would
still have some impact on the motivation pay attention to an event. Rescaling
was necessary since in experimental studies, even modest changes in motivation
such as hunger resulted in significant changes in attention (Fazio et al., 1994). A
linear weight was not acceptable, since this would lead to clipping the range of
SEU for the purposes of motivation (high motivation and very high motivation
would have the same impact). As such, a calibration exponent was calculated
from the Stanford Prison scenario which allowed the maximum possible utility
changes to span a range between [0.15, 0.85] for the central motivated attention
factor. Unfortunately, since motivation does not have a standardized unit or
scale, there was no way to calibrate this parameter in a more methodological
manner. For a follow up model, this would be an area that would benefit from
additional empirical data.
Attentional Salience
Salience is used to calculate the probability that an action is receives enough
attention to be processed cognitively. This is accomplished by first calculating a
salience for each event occurring during a time step. An additional salience term
exists which represents inattention salience: the salience of background events
not simulated that might be attended to instead of the simulated events. This
vector of saliences is normalized to form a probability vector, from which a finite
number of events are chosen. Each event is chosen without replacement, except
for inattention which always remains an option. The probability distribution for
choosing an event to attend is shown in Equation 5.8, where E is the set of all
simultaneously observable events, EAtt is the set of already attended events, se
is the salience of an individual event e, and sI is the inattention salience.
P [e = Attended] =

se
sI+
∑
e∈E\EAtt
se
if e ∈ (E \ EAtt)
sI
sI+
∑
e∈E se
No Event Attended
0 if e ∈ EAtt
(5.8)
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The algorithm for drawing the set of attended events is displayed in Algorithm
5.6, where N is the maximum simultaneous events attended, E is the set of all
simultaneously observable events, and X(E,EAtt) is a random variable with a
distribution defined by Equation 5.8. The output of this algorithm is EAtt, the
total set of attended events. If an inattention term is selected, it is ignored and
one less total event will be attended. This attention algorithm is effectively an
iterated drawing from the yet-unattended events, with a constant probability of
no event being attended. This corresponds loosely to a series of winner-take-all
competitions for attention between events, a process which has some support
in neurological research (Lee et al., 1999). These events are processed by the
learning model, which can learn new affordances.
Figure 5.6: Attention Algorithm
EAtt = { }
for i = 0 to N do
ATTENDED EVENT = X(E, EAtt)
if ATTENDED EVENT != No Event Attended then
EAtt = EAtt ∪ { ATTENDED EVENT}
end if
end for
While the parameters used to calculate attentional salience and their basic
curves are known, no data exists to define their relative strengths or appropriate
combination. To accommodate this uncertainty, multiple classes of functions
with different weight parameters are available within the model. By examining
the studies that define these parameters as impacting recall of events and/or
messages, a linear weight was estimated for each component which represents
the slope of change between the high condition and the low condition in the
experiment. For example if the high authority condition resulted in a 0.3 increase
in probability of recall, this was chosen as the linear weight. Alternatively, for
those factors which do have experimentally derived curves (conformity), the curve
slope was used instead. All factors were normalized to fit the range [0,1].
Attentional salience is calculated as a function of attention and social influence
terms previously defined. These factors are novelty, centrally motivated attention,
selective attention, transferability, authority influence, conformity influence,
similarity influence, valence influence, ingroup influence, and reference group
influence. Each parameter is combined using a linear weight that determines
its contribution to the total salience for an event. As such, the attentional
salience for an event e is determined by a function as shown in Equation 5.9.
The w factors represent the weight given to each factor. This form of equation
was chosen as it was the simplest possible combination that would capture the
information operationalized from the social science findings and theories.
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se = Salience(e) =w0·Novelty(e) + w1·MotivatedAttention(e)+
w2· SelectiveAttention(e) + w3·Transferability(e)+
w4·Authority(e) + w5·Conformity(e) + w6·Similarity(e)+
w7·Valence(e) + w8· InGroup(e) + w9·ReferenceGroup(e)
(5.9)
Table 5.7 notes the weights for each factor, as well as the source used to
help initialize these weights. The “Process” column in Table 5.7 refers to if the
component is Central (depends on the specific event), Peripheral (depends on
more general context), or Mixed (combination of both).
Table 5.7: Event Salience Component Weights
Component Assumed Weight Source Process
Authority 0.33 Mantell (1971) Peripheral
Conformity 0.34 Tanford and Penrod (1984) Peripheral
In-Group 0.30 Tajfel (1982) Peripheral
Motivation (central) 0.47 Roskos-Ewoldsen and Fazio (1992) Central
Novelty 0.21 Johnston et al. (1990) Mixed
Reference Group 0.30 Kameda et al. (1997) Peripheral
Selective Attention 0.32 Simons and Chabris (1999) Mixed
Similarity 0.47 Platow et al. (2005) Peripheral
Transferability 0.10 Bandura (1986) Central
Valence/Halo 0.38 Hilmert et al. (2006) Peripheral
Each of these weights was inferred from examining the related paper, as
noted in Table 5.7. The weights are intended as a “best guess” estimate of
the importance of each factor with respect to social learning, due to their
observed effect on either attention, perception, or retention. First, the input
and output variables of interest were determined. Second, the form of the
empirical relationship was determined, to the level of the paper’s presentation
(ex. correlation, slope, function, etc). The third step was to estimate amount
that the input could affect the output, if known. Last, each relationship was
normalized so that the input variable ranged between 0 and 1. From these,
the salience weights were defined. More information on how these weights were
initialized is given in Appendix F. These weights are not intended to be taken as
reliable estimates of the relative importance of factors, but were estimated to try
to capture major differences between importance of factors.
The limitations to this approach are significant but unavoidable. Firstly, the
experiments which prove these factors are important do not generally establish
minimum or maximum values for their inputs. Even at the theoretical basis, it
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is difficult to establish criteria for what constitutes the maximal or minimal level
of authority that a person is perceived to have. Secondly, there is no assurance
that these factors work linearly or independently. While this attempt at a linear
approximation was workable for this research, a better functional combination
could be necessary for more in-depth study.
Despite the limitations and caveats to the attentional salience calculation
approach, it incorporates the directionality and known functional characteristics
of the underlying empirical studies. This provides some insight into how various
factors may interact and produces some interesting results that will be noted in
Section 7.
Additionally, social learning of affordances is straightforward using this
cognitive framework. It requires three conditions: an affordance available to
all agents, a set of agents aware of the affordance, and a set of agents unaware
of the affordance. When agents choose to perform an action, the OODA loop for
each observer evaluates if social learning of the affordance is appropriate. Any
affordance in PMFServ can be treated as a meme using this system, without any
changes to the affordance.
5.3 Scenario Architecture
Scenario design in PMFServ involves designing the affordances for entities in a
scenario. These affordances are rules that determine if an agent can take an
action on some part of the environment. These affordances associate with action
implementations, which have outcomes that affect the environment and acting
agent. Designing the affordances and models for actions creates a family of models
which must be populated with data.
Objects are the simplest entities. An object requires data purely to support
its affordance functions and the actions performed on it, plus a name and unique
id. The initial values for objects are generally part of the assumptions of the
model and will not be varied during experiments.
Groups are more complex. In addition to the requirements of an object,
groups have membership, resource, and social data. Membership data stores the
members involved, their levels of authority, and their roles in the group. Groups
may also have subgroups, forming a hierarchy structure. Resource data stores
the types and levels of holdings by the group, such as shared economic or security
holdings. Economic models in PMFServ make use of these resources, described
in (Silverman et al., 2010). These models will only be used for the Iraqi village
scenario. Relationship data for groups is limited to a valence toward other groups.
The relationships across groups are not always the same as those between agents
across groups and should be considered the “official stance” of groups toward
each other.
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Agents require the largest amount of data. They must be initialized with the
strength of social influence factors, weights on the GSP personality tree, learning
values, and physiological levels. Social influence data tracks the perceived valence
and agency for each agent toward every other agent. The remainder of social data
is retained by the group structure and data. The GSP tree requires the largest
amount of data, populating the relative weights of a personality tree consisting of
dozens of nodes. A knowledge engineering methodology exists for calculating this
data through a combination of demographic data and other sources, described
in Bharathy (2006) and Silverman and Bharathy (2005). Data in the memory
model stores the affordances that an agent initially knows in a scenario. These
values are vital to experiments in this model.
5.4 Simulation
A PMFServ simulation occurs in discrete time and can be considered as a Markov
Decision Process (MDP). PMFServ simulations support discrete state models or
continuous state models (to the level that computer simulation allows). The
transitions between states are determined by the actions performed by agents.
Agent action is simultaneous- all agents make their decisions based upon the
present state. The set of an agent’s decisions is their chosen behavioral expression
for that time step. The transitions for the system are a function of the full vector
of agent decisions, which may have covariant effects.
State transitions may be random or non-random, depending on the nature
of the actions available and environmental effects added by the simulation.
Simulation effects are generally minimized but may be required to resolve resource
conflicts, such as two agents intending to use the same door. Randomness
in action implementation and covariance with other agent actions cause the
difference between decisions and behavioral outcome in the environment.
The two scenarios implemented in the next section have different simulation
setups. In the Stanford Prison Experiment scenario, all agents act simultaneously.
This means that each agent generates an event that competes for attention
on each step. In the Iraqi village, all agents are allowed one action per time
step, taken based on a turn order. The turn order is unimportant, due to the
scenario designs. In this case, the events created by agents only compete against
inattention salience (as defined in Section 5.2.5). To account for this, the Iraqi
village has a higher inattention salience value which represents the greater level
of ongoing activity that is not simulated. In both scenarios, no simulation effects
are applied other than performing the agent actions and applying the effects.
Randomness is introduced by the attention model, which probabilistically attends
to events.
The Iraqi village differs slightly in its implementation. This scenario has
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an additional source of randomness, where the meme expression has different
probabilistic effects. It also employs actions that occur over time. This is
accomplished by disallowing an agent from choosing a new action until the
ongoing action is terminated or suspended. While slightly different in sequencing,
the same models apply for this simulation.
Chapter 6
Experiment Design: Affordance
Discovery
Two test scenarios were selected for experimentation, each with calibration and
validation goals. These scenarios employ different types of data and different
standards of evaluation specific to their purpose. The first scenario was an analog
of Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison experiment, examining the spread of suppressive
and rebellious actions (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973a). This experiment
included a training stage used for hand tuning of model connections. The
Stanford Prison experiment was also used for a selection of internal and external
validity tests. The external validity test for the Stanford Prison simulation is
designed to validate the transmission dynamics of the model. The second scenario
was intended to analyze competition of memes in a complex environment. This
scenario was built using human terrain data for an Iraqi village provided by the
United States Marine Corps.
Experiments were performed in four steps: scenario design, initialization,
simulation, and analysis. The scenario design phase involved designing the actions
and entities present within the experiment. The initialization phase involved
estimating initial state values for the data of the model. Before simulating, each
experiment was assigned a set of experimental cases. Setting up experimental
cases involved selecting the independent variables that would vary between
different experimental cases. Each independent variable for an experimental case
would be assigned an initial value for that case based upon either a static value
or a random variable. As such, the simulations differed only by the distribution
that generated their initial state prior to simulation. Since memes are the focus
of interest, the agents initially aware of each meme were used as the independent
variable.
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During the simulation stage, each experimental case was used to generate
a set of runs. A run is a specific number of simulation steps that defines a
state trajectory (the path of states the simulation ran through). The number
of steps were calibrated for each scenario to ensure that a majority of agents
have the opportunity to become aware of the meme before the run halts. Since
PMFServ runs as a discrete-time simulation, each time step must be assigned
units that determine the amount of time that passes between ticks. The time
interval assigned to a time step has an impact on time-sensitive functions such
as physiology (ex. hunger), activity context (job shifts), and the decay rate
for emotions. The level of granularity required for modeling affects the length
assigned to time steps. Additionally, the number of steps for a run was also
bounded by simulation runtime and data storage concerns. Precision in modeling
was balanced against hardware concerns, both for simulation and analysis.
Analysis of data was conducted using established statistical analysis tools
where possible, as well as developing a novel analytical tool for comparing ordered
sequences. The internal validity analyses were expected to reproduce results
consistent with the underlying empirical research used to generate the cognitive
models in Section 5.2. These measures also produced some unexpected results
that have interesting connections with the social science theories used to generate
the computational model. External validity testing was done by comparing
experimental results against hold-out data that was not used for experimental
calibration. External validity metrics were only available for the Stanford Prison
Experiment scenario, since the Iraqi Village scenario did not have behavioral
metrics to use as a comparison. In additional to examining each model in
isolation, cross-validation between the experiments was conducted where possible.
6.1 Scenario 1: Stanford Prison Experiment Simulation
The first scenario was a classical social science experiment, chosen to help
calibrate the connections between models and perform external validity checks.
The Stanford Prison Experiment case study (Haney et al., 1973a) was translated
into a scenario, to help examine the effects of social connections, groups, and
roles on meme transfer. This scenario design proved workability, that the model
can be implemented and studied.
The Stanford Prison Experiment was conducted in 1971 and was intended to
explore of the impact assigned roles had on behavior inside a simulated prison
environment (Haney et al., 1973a). In the experiment, 24 subjects were selected
out of a group of 75 applicants based upon their psychological test results which
indicated they were mentally stable and that their scores were relatively close to
“normal” (i.e., the mean of the tests). These subjects were randomly assigned
to be prisoners or guards. The experiment, intended to last two weeks, lasted
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only 6 days due to the growing abusiveness of the guards and signs of distress
among the prisoners. Haney et al. (1973a) interprets this outcome as evidence
for the role of situational factors in causing institutional abuse, as opposed to
purely individual factors.
The conclusions of the study have been contested since its publication, with
a variety of alternate hypotheses suggested for the causes of cruelty within the
prison. Carnahan and McFarland (2007) presents data which suggests that self-
selection may have given a disproportionately cruel subject pool, since the call
for subjects noted it involved prisoner and guard roles. Fromm (1973) and others
have suggested that the since the guards were not uniformly cruel, individual
factors were still a major driving force for abuses. It has also been suggested that
a major cause for the abuse of prisoners was the orientation given to guards, in
which they were informed that part of the intent of the prison was to make the
prisoners feel powerless (Reicher & Haslam, 2006). The intention of using this
scenario is not to assert a position with respect to the cause of all abuses within
the experiment, but to explore the possibility that social learning played a role
in how certain abuses and resistance unfolded within the experiment.
The Stanford Prison Experiment was chosen as a scenario to model because
it was a controlled field study which collected a data using a variety of
collection methods. The Stanford Prison Experiment researchers collected
data that included personality traits, emotion surveys, social groups, and
detailed behavioral logs. Despite the Stanford Prison Experiment’s status as
a controversial study, there simply have been few studies released that have this
breadth of data.
6.1.1 Stanford Prison Experiment Data Sources
Data for the Stanford Prison Experiment was collected on site at the Archives
for the History of American Psychology (AHAP), under special permission from
Dr. Zimbardo and the AHAP archival staff. All data from the experiment was
present only in print, with some holdings of the archive present only in raw form
(no reliable subject code keys). A week was spent working with the archive staff to
collect redacted and subject-coded papers and data from the archives, according
to a code key developed for this project. Certain data from the archives was
missing or only partially complete, but the total quantity of information in the
holdings related to the Stanford Prison Experiment was large and very useful for
setting up a meaningful scenario for simulation.
The data extracted from the archives included qualitative and quantitative
information. Table 6.1 displays the types of data available from the Stanford
Prison experiment. As is common in dealing with archival data, each of these data
sources had some missing data. In some cases the missing data was incidental,
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while in some cases the raw data no longer existed and only metrics on the data
had been archived.
Table 6.1: Stanford Prison Experiment Information
Data Source Use For Simulation
Comrey Personality Inventory 8 factor personality trait inventory
F-Scale Authoritarian personality measure
Mach Test Measure of machiavellianism
Mood Adjective Checklist Measure of positive and negative affect
Action Frequency Metrics Frequencies of actions occurring (coded from video)
Hour By Hour Logs List of recorded events, with approximate times
Personality trait information is available through the Comrey Personality
Inventory (Comrey, 2008), the F-Scale (Adomo, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson,
& Sanford, 1950), and the Mach test (Christie & Geis, 1970). Personality data
from each of these inventories is contained in Appendix H. The Comrey inventory
is the most comprehensive measure of the measures, consisting of 180 questions
which are used to derive metrics for 8 traits: Trust, Orderliness, Conformity,
Activity, Stability, Extroversion, Masculinity, and Empathy. While the Comrey
Inventory has been used less frequently since the Stanford Prison Experiment,
studies continue to examine the constructs involved- especially in comparison to
other trait inventories such as the Big Five factors and the MMPI (Paunonen
& Jackson, 2000; Rushton & Irwing, 2009). The raw data was available for
only 3 subjects, all of them prisoners. However, an intermediate form of data
existed which listed each subject’s standard deviations from the mean trait value
of their group (guards or prisoners). Finally, the mean and standard deviation
for each trait was available for each group. Given the level of precision involved
in the model, the mean and standard deviation data was sufficient to estimate
the personality trait differences between agents. Additional information about
this process is found in Appendix H.
The F-Scale measure, though intended to measure authoritarian tendencies,
has been shown to be a better indicator of racist tendencies and a tendency toward
in-group centric attitudes (Eckhardt, 1988). A similar set of partially complete
data was available for the F-Test results. 9 prisoners and one guard had raw
F-Test results available. As with the Comrey results, the mean and standard
deviation of the results for each group was available for the F-Test. The F-Test
data for guards would have been a loss, except for the fact that the guards had a
relatively low variance on this measure, with x=4.36 and s=1.19. Since the one
known value was an 8 it accounted all of the variance, this meant that all other
guards scored exactly 4.
The Mach tests recorded a measure of the Machiavellianism of subjects, in
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terms of their willingness to use others as a means to an end (Christie & Geis,
1970). For the Mach tests, the mean and variance of each group was known
but the specific values were incomplete. However, as with the prior measures,
the subjects whose data was recorded were the deviants- subjects who varied
significantly over or under their population mean. This mean that the agents
without specific data could be constrained into a fairly narrow range. The same
approach applied to missing measures on the Comrey inventory was applied to
the Mach test, and is documented in H.
The Mood Adjective Checklist (MAC) questionnaire was filled out by
prisoners and guards at three separate time points throughout the experiment,
each about 2 days apart. The MAC questionnaire measures positivity, negativity,
activity, and passivity for a subject for the moment the survey is filled out. It
was expected that the raw data for the MAC measures would provide additional
information about the emotional state of specific agents over time, or at least
provide the specific data points for emotional trends for each group (guards
and prisoners). Unfortunately, no MAC data remains that explains the specific
emotional state of individual subjects. Worse, some of the original questionnaires
were either lost or never filled out. This means that while means and variances are
present for each questionnaire, these aggregate values are missing data. Different
sets of subjects are missing from each questionnaire, meaning that mean values
for prisoners are not comparable even between the first and second batches of
questionnaires. Though the raw data was not available, published papers from the
experiment reported emotional trends of the prisoner and guard groups (Haney et
al., 1973a). Given that even the original researchers were missing data however,
the emotional trends reported in papers such as Haney et al. (1973a) must be
considered as partially incomplete.
Action frequency metrics were recorded during the experiment by analyzing
video recordings taken by inconspicuous cameras during the experiment (Haney
et al., 1973a). Approximately six hours of day-to-day activity was recorded during
the experiment. Each tape recording was manually coded by researchers, counting
the frequency of certain actions over 100 frames of tape (about 6.5 minutes).
In addition to counting the total frequency of certain actions over each 100
frames, the total count was broken down into actions directed between different
groups (prisoners to guards, prisoners to prisoners, etc). The recorded actions
were commands, information, insults, questions, resistance, physical aggression,
helping, threats, use of instruments (threatening with a baton), and addressing
others individually (individuating reference) or impersonally (deindividuating
reference). For each of these actions, some of total data was missing. However,
most actions had either a raw count from the daily life tapes or a frequency count.
Additionally, almost all actions provided the percentage of such actions that were
performed from guards to prisoners and the percentage that were performed from
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prisoners to guards. A significant amount of action frequency data still existed
from the tapes. Since much of the original tapes have been transferred to DVDs
in the archives, it might also be theoretically possible to recode this information
in order to recapture any lost information. With that said, recoding the tapes was
not done because it did not appear to provide much additional data on actions
over time and because the poor sound quality of these recordings might make it
hard to reliably code speech acts.
The largest data source for the experiment, at least in physical dimensions, is
a resource known as the “Day By Day, Hour By Hour Logs.” These logs appear to
have been compiled by Dr. Zimbardo some time after the experiment as a way to
aggregate the events of the experiment into a single resource. These logs are a set
of approximately two dozen poster-sized sheets of graph paper, representing the
approximate chronology of the Stanford Prison Experiment. Events from each
day are presented in approximate order, with either an exact or approximate
time listed for the event in a separate column. While not an exhaustive list of
the experiment’s activities, it captures the key events of the experiment. The log
also captures incidental occurrences such as when prisoners resisted and when
prisoners were thrown in the hole (a storage closed used for isolation). While on
site at AHAP, these logs were manually transcribed into an electronic format-
applying a subject code key to remove any identifying information. As a data
source, the hour by hour logs were extremely important because they display the
order that events occur- an important aspect for studying memes.
Other information about the experiment was collected by examining a
transcript of the instructions given to guards and notes about the scheduled
activities inside the prison. In addition to these data sources within the AHAP
holdings, the published results from Haney et al. (1973a), Haney, Banks, and
Zimbardo (1973b), and Zimbardo (2007) based on the experiment were examined
closely. These sources gave additional information about the context of the prison
environment, which helped in modeling the Stanford Prison Experiment scenario
in PMFServ.
6.1.2 Stanford Prison Experiment Scenario Design
Scenario design in PMFServ requires setting up the environment, available
actions, and agents that will be simulated. The environment in PMFServ
consists of its entities: all objects, groups, and agents within the scenario.
The interactions between these entities are determined by the agents’ cognitive
models, the actions available in the scenario, and simulation settings that
determine when agents can initiate actions. The design of these elements will
be described briefly.
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Entities
As stated in Chapter 5, PMFServ supports three types of entities: objects, agents,
and groups. Objects are inanimate entities that do not take actions but may be
targeted by actions. Agents within a scenario take actions, typically using an
OODA-loop cognitive model to drive behavior. Groups are social structures for
agents in which an agent may have membership, roles, and authority. Groups also
store collective properties, such as group wealth. The Stanford Prison Experiment
simulation uses only agents and groups and does not represent specific objects or
locations involved in interactions (ex. doors, food, etc). This approach was chosen
because the social dynamics appeared to be the key element of the experiment,
rather than the logistics of taking actions.
The Stanford Prison Experiment simulation utilized three types of agents:
meme-capable cognitive agents, a minimal PMFServ cognitive agent, and an
automaton agent. Table lists of the set of agents present in the simulation,
their group, and their relevance to the experiment. All prisoners and guards
were instantiated as meme-capable cognitive agents, as described in Section 5.2.
These agents were capable of socially-driven attention and could consider social
influence on their decision making. All subjects within the simulation are referred
to by subject codes established during data collection, since not all participants
in the experiment were assigned a consistent code key in the raw materials. Table
6.2 lists the set of agents used for simulating the Stanford Prison Experiment.
The prisoner agents (S 00 - S 09) and guard agents (S 11 - S 21) were
represented by meme-capable agents. Subjects S 07 and S 14 were not simulated
since they were alternates that did not participate in the experiment. S 00 and
S 21 were unique cases because they were alternates who joined the experiment
later than other agents, so these late entrances had to be simulated. Subjects
S 22 and S 23 were not simulated, since the first was a guard that was present
for only one shift, the second was a researcher informant who was present for
less than a day. Given that these agents were added later in the experiment, the
memes of interest were already prevalent before they arrived. This made their
role was minimal for the experiment in general. S 10 was held out of analysis
since it unclear if the personality data for this subject was complete.
Prisoners in the experiment were always present once they joined the
experiment, for up to 6 days. Guards entered and exited the experiment based
upon their shifts. The shifts ran from 10 AM - 6 PM (Day Shift), 6 PM - 2
AM (Evening Shift), and 2 AM - 10 AM (Night Shift). Overlap existed between
the shifts where guards tended to interact, partly due to guards staying late and
also due to requests from the experimenters to have additional guards present for
certain activities.
Since each participant was built from the same template, the basic setup of
each agent was relatively similar. Each agent utilized the same model of cognition.
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Table 6.2: Stanford Prison Experiment Agents
Agent Name Group Importance
S 00 Prisoner Alternate prisoner added on Day 4 at approximately 7
PM. Quickly resisted and was treated badly by guards in
response (force fed, thrown in hole). (Prisoner 416)
S 01 Prisoner Insulting and sarcastic toward guards, but some
resistance. (Prisoner 5704)
S 02 Prisoner Strategically acted as a “model prisoner” by working hard
to obey guard orders. Got the nickname Sarge for his
soldier-like attitude. (Prisoner 2093)
S 03 Prisoner Minor resistance, following others. Released on Day 4 due
to stress-related eczema. (Prisoner 3471)
S 04 Prisoner Resisted early in the experiment, but stopped resisting
later. (Prisoner 7258)
S 05 Prisoner First prisoner to resist, became agitated and was released
by the end of day 2 following a revolt. (Prisoner 8612)
S 06 Prisoner Generally cooperated and did not resist. Felt like he was
really imprisoned. (Prisoner 1037)
S 08 Prisoner Initially cooperated and did not resist until later than
other prisoners. Generally kept in mind that the prison
was an experiment. (Prisoner 5486)
S 09 Prisoner In the initial wave of resistance, targeted by punishment.
Broke down and was released on day 4. (Prisoner 819)
S 10 Prisoner Cooperative with no resistance at the start, but resisted
occasionally as experiment continued. (Prisoner 4325)
S 11 Guard Night shift guard. Some sadistic and vengeful behaviors,
but generally just played guard role.
S 12 Guard Night shift guard. Attempts to be “stern, but not
overzealous” but regularly degrades prisoners. Appears
to take a leadership role in his shift.
S 13 Guard Evening shift guard. Referred to as “John Wayne” he
is the most verbally abusive guard and is noted as an
innovator of sadistic punishments. De-facto shift leader.
S 15 Guard Evening shift guard. “Good” guard who attempted
to treat prisoners fairly, avoiding severe or arbitrary
punishments. Initial power struggle with S 13.
S 16 Guard Day shift guard. Did not tend to abuse prisoners, but did
go along with the other guards when needed.
S 17 Guard Day shift guard. Became de-facto leader of the day shift.
Authoritarian and utilitarian approach (enforce rules).
S 18 Guard Night shift guard. Took on guard role like a job, which
became routine.
S 19 Guard Day shift guard. Avoided harassing or commanding
prisoners in general, but did approve of some punishments.
S 20 Guard Evening shift guard. Harsh and physically intimidating
toward prisoners. Followed S 13’s lead.
S 21 Guard Evening shift guard. Added to experiment on 2nd day
shift, staying on as a night shift guard.
Experimenter Experimenter An agent representing the experimenters. Generic
representation of experimenter with authority.
PrisonSchedule None An automaton that keeps track of the time of day and
controls the scheduled activities for each day.
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All agents started the simulation with neutral feelings toward each other, equal
physiological states (low hunger, low fatigue), and equal authority within their
respective group. This meant that agents initially differed entirely as a result of
their personalities, their group assignment, the time they entered the experiment,
and their shift (for guards). For this reason, it would actually be trivial to
explore the counter-factual case where the role assignments were reversed, making
prisoners be guards and vice versa. While this was not attempted, it does
highlight one of the advantages of an agent-based modeling approach- the ability
to easily explore “what-if” scenarios.
Assigning the guard shifts, group assignments, and time that agents started
the experiment was a relatively straightforward modeling task. The richest
differences between agents were the differences in the agents’ personalities, as
represented by the weighting of the GSP trees. Significant time and modeling
effort was made to estimate GSP tree weights that captured the differences
between agents’ personalities. These differences would be a driving force for
agent behavior and interaction.
One additional agent exists within the scenario to represent an experimenter
observing the experiment. This agent was necessary for two reasons. Firstly, the
Experimenter agent was able to dismiss prisoners who had very high levels of
stress and were demanding to be released. Since such actions occurred within
the experiment, this decision rule allowed participants to be dismissed. Secondly,
the Experimenter was used to present memes to participants prior to the start
of the simulation. This was intended to represent the Experimenters briefing
participants about their ability to perform certain actions a priori and was used
for generating one of the experimental cases. The Experimenter agent is not a
full fledged cognitive agent in this scenario, however. It has no physiology, agents
cannot take actions upon it, and its GSP is fully normalized such that all traits are
equally valued. As such, it does not act as a simulated person within the scenario
but is present to provide a placeholder for these two pieces of functionality.
Three groups also exist for structural reasons, the Prisoners, Guards, and
Experimenters. These groups cannot be targeted by actions but allow agents to
have membership and authority within their respective groups. Agents are not
given any specific roles within their groups in this scenario, since there are no
official leaders or specialists.
Finally, an automaton agent named PrisonSchedule maintains the schedule
of activities for the prison and other time-based events. In the Stanford Prison
Experiment, guards were expected to run prisoners through a regular schedule of
activities. The regularly scheduled activity blocks were sleeping, eating, working,
counting off, and unstructured time. Figure 6.1 shows a 24 hour clock which
represents an approximate schedule for the typical prison day, with activities
rounded to the nearest hour. The PrisonSchedule contained this information
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Figure 6.1: Prison Schedule Day
and updated its information so that agents could be aware of the appropriate
scheduled activity. This schedule is a slight simplification, since Count Offs
occurred with greater frequency but shorter duration during the day, rather than
always lasting an hour. It also does not include special activities such as visitors
or meetings with researchers, as these periods were not likely times to spread the
memes of interest. While the PrisonSchedule agent provides the information to
agents about the appropriate activity, it has no direct impact on their actions.
For example, if an agent is not hungry at meal time- they may not eat. Except
for meal times the schedule does not change the effects of agent actions, it only
changes their perception of the situation. However, since both prisoners and
guards are aware of the appropriate actions, if a prisoner is not performing the
correct activity then guards will have incentive to punish them.
Actions
The actions in the Stanford Prison scenario can be broken down into three groups:
baseline activities, transitions, and interpersonal actions. Interpersonal actions
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were the most important to model because the Stanford Prison Experiment
recorded action frequencies for these types of actions. Baseline activities and
transitions were modeled to ensure that the right context was present for meme
transmission.
Table 6.3: Stanford Prison Experiment Baseline Actions
Action Available To Description
Count Off All Agent states their name and number. Modeled as
a boring but active speech act.
Eat All Agent eats food, if available in the given context.
Off duty guards are assumed to have access to food.
Perceive All Agent looks at another entity or themselves. Agent
only watches and otherwise is inactive.
Sleep All Agent tries to sleep. Once an agent is asleep, they
remain asleep until they wake or an external event
wakes them.
Work All Agent engages in repetitive work, such as making
beds, moving boxes, or pulling nettles out of
blankets.
Baseline activities are actions that an agent can take, even without other
agents being present. Baseline activities are available to all agents, even if they
are not currently present in the experiment. This allows off-duty guards to handle
their basic needs when not in the experiment. This modeling choice was made
because while it is impossible to model a guard’s life outside of the experiment, it
is reasonable to assume that they would eat, sleep, and occupy themselves. As a
result, allowing off duty guards to perform baseline actions was more realistic
than assuming they returned to the experiment as if the had been in stasis
while away. The set of baseline actions is presented in Table 6.3. The majority
of baseline activities correspond with the scheduled activities in the Stanford
Prison Experiment: eating, sleeping, counting off, and working. While these
activities were not directly recorded within the experiment, they were a backdrop
interpersonal actions. For prisoners, the schedule determines which activities
they should be engaged in. If prisoners are performing these activities during
their assigned periods, guards have less incentive to harass them. Conversely,
if prisoners hate a particular activity they will be more likely to perform other
actions such as resisting the guards.
Transition actions are the simple actions, but are important for the
experiment to run realistically. Table 6.4 describes the three types of transition
actions: attempting escape, ending shifts, and starting shifts. Attempting escape
is available so that prisoners are able to attempt jailbreaks, as happened during
the experiment. However, prisoners within the experiment who attempted escape
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did not generally intend to run away and did this action to gain leverage for
negotiating better conditions. For this reason, prisoners attempting escape never
actually exit the experiment. Starting and ending a shift are mutually exclusive
actions that allow a guard to enter and exit the experiment, respectively. Agents
are allowed to start their shift up to 30 minutes early and can exit a shift
20 minutes after the next shift is scheduled to arrive. Agents have additional
activations for showing up for their shift when it starts and for leaving a shift
when they are able. These activations drive the guards to typically show up on
time and leave on time. In general, this means that guard shifts officially have a
20 minute overlap where guards can interact. In reality, guards sometimes arrived
or left late. Modeling these transitions as actions allowed guards to arrive early,
leave late, or not transition at all (stay in one place). In practice, the agent
personalities modeled in the simulation tended to keep to the official shift times,
plus or minus 10 minutes.
Table 6.4: Stanford Prison Experiment Transition Actions
Action Available To Description
Attempt Escape Prisoners Prisoner attempts to leave the experiment without
permission, such as by a jailbreak. (Note: Since
escape never occurred in the experiment, prisoners
have a zero probability of actually escaping).
End Shift Guards If guard is on shift in the experiment, exit the
experiment location.
Start Shift Guards If guard is off shift away from the experiment, enter
the experiment location.
Table 6.5 lists the set of interpersonal actions, accompanied by a brief
description of the meaning of the action within the simulation. This set of actions
includes all of the frequency-recorded actions noted in Section 6.1.1 except for
individuating and deindividuating references. The “referencing” actions were
omitted because they were much more fine-grained than the other actions and
would probably have significant overlap (i.e. threatening by name).
The interpersonal actions allow agents to interact with each other. While a
majority of actions are negative or neutral, this does not necessarily mean that
the majority of behavior would be negative. Positive interactions actions, such
as helping, activate different parts of the GSP tree than actions such as insults
and threats. This means that GSP trees are possible that would only perform
neutral or positive actions. The actions chosen by each agent will depend heavily
on its GSP personality weights. Additionally, the actions of an agent will depend
greatly on the behavior of other agents. A guard that is generally passive may
become abusive and sadistic when confronted with resistance, for example. The
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Table 6.5: Stanford Prison Experiment Interpersonal Actions
Action Available To Description
Command Guards Guard orders a prisoner to do the correct task,
based on the schedule.
Demand Release Prisoners Prisoner demands to be let out of experiment.
Feel Imprisoned Prisoners Prisoner vocalizes that they cannot leave the
experiment.
Help All Actor provides unsolicited help to target.
Information All Actor speaks to target, giving information about
an event.
Insult All Actor calls target insulting names and/or describes
them negatively.
Question All Actor requests information from target.
Physical Aggression All Actor physically handles target in a violent manner,
such as an attack or a shove.
Remove From Hole Guards Guard removes prisoner from “The Hole” and
returns them to regular activities.
Resist Prisoners Prisoner directly confronts guards, with the
intention to change conditions for prisoners.
Threaten All Actor threatens target with negative consequences.
Throw In Hole Guards Guard initiates action to take prisoner to “The
Hole,” a supply closet with a lock.
Use of Instruments Guards Guard threatens a prisoner by using a baton or
other object as a symbol of authority.
context that modifies the base activations of each action is determined by a set of
Perceptual Types (pTypes), as shown in Figure 6.2. The pTypes that define the
activations for each action were calibrated as part of the initialization process,
discussed in Section 6.1.3.
The activations produced by taking actions cause emotional responses for the
actors taking those actions and for observers that view the events. In addition
to the emotional effects, actions also cause direct effects. In the Stanford Prison
Experiment simulation, there are four types of effects that occur: valence changes,
authority changes, hunger changes, and fatigue changes. Fatigue and hunger are
reduced by sleeping and eating, respectively. Valence and authority change as a
result of interpersonal actions. Table 6.6 in Appendix H lists the direct effects
of each action on valence and authority. Each column of the table represents the
change in properties that occurs as a result of the action. For example, the table
states that if an actor issues a command they gain authority while the target
loses authority. The columns marked “Guards” indicate that taking a particular
action changes the authority for all guards or the relationship of all guards toward
the actor. Attempting escape and resistance undermine the guards as a group,
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Figure 6.2: Stanford Agent PType Grid
so all guards in the experiment are affected by a prisoner taking these actions.
Table 6.6: Stanford Prison Actions - Valence and Authority Effects
Authority Valence
Action Actor Target Guards Actor
→
Target
Target
→
Actor
Guards
Attempt Escape - -
Command + -
Help +
Information +
Insult + - -
Physical Aggr. -
Threaten + - -
Release From Hole +
Resist + - -
Throw In Hole + - -
Use of Instruments + - -
In addition to these effects, authority and valence are also changed due to
prisoners obeying, disobeying, or resisting commands by guards. If a guard
issues a command and a prisoner does not do the appropriate action, the guard’s
authority is reduced and the guard’s valence toward that agent decreases. A
prisoner resisting a guard results in a more severe decrease in both the relationship
and the guard’s authority. Alternatively, a prisoner obeying a guard improves
the guard’s valence toward them and slightly increases the guard’s authority.
Through this dynamic, de-facto leaders can emerge and the relationships between
agents change as a result of behavior. As would be expected, valence tends
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to have positive feedback. Agents that initially take negative actions against
each other tend to have deteriorating relationships, for example. This simple
system of effects allows valence and authority to emerge from the interactions
between agents, rather than assuming that agents would always develop the same
relationships and power structure.
Simulation
The Stanford Prison experiment was simulated using a simultaneous simulation
scheme. Under this simulation sequencing, all agents make their decisions and
the results of all actions are executed simultaneously. After all actions have
been executed, agents perceive all the events that have occurred simultaneously.
This allows different events that have occurred to compete for attention. In
this simulation, each time step represents 10 minutes, allowing agents to change
their action every 10 minutes. The simulation ran for 693 steps, representing the
time period from 4:30 PM on the first day until noon on the sixth day. This
duration represents the approximate time period between when the prisoners
were admitted to the experiment until the continuity of the experiment was
permanently broken (no return to schedule).
Memes
Three memes of interest were studied: prisoner resistance (Resist), guards
throwing prisoners in the hole (Throw In Hole), and feeling imprisoned (Feel
Imprisoned). These actions were chosen for study as potential memes because
they each showed signs of propagating through the groups over time, with clear
early adopters. It should be stressed that these actions are only potential memes.
The intent of simulation was to examine if treating these actions as memes better
represents how these actions were expressed in the scenario.
The memes in the Stanford Prison Experiment scenario had two vectors of
transmission. The primary vector was direct observation, where agents performed
an action and other agents observed this and became aware of the affordance
of that action. A secondary vector was possible by agents taking Information
actions. The Information action for an agent contained information related to the
first event returned by an agent’s uncued recall from memory. If a meme action
was recent and emotionally salient, an agent might learn about an affordance by
talking with another agent.
Throw In Hole was chosen as a meme because it showed evidence of a clear
early adopter: S 13 (John Wayne). S 20 was noted as imitating S 13 in some of
the supporting materials. A document in the archives entitled “Remarks” asks,
“Why did S 20 imitate John Wayne rather than S 15?” (real names have been
replaced by coded numbers). It appears clear that some imitation in methods
occurred among the guards. Finally, despite S 13 not arriving until the second
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shift in the experiment- the supply closet was not used as a solitary confinement
until he first took this action. This gives a credible claim that other guards
learned how to use the supply closet as “The Hole” through social learning. At
the very least, it seems plausible that the guards moved from a general awareness
of the potential for solitary confinement to it becoming an intuitively afforded
action when punishing prisoners.
Resistance was chosen as a meme because it was studied explicitly within
the experiment and S 05 was a clear resistance leader to start the experiment.
While some prisoners enjoyed causing problems, S 05 resisted with the intention
to change conditions in the experiment. This resulted in a general outbreak
of resistance, which was eventually subdued. S 00, a late arrival, appeared to
independently have an awareness of passive resistance, which he employed shortly
after entering the prison. As such, if resistance was a meme, S 05 and S 00
appeared to be the original carriers.
Feel Imprisoned was chosen as a meme because it appeared to spread through
the prisoner population as a result of S 05’s initial demand for release. After S 05
requested release and was convinced to stay, he reacted strongly and said that
he felt he was really being imprisoned. Based on this meme spreading through
the prison, other prisoners expressed that they felt imprisoned. While there has
been debate in academic circles about if the experiment literally denied release
to subjects, the logs show that many prisoners believed or feared that they would
not be allowed to leave. One common theme was that they were in a prison,
just a prison run by researchers rather than the government. Prisoners who
expressed this meme did so with significant distress (ex. breakdown). Guards
and prisoners both noted these strong reactions in their personal logs. The spread
of this potential meme was inferred from the events in the hour by hour logs as
well as excerpts from personal logs and letters written by prisoners. Rather than
considering Feel Imprisoned as a meme with a static origin, it seems possible
that this meme originated due to a prisoner feeling that they had been denied
release. As a result, this meme could be spread to an agent by requesting
release (and being denied) or by observing other agents expressing their feelings
of imprisonment.
Studying these actions as memes is difficult because the hour-by-hour logs
are not an exhaustive resource for the events in the scenario. Additionally, since
only behavior can be observed, it is impossible to know when or if agents learn
about affordances. For these reasons, the choice was made to study memes by
examining the order that agents first took actions. As such, resistance would be
studied by looking at the first agent that ever resisted, then the second, and so
on. This method has the advantage that while not every instance of resistance
would be recorded, the first time that an agent resisted the guards was notable
and was noted in the hour by hour logs.
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While this solves the original issue, a secondary problem is caused by the fact
that in some cases more than one agent expressed a meme for the first time in
a similar time period. Given that the hourly logs contain approximate times, it
is difficult to state with certainty which agents expressed first in some cases. In
general however, this was the exception rather than the rule. From the hour by
hour logs and the supporting materials, the order that each agent first took each
meme action was constructed.
Table 6.7: Stanford First Meme Expression Orderings
Throw In Hole Resist Feel Imprisoned
S 13 S 05 S 05
S 20 S 09 S 02, S 03
S 11 S 01, S 04 S 06
S 12, S 18 S 06 S 01
S 16,S 17,S 21 S 08 S 09
(S 15, S 19) S 03 S 10
S 00 S 00
S 02 (S 04, S 08)
(S 10)
Table 6.7 lists the order that agents first took each action, as listed in the
hour by hour log. Agents who share a row appeared to take the action in the
same general time period, but with an unclear order. The final entry in each list
contains agents for which no written evidence exists to show that these agents
performed these actions. In most cases, the agents who were not noted to take
certain actions make intuitive sense. S 15 and S 19 were noted as a “nice guard”
and a “weak guard” respectively, and it is unclear if they ever initiated sending
a prisoner to the hole. S 16 also appeared to be kinder to prisoners than other
guards. Likewise, S 04 did not express a reaction to feeling imprisoned because
he entered the experiment expecting that he would not be allowed to leave. This
means that he would be considered a passive carrier, in some respects. These
orderings were used as the ground truth, against which the simulation orderings
were compared.
6.1.3 Stanford Prison Experiment Initialization
Before being able to simulate with the Stanford Prison Experiment scenario, the
experiment had to be initialized with starting values for each model and activation
tuning was necessary. Meme capable PMFServ agents needed to be initialized
with starting values for physiology, authority, valences, and the weights for the
GSP personality model.
CHAPTER 6. EXPERIMENT DESIGN: AFFORDANCE DISCOVERY 110
Model Initialization
The physiology model contains tanks for the stomach (hunger), fatigue, and
available caloric energy. No evidence from the experiment holdings suggested
that the participants had significant differences in hunger or fatigue at the start
of the experiment, so all agents were assigned the same initial values for each
tank. All tanks were initially set to 80% full, to represent exertions related to
gathering at the experiment site but having each agent be in good physiological
condition at the start of the experiment.
Each agent was assigned as a member for their respective group. Prisoner
group members were each assigned an authority of zero, the lowest possible
authority. This represented their equal status as a group, as well as their
low status within the experiment as a whole. Guard group members initially
started with an authority of 0.25 (out of 1). This represented the authority
conferred by their uniforms and role, while also representing initial equality
between guards. Valences between agents were initially assigned to zero (neutral)
for all relationships between different agents (on a scale from -1 to 1). Since an
agent also has a valence toward itself, this valence was set to 0.8 (high valence)
that assumed an initial state of positive self-attitude.
Initializing each agent’s GSP model was a much more involved process than
the other models, which were initialized based upon reasonable assumptions.
The GSP personality models were initialized based upon the personality trait
data from the Comrey Personality Inventory, the F-Scale, and the Mach test.
The PMFServ GSP personality model can be set up to use these factors directly,
but the modeling choice was made to utilize a pre-existing GSP tree structure.
While harder to map the trait data into, this existing personality structure had
performed well in PMFServ-based experiments such as Silverman and Bharathy
(2005) and utilizes personality traits intended to correlate with behavior. Since
the personality trait data was not used directly, a mapping between test concepts
and GSP concepts had to be created.
Table 6.3 shows the mapping between personality trait factors and GSP nodes.
For reference, the GSP model of Guard S 13 is displayed to show the final product
of the mapping algorithm. After each affected GSP node, the letter in parenthesis
notes if the constructs are expected to have a high (H), moderate (M), or minor
(L) correlation. Using this map, an algorithm generated GSP tree weights based
upon the raw values for each personality trait metric. The algorithm is contained
in Appendix H. The algorithm accepts normalized measures (between 0 and 1)
and returns an appropriately weighted GSP tree. Since the raw trait data is not
normalized, each measure was renormalized to fit a range between 0 and 1.
The attention model also had a pair of parameters that had to be set up as
part of the model initialization. As noted, the attention model has parameters
that set the maximum number of attended events and an inattention salience
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Figure 6.3: Map: Measured Traits to GSP Nodes
Measured Trait Related GSP Nodes
Trustworthiness Keep Ones Word (H)
Orderliness Be Controlling (H)
Conformity Conform To Society (H),
Respect Authority (M)
Activity Physiology (H)
Stability Assert Individuality (M)
Extroversion Belonging (M), Esteem (M),
Be Relationship Focused (L)
Masculinity Use Conventional Attacks (H),
Conform To Society (M),
Belonging (M)
Empathy Be Relationship Focused (H),
For Everybody (H)
Machiavellianism Be Task Focused (H)
F-Scale Value Outgroups Are Targets (H),
For Group (H)
Figure 6.4: S 13 GSP
that affects the likelihood of paying attention to events that are not modeled.
The maximum number of attended events was set to 4, based upon research that
shows that typically humans only have sufficient working memory to keep track
of 4 items at once (Cowan, 2001). The inattention salience was set to a low value,
0.28. This value was selected so that a single, maximally salient event would be
attended with a 92% probability. This value was chosen based on the maximum
recall rate for across the experiments used to set the salience components in
Section 5.2.5.
Calibrating Activations
Activations for actions were calibrated manually, since insufficient data existed to
automate a training algorithm that would produce meaningful activations. While
various methods of automated calibration were considered, a machine learning
approach was deemed too likely to produce unintuitive semantics. Agents might
take the actions at the right frequencies, but for the wrong reasons. The
combination of limited training data and the richness of personality data made
this outcome almost unavoidable. As a result, the activations were calibrated
manually to ensure face validity was maintained.
For manual calibration, the first values for activations were set ad-hoc based
upon the best guess. This stage was not intended to get precise values, but
identified contexts where certain GSP nodes that should be activated. For each
pType-action pair, the set of possible GSP node activations were selected.
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The second step of calibration involved balancing different action contexts,
using a fully normalized GSP tree. In a fully normalized GSP tree, all nodes
are valued equally. This makes calibration easier, since the subjective utility of
any action reduces to a sum of linear activation values. This calibration method
generated rankings of the same action under different contexts, as well as rankings
of different actions under similar contexts. This allowed tuning activations for the
same action under different contexts, to establish which contexts were preferred
for performing that action. It was also used to set conditions where one action
would strategically dominate a different action (Shoham & Leyton-Brown, 2009).
This tuning phrase established reasonable values for activations under each of the
possible pType contexts for an action.
Finally, activations were calibrated by simulating the first 20 hours of the
experiment repeatedly and calculating the frequency that actions occurred during
each scheduled activity. Calibration was performed using the Fully Known
experimental case which has all agents know all actions (described in the following
section). The intention of this calibration phase was to ensure that actions
occurred with the appropriate relative frequencies with respect to each other. The
tuning script generated a report listing the frequency that each action occurred.
This report was compared against the expected frequency for each type of action,
if known.
Table 6.8: Activation Training Frequencies
Action Time Period Frequency (Events/10 min)
Command Count Off, Eat, Work, None 6.46
Help Count Off, Eat, Work, None (only 1 recorded)
Information Count Off, Eat, Work, None 3.02
Insult Count Off, Eat, Work, None 3.10
Insult (by S 13) S 13 on Shift 1.55
Resist Count Off, Eat, Work, None 1.58
Threat Count Off, Eat, Work, None 1.48
Use Of Instruments Count Off, Eat, Work, None 1.34
Table 6.8 notes the frequencies used for training the relative frequencies of
actions. These frequencies could not be used for direct comparison, since the
simulated agents only generate one event per 10 minute interval. Tuning to
these frequencies would be impossible, since the total number of events would be
higher than agents could generate. Instead, the metrics were used to examine the
relative differences between the expected count of each action as compared with
the actual count. While the simulated frequency of all actions was lower than
the ground truth, the calibration goal was to ensure that each action occurred in
a similar proportion compared to each other.
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A second set of metrics measured the baseline actions during each period.
Based on the archival materials, prisoner agents spent a majority of their time
performing scheduled activities rather than engaging in interpersonal actions.
The training metrics assumed a high frequency for a scheduled action during its
assigned time period. It was assumed that prisoners performed the scheduled
activity 75% of the time during count off periods, 80% of the time during eating
periods, 90% of the time during sleep periods, and 75% of the time during
work periods. While these activities were not specifically measured during the
experiment, it was assumed that prisoners performed their assigned activities
during periods of no incidents.
Using these metrics, the activations were trained to approximate the expected
distributions over the start of the experiment. This allowed the simulation to
better match the expected behavior from the actual experiment. However, this
calibration was not intended to ensure that the behavior of the simulation exactly
matched the ground truth frequencies. Due to random and chaotic elements in
the simulation, individual simulation runs can deviate from these distributions.
However, it provided a useful tool for ensuring that agents would use each of the
modeled actions in reasonable circumstances and at reasonable rates.
6.1.4 Stanford Prison Experimental Cases
Three experimental cases were designed for the Stanford Prison Experiment,
each intended to represent one hypothesis for the origin of the potential memes
within the experiment. The three experimental cases will be referred to as Full
Knowledge, Authority condition, and Hypothesis condition. These cases differed
based on the agents who were initially aware of the affordances for Throw In
Hole and Resistance. Feel Imprisoned was allowed to emerge under the same
conditions across all runs, as a result of a prisoner being denied release. The
Full Knowledge case assumed that no meme reproduction occurred because the
agents were aware of all affordances at the start of the experiment. This would
mean that even if memes existed, they would be at saturation and agents would
not learn new affordances socially.
The Authority condition is based upon the hypothesis that guard cruelty was
fostered due to information presented to participants during their orientation
(Reicher & Haslam, 2006). This condition assumes that participants were
presented an example of each meme at the start of the experiment, as part
of an orientation. For example, the guard orientation might have included a
demonstration of how to throw a prisoner in “The Hole.” This condition presents
each agent with an event that shows the Experimenter agent taking the meme
action, for each meme action. This condition will result in a random subset of
agents receiving each meme, with the bulk of attentional salience driven by the
authority of the Experimenter agent. Agents will differ in their reception of the
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meme based on if they can repeat it (transferability) and if they have a similar
personality (similarity).
The Hypothesis condition assumed that certain agents acted as seeds for the
meme to spread through the population. This is referred to as the Hypothesis,
as it is intended to test if memes are a plausible mechanism for explaining the
order that memes were expressed. In this condition, S 13 was the only agent
initially aware of the Throw In Hole affordance when perceiving other agents.
Correspondingly, the Resist action was only afforded to S 05 and S 00 at the
start of the experiment. Since S 00 did not enter the experiment until the fifth
day, he could only have passed along the meme to S 02 or S 10 for the first time.
All other agents had already expressed resistance by that time.
If the Meme Origin condition shows a better match to the first expression
ordering, this would imply that memes might have had a role in transmitting
certain affordances through the Stanford Prison Experiment subjects. This would
not necessarily imply that the exact memes stated would be the memes involved,
however. As explored in Section 4.2 and Appendix B, other forms of social
learning can have similar outcomes to socially learned affordances.
Even if this order was influenced by the spread of memes, this does not
prove that the meme was a socially-learned affordance. With that said, these
actions are sufficiently complex and specific to the experimental condition that it
is reasonable to suggest that their affordances might have been learned through
the course of the experiment. If simulating memes improves models this order
well, this will only imply that some memes affected the order that these actions
were expressed. The exact nature of any such memes cannot be known, since
the original Stanford Prison Experiment did not attempt to measure any such
learning in detail.
The Stanford Prison Experiment scenario was simulated for 30 runs under
each experimental condition, for a total of 90 runs of the Stanford Prison
Experiment. This provided sufficient data to apply a variety of analyses, including
first expression ordering and diffusion rate estimation. The data collected from
this experiment was used for internal validation measures, as well as externally
supported metrics such as the first-expression of meme actions.
6.2 Scenario 2: Iraqi Village
The second scenario modeled was Hamariyah, an archetypal Iraqi village based
on a human terrain data set. This scenario was generated by the ACASA lab,
utilizing data provided by the US Marine Corps (USMC) (Silverman, 2010). This
scenario stresses the model of memes, connecting it with day to day economics
and a rich society based on human terrain data. Compared to the Stanford
simulation, the Iraqi village reduced agent attention capabilities of events, used
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a longer time step value, and used behaviors that unfold over time rather than
occurring immediately within a time step. This scenario was designed to evidence
completeness, that the model can be used meaningfully in different context. It
also uses competing memes, to allow examination of selection effects. While
the Stanford Prison Experiment had separate memes for each group, the Iraqi
Village allows its memes to be reproduced by any agent. Two memes exist in this
scenario: giving information to the US-backed government and planting an IED
by a government building. Since this framework had pre-existing actions, these
memes competed against each other and against the existing action set, which
primarily models daily life.
6.2.1 Iraqi Village Data Sources
The Hamariyah Iraqi village is a fictional village created by the USMC for the
purposes of training. While it is not modeled on any specific Iraqi village, it
integrates common social structures, cultural elements, and personality trait
profiles that would be representative of an Iraqi village. The original data used
to design this village is described in Silverman (2010), stating:
The USMC folks from 29 Palms generated Hamariyah and
descriptions of the town history, its 200 residents, 3 tribal groups,
families, jobs, institutions, inter-factional grievances, and so on. This
is a paper-based description, though some of it was provided in comma
separated value (csv) files that we recast into spreadsheet workbooks
that were then read by the PMFserv model constructor. (p. 25)
The Hamariyah village was used as the base scenario for simulation, with
some modifications. The village itself was built off of human terrain data
contained in comma separated value (CSV) files. These files outlined the set
of agents in the scenario, with information about each agent’s personality and
social position. Table 6.9 lists relevant data available for each agent, which was
used to generate the PMFServ scenario. In addition to these data fields, written
materials described the village’s members, backstory, and the relative advantages
of each group.
Based on this information, modelers and programmers populated the
Hamariyah NonKin village scenario- which has been under development from
approximately 2007. In addition to the agent properties, information about
typical daily life actions and insurgent activities were present in the data sources
used to design the village.
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Table 6.9: Hamariyah Agent Data Fields
Agent Property Description
Age Age of the agent, as an integer
Attitude Toward MNF Attitude toward multi-national forces (US), in terms of
Pro-MNF, Anti-MNF, and Neutral
Employment Level If an agent is employed full-time, part-time, or
unemployed
Ethnicity Ethnic group, such as Arab or Kurd
Family Name Name of the family the agent belongs to
Gender Agent gender, either male or female
Internal Group A subgroup an agent belongs to, if applicable.
Internal Role Role of the agent in their main group, chosen from Leader,
Core Follower, and Fringe Follower.
Kinetic Special Skill Special knowledge agent has about weaponry (i.e. placing
IED)
Marital Status Relationship status: Married, Single, Widowed
Military Experience Level of military training the agent has
Occupation The agent’s job in the scenario
Personality Archetype (GSP) The type of personality for the agent, selected from a list
of 12 personality models. A GSP personality model was
estimated to represent each personality type.
Religion The religion of an agent, chosen from Shia, Sunni,
Christian, or None.
Tribe Name The tribal group an agent belongs to, chosen from
Heremat, Shumar, and Yousif.
6.2.2 Iraqi Village Scenario Design
Given the scope of the NonKin Village project, it is infeasible to explore every
aspect in detail. Instead, the following sections will highlight the key scenario
features and note any modifications that were necessary in order to study memes
within village. For more detailed information about the scenario Silverman (2010)
discusses the design history of the Hamariyah village, while Silverman et al.
(2009) overviews the general NonKin village functionality. Since the NonKin
village was being used as a simulator rather than a game, certain elements of the
framework noted in Silverman et al. (2009) were not utilized. In particular, 3-D
representation and detailed conversations were disabled because no user agents
existed to interact with the village. Otherwise, this scenario may be considered
an extension of the existing NonKin village scenario template.
Entities
A NonKin village contains three types of entities: groups, agents, and structures.
These entities differ from the Stanford scenario in a few notable ways. Firstly,
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all agents utilize a slightly different model set. While all the new meme-enabling
models are the same, NonKin agents utilize modified decision, perception, and
physiology models. These models work similarly to the standard PMFServ
models, but are modified to allow agents to be asynchronously driven- such as by
interacting with a 3D engine. A second major difference is that in the NonKin
village, the location of an agent is very important. Certain actions are only
available at particular locations, such as sleeping at home or working at their
workplace. This makes buildings and other structures important entities in the
NonKin village.
The Hamariyah scenario contains 200 agents, split into three main groups:
Heremat, Shumar, and Yousif. In addition to the agent groups, a US group was
present in the scenario to allow group relationships and ownership of buildings in
the village. The original scenario file split some of these groups into subgroups,
such as particular militia cells. Since these groups included only a handful of
agents, all subgroups were collapsed back into the three primary groups. Agents
that had leadership roles in subgroups were assigned to the main group as
followers with a high level of authority. In addition to agents being members
of groups, structures in the NonKin village are tagged by their group affiliation.
This allows agents to see if buildings belong to their group, a group they like, or
an unfriendly group.
These relationships are determined by the group to group valences, as shown
in Figure 6.5. The Heremat group is generally friendly to the US and controls the
local police force, but is not a very big group. The Shumar group is a primarily
Sunni group unfriendly toward all other groups, especially the US Group. It is the
largest group, with a majority of its members working as merchants or tradesmen.
The Heremat and Shumar groups both have members working as part of the local
government. The Yousif group is a primarily Shia group, with higher than 60%
unemployment and religious leaders in higher positions of authority.
Figure 6.5: Hamariyah Group Valences
The agents in the Hamariyah scenario include some agents that are intended
for simulation and other agents that are intended for scripted actions, such as
external combatants entering the area. To keep the village streamlined and
populated with agents with full sets of human terrain data, only a subset of
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agents from the full Hamariyah village were used for simulation. Of the total set
of agents, 72 agents were simulated for meme analysis: 11 Heremat members, 38
Shumar members, and 23 Yousif members. These members utilize 10 separate
GSP personality models, as shown in Table 6.10.
Table 6.10: Number of Agents Using Each GSP Model, By Group
GSP Model Description Heremat Shumar Yousif
Al-Qaeda Iraq (AQI) 2
Baathist 2 8 13
Child 1
Shia Imam 3
Iraqi (Sunni) 10
Mayor/Official 2 1
Merchant 9
Policeman 2 1
Tea Man (Tea house owner) 3 2
Woman 2 7 4
While it would be impossible to describe the full modeling process of each of
these GSP models, they do have some notable differences. The AQI and Baathist
GSP models are more accepting of violence and asymmetric tactics than other
personalities. They also tend to be task focused, rather than relationship focused.
Conversely, Police GSP models accept violence but prefer to use conventional
tactics and be relationship focused (i.e. negotiate). The Imam and Mayor/Official
GSPs represent leaders and potential leaders. These agents focus on asserting
individuality and leadership goals, rather than primarily focusing only on day
to day goals. Merchants, women, and children place a low value on violence
compared to other personalities. Across all personalities, agents value outcomes
that benefit themselves or their group but place little value on outcomes that
benefit other groups. These personality weights affect how each agent will respond
to the available memes: giving information and planting an IED.
The structures in NonKin village are important elements of the environment.
Three structures play a major part in each agent’s life: homes, workplaces, and
mosques. Many actions are only available in particular locations. Each agent has
a home in the simulation, where they perform actions such as sleeping, eating, and
socializing. Workplaces fill a double role as places of employment and places of
business. Employed agents have a workplace where they typically go during their
work shifts in order to earn money. These same workplaces provide services such
as selling food. Mosques are a special form of workplace where agents may come
to pray. Agents consider the group affiliation of businesses before patronizing
them, as well as the religious affiliation of a house of worship before attending. A
significant portion of each agent’s day will be traveling to various buildings and
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performing daily life tasks at these locations.
A special structure exists to be the target of meme actions. This structure
is affiliated with the US group and is named the “Government Meme Target.”
This structure does not have any workers modeled and only allows agents to visit
the building, give information, or plant an IED near the building. As the name
implies, this structure exists in order to allow agents to perform meme actions
on an object representing US interests in the region.
Actions
Including memes, the Iraqi village PMFServ file contains 57 different actions
which can be taken by agents in the scenario. These actions range from complex
multi-stage actions (i.e. go to market and buy food) down to niche actions for
forcing entry into a building. The actions in the Iraqi village were not modified in
any way except by the addition of the two new meme actions. The most common
actions agents take within Hamariyah village are those related to daily life. These
actions include moving from one building to another, entering/exiting buildings,
buying food, working, socializing, praying, sleeping. Agents are also able to take
less common actions such as attacks, shootings, and hiring/firing employees but
these actions are infrequent. Based on the actions that agents most commonly
perform, agents will commonly be deciding between going about a normal day or
taking an extreme action for or against the US.
Simulation
The Iraqi village runs in 30 minute steps, such that every agent is allowed to
pick a new action every 30 minutes. Each simulation run lasted for 2 days in
simulation time (48 decisions per agent). During the 30 minute interval, agents
travel between locations and perform components of the actions they committed
to at the start of their decision cycle. Unlike the Stanford scenario, the Iraqi
village is simulated asynchronously. This means that each agent takes their action
separately, rather than at the same time. From the standpoint of attention, this
means that agents will only observe a maximum of one event at any particular
time. This means that events compete against inattention salience rather than
each other. Otherwise, the Hamariyah scenario simulation runs similarly to the
Stanford scenario.
Memes
The memes modeled in the Hamariyah Iraqi village were Give Information and
Plant IED. Both of these memes could only be performed on the “Government
Meme Target” structure. The Give Information action represents acting as an
informant to the US. Giving Information is a risky action in this context, because
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anti-US forces could try to eliminate local informants. The meme for Give
Information is the learned affordance from an agent can go to the US structure to
inform on dangerous members in the village. The Plant IED action is an opposite
and competing action. This action involves being willing to take an IED from
local militia groups and place it in the vicinity of the US structure. As with Give
Information, this action has inherent risks that give it negative activations for
personal safety.
For both memes, most agents would need to feel strongly about supporting
or opposing the US Group in order to take these actions. However, these memes
have other appeals. The Plant IED action can appeal to agents that greatly
value violence and attacks, for instance. Similarly, the Give Information action
can appeal to agents that support building relationships and negotiation. These
characteristics are part of what determines which agents will be likely to express
these memes within the village.
Due to limitations on simulation length, both memes have been made
more attractive than they would be in the real world. This allows for better
examination of relative expression rates and diffusion, since it avoids runs where
no agents express the meme. Due to this modeling choice, the village simulation
will not be a good a predictor of agents that would never express the meme.
However, it increases the ability of the simulation to work as a relative predictor
of agent’s preferred meme. Since this simulation is intended to examine meme
selection, this is beneficial for the analysis. However, it does mean that the total
number of people who express either meme will be higher than one would expect
in a real world scenario- especially given the time frame.
6.2.3 Iraqi Village Initialization
The Hamariyah village was a pre-existing scenario, so minimal initialization was
necessary. Only the new models required initialization, such as the attention
model. The attention model, as previously noted in Section 6.1.3, has values to
set the maximum simultaneously attended events and the inattention salience.
The Hamariyah simulation works asynchronously so agents will be presented with
at most one event at any given time. This meant that the maximum number of
attended events was set to 1. The inattention salience also had to be significantly
increased compared to the Stanford Prison scenario. Since the Stanford Prison
was in a controlled environment, distractions were minimal. In a real village
situation, intermittent distractions would be more prevalent. Presenting events
one at a time also requires an additional inattention salience, to account for
the lack of competition that would otherwise exist. Based on these factors, the
inattention salience level was set to 8.0. This meant that an event of typical
salience (about 1.6) would have a 1 in 6 chance of being attended. While this
may seem low, with 72 NonKin agents interacting in a small village, this means
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that an agent observing all of these events would be expected to observe 12 events.
This was the only model that required initialization for this simulation.
6.2.4 Iraqi Village Experimental Cases
The Hamariyah scenario utilized two experimental cases: a Hypothesis case and a
Randomized case. The Hypothesis case assumed that a particular set of 6 agents
initially knew each meme, based upon their roles in society. In the hypothesis
case, Give Information was initially known by HAM003, HAM004, HAM005,
HAM0021, HAM041, and HAM084. These agents were chosen because they
were members of the local police (HAM003, HAM004, HAM005, HAM0021) or
involved with the local government (HAM041, HAM084). Agents in the police
force and government could be expected to be aware of how and where to provide
intelligence to the US forces in their area. Plant IED was initially known by
agents HAM059, HAM060, HAM075, HAM081, HAM120, and HAM130. These
agents were all categorized as anti-US and their Kinetic Special Skills listed
them as a “IED Maker” or “IED Emplacer.” These agents were specifically
noted in the human terrain data as having IED skills, so they started with the
affordance to Plant IED in the scenario. This scenario was intended to represent
the transmission of competing memes under realistic conditions.
The Randomized case took the opposite approach. At the start of each run,
6 agents were randomly chosen to start with the Give Information affordance
and another 6 agents were randomly chosen to start with the Plant IED meme.
No constraints were placed to allow an agent to start with only one meme, so
it was probabilistically possible for one agent to start with both memes. This
scenario was intended to examine the patterns of meme transmission that exist
when memes are available to agents that would not normally be expected to carry
them. This scenario allows examining scenarios such as passive carriers, agents
that start with the meme but never express it.
Twenty runs were simulated under each experimental condition, with data
collected from each run for analysis. The Hypothesis condition always started
with the exact same initial conditions, while the Random condition started
with a different random set of agents aware of each meme on each run. These
experiments provided interesting results and insights into competition of memes
in a rich multi-agent environment.
Chapter 7
Analysis and Results
The same set of metrics were recorded for the Stanford simulation and the Iraqi
village simulation. For each simulation run, the simulation system recorded the
actions, emotions, attention focus, and learning for each agent. The analysis of
this data attempts to examine how meme transmission occurs at the individual
level and how meme diffusion occurs at the societal level. The types of analysis
applied can be split into three categories: internal validity, external validity, and
exploratory analysis. This section will begin by discussing the data collected and
the paradigms used to analyze this data. Internal validity measures are discussed
next, examining internal validity measures from both scenarios. Following this, an
analysis of the Stanford simulation will present external validity measures and
an exploratory analysis of meme transmission trends. Finally, an exploratory
analysis of the Hamariyah Iraqi village will show trends within this larger and
more diverse simulation.
7.1 Simulation Data Collected
During each simulation run, data was collected after each time step. This data
was logged into four data tables: simulation events, agent emotions, agent meme
awareness, and affordance transmission. The simulation events table logged every
action that occurred during a simulation run, coded by the simulation time. Table
7.1 displays the data collected about simulation events. This data table logs to
the standard data present in PMFServ events. This data was collected to examine
action frequencies and to examine when memes where expressed.
The agent emotion table captures each agent’s set of emotions at each time
step, which are the result of their actions and the actions of other agents.
Table 7.2 displays the data collected about agent emotions during simulation.
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Table 7.1: Simulation Events Data Table
Data Field Description
Simulation Step Time that the action occurred
Actor Name of agent taking the action
Action Name of action agent initiated
Target Name of target of the action (if targeted)
Result Result of the action
Joy, Distress, Pride, Shame, Liking, Disliking, Gratification, and Remorse are
emotions generated by the PMFServ emotion model, which is based on the
Ortony et al. (1988) formalization of emotions. Each of these emotions has
a range between 0 and 1, with 0 being none of that emotion present and 1
being the strongest feeling of that emotion. Multiple emotions can be present
simultaneously under this system. These are discussed in detail in other papers,
as they are core parameters of PMFServ (Silverman et al., 2006).
Table 7.2: Emotions Data Table
Data Field Description
Simulation Step Time that the emotions were measured
Agent Name of agent who has these emotions
Group Name of the group that the agent belongs to, if any
IsOnShift True if the agent is on shift (present in experiment), else
False (Stanford Experiment Only)
Joy Joy of an agent due to short term goal successes
Distress Distress of an agent due to short term goal failures
Pride Pride of an agent due to success following personal
standards
Shame Shame due to failures in following personal standards
Liking Like of the world state, based on long term preferences
Disliking Dislike of the world state, based on long term preferences
Gratification Positive compound emotion that combines joy and pride
Remorse Negative compound emotion that combines distress and
shame
Aggregated Emotion term representing the total emotional state
Stress Integrated stress of the agent (from the stress model)
The Aggregated term was calculated during data collection and is a sum of
those eight emotions, where good emotions are taken as positive and bad emotions
are taken as negative. This sum is divided by 4 to fit between -1 (dysphoric) and
1 (euphoric) and can be thought of as an estimate of the valence of an agent’s
current emotional state. Equation 7.1 shows how the Aggregate emotion value is
calculated, based upon an agent’s other emotions. The Stress term is calculated
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by a separate PMFServ model, which calculates an integrated stress value that
is based upon emotional stress, time pressure, and fatigue (Silverman et al.,
2006). This term varies between 0 and 1, where 0 is completely unstressed (nearly
unconscious) and 1 is a state of panic. This data table provides a summary report
of the agents’ affective states over time. This data was collected to compare the
emotional trends in the Stanford Experiment with those reported in Haney et al.
(1973a).
AggregatedEmotion =
1
4
((Joy −Distress) + (Pride− Shame)+
(Liking −Disliking) + (Gratification−Remorse))
(7.1)
Agent meme awareness is a table that is generated from the each agent’s
memory model. This table is formatted as shown in 7.3. This table has a column
for each meme measured, to monitor when each agent became aware of each
meme. This table is a simplified probe of the memory model, which is either
knows a meme (familiar) or doesn’t know about a meme. This data was recorded
to help measure agent learning.
Table 7.3: Meme Awareness Data
Data Field Description
Simulation Step Time that agent knowledge was probed
Agent Name of agent whose memory was checked
(Meme Name) True if agent is aware of an affordance used as a meme, else False
(...) (Additional fields for other memes)
The affordance transmission data records if an agent attended and learned
from each event that occurred during the scenario. This data was recorded for
meme-related events and unrelated events, since the attention step is inherently
competitive. This recorded N2 entries per step, where N was the number of
agents in the scenario- making the data table very large (approximately 250,000
entries per run for the Stanford Prison simulation). Table 7.4 displays the fields
recorded within the transmission data table. This table notes three possible levels
of processing an event: “Can Observe,” “Attended,” and “Learned.” Each stage
requires the prior stage to be true. An agent must physically be able to detect
an event to attend it and must attend an event to learn from it. In this way,
physical meme barriers are differentiated from attentional issues and learning
issues. It also stores the factors that contribute to attention salience, such as
novelty, motivated attention, and other event salience components noted in 5.7.
One focus of analysis will be the “Attended” parameter, as mediated by these
salience components. Additionally, this interaction data contains information
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about which agents pay attention to which other agents- useful for examining the
emergent social network for attention.
Table 7.4: Affordance Transmission Data
Data Field Description
Simulation Step Time that agent knowledge was probed
Observing Agent Name of agent examining an event
Event Acting Agent Name of agent performing initiating event examined
Event Action Name the action initiated by the acting agent
Can Observe If true, the observing agent can physically detect the event
(i.e. close enough to see)
Attended If true, the observing agent attended this event
Learned If true, the observing agent recorded the action from this
event
Total Salience The total attentional salience of the event, as a weighted
sum of attention salience factors
Authority Authority of the actor of the event
Conformity Conformity due to number of agents engaged in the event
action at this time
InGroup If observer and actor share the same primary group, this
is 1, else 0
Motivation Motivation to gain the outcomes of the event
Novelty Novelty factor of the event
Reference Group Amount that an observer uses the actors group for social
cues
Selection Amount of active attention to the actor of the event
Similarity Similarity of personalities between observer and actor
Transferability If observer can take event action, this is 1, else 0
Valence Amount that observer likes actor (0 is disliked, 1 is liked)
7.2 Analysis Methodologies and Techniques
A variety of analytical techniques were applied to examine relationships in the
simulation data collected and to compare these against external holdout data.
Each of these methods will be discussed briefly in this section, to allow a more
coherent discussion of the results in the following sections. To assist in batch
analysis of the data, all computational analyses were performed using Python
code, pre-existing Python packages, or other statistical packages wrapped in
Python (ex. the R stats framework).
7.2.1 Correlation Analysis
Correlation matrices were generated from the transmission data in order to
examine the effects of social and situational factors on attention and learning.
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This correlation analysis provides information about the strength of each of the
input variables (ex. authority) on the dependent variable: learning from an
event. These correlations can be compared against the empirical findings from
the studies used to design the cognitive components, as a test of internal validity.
Additionally, the correlation analysis provides information about relationships
between factors. While from the attention model’s standpoint, each factor is
independent- their values may be influenced by common factors. Correlation
analysis was completed using the SAS 9.2 software, generating both the Pearson
and Kendall correlation matrices.
7.2.2 Multivariate Regression
Multi-variate generalized linear regression techniques will be used for internal
validation testing of the attention process for agents. Internal validation
is important, since the PMFServ agent cognitive model contains dozens of
interacting cognitive components. In particular, the attention salience component
integrates the input from ten other new cognitive components. Additionally,
the salience term must itself be used by the attention model to determine the
probability that an event is attended. While each component was carefully
designed and tested, internal validation of the agents’ attentional responses
was an important check to make sure that all components were implemented
as intended. The internal validity test design was based upon the Affordance
Transmission Data, described in Table 7.4. Each row in this data table contains
the values of the inputs to attentional salience (e.g. the novelty of the event),
accompanied by whether or not the agent paid attention to that event. The
regression was intended to validate that the inputs to attention had the correct
relative importance and that their signs were correct.
A multi-variate linear regression assumes that the data is a set of N
observations in the form yi =
−→
Xi·
−→
β + ε for each observation i ∈ {1, ...N}. In
this formulation yi is a response variable,
−→
Xi is a vector of inputs,
−→
β is a vector
with a weights for each input, and ε represents unexplained error. The regression
algorithm attempts to estimate the weights (
−→
β ) that best explain the response
variables as a function of the input variables.
Regression techniques were used to examine how the simulated agents oriented
their attention to events, which in turn controls the events they learn from. As
noted in Section 5.2.5, the events that agents pay attention to are probabilistically
selected as a function of the attentional salience of each event. The attentional
salience term was implemented in a PMFServ cognitive component as a function
in the form shown in Equation 7.2 (a copy of Equation 5.9 in Section 5.2.5). Each
of the weight terms (wi) was initialized with a “best guess” value from examining
associated literature.
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Salience(e) =w0·Novelty(e) + w1·MotivatedAttention(e)+
w2· SelectiveAttention(e) + w3·Transferability(e)+
w4·Authority(e) + w5·Conformity(e) + w6· Similarity(e)+
w7·Valence(e) + w8· InGroup(e) + w9·ReferenceGroup(e)
(7.2)
Logistic regressions were used to estimate these factors from the model when
applied to the Attention and Learning data collected. This was done by finding
and examining the regression β coefficients, based upon a data set of agents
examining events. The regression formula used to estimate the coefficients is
shown in Figure 7.3. This formula mirrors the one for the attention salience
equation, but with three differences. Firstly, an intercept term m was estimated
by the regression (as is typical in a regression). Secondly, the response variable
is a binary output designating if the event e was attended or not. Finally, there
is error term ε because this is a regression equation form- this represents any
unexplained variance.
Attended(e) =β0·Novelty(e) + β1·MotivatedAttention(e)+
β2· SelectiveAttention(e) + β3·Transferability(e)+
β4·Authority(e) + β5·Conformity(e) + β6·Similarity(e)+
β7·Valence(e) + β8· InGroup(e) + β9·ReferenceGroup(e) +m+ ε
(7.3)
This regression was useful for testing the implementation of the total attention
system. Since attention to events is a function of their salience, the sign and
importance of each input into salience should match its sign and importance to
attention in the cognitive model. Equation 7.4 restates the relationship between
attention and attentional salience (explained in detail in Section 5.2.5). In this
equation, E is the set of all simultaneously observable events, EAtt is the set of
already attended events, se is the salience of an individual event e, and sI is the
inattention salience.
P [e = Attended] =

se
sI+
∑
e∈E\EAtt
se
if e ∈ (E \ EAtt)
sI
sI+
∑
e∈E se
No Event Attended
0 if e ∈ EAtt
(7.4)
When only one single event is presented at a time, Equation 7.4 reduces to
Equation 7.5. This means that for a single event, the probability that an event
is attended is quite similar to the logistic function. This indicates that in this
simple case, the regression should give a good estimate of the attentional salience
function so long as the inputs are all independent.
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P [e = Attended] =
se
sI + se
(7.5)
Three such data sets were examined using this approach. The first data
set was generated by artificially generating sample events. These events were
specifically created with each salience input was independent and selected
randomly from its possible range. A single agent processed these events and
returned if that agent paid attention to the event or not, populating a data set in
the form described in Table 7.4. Attention in this system follows the form shown
in Equation 7.5.
The other data sets examined were collected from the Stanford Prison
Experiment simulation and the Hamariyah Iraqi Village simulation. The events
in these data sets were the outcomes of the actions that agents took within each
respective simulation. The Hamariyah simulation only allowed one event at a
time, so attention in this system also follows Equation 7.5. The Stanford Prison
Experiment involves multiple simultaneous events, so salience relates to attention
through the more general form noted in Equation 7.4. However, even in this case,
each input to attentional salience has a positive contribution to salience and
should contribute positively and their relative importance on attention should be
maintained.
As such, the regression provides a useful system verification measure. If
the regression weights from in the data (
−→
β ) match weights set in the system
(−→w ), the regression demonstrates that each input has the appropriate sign and
importance for determining attention. Since the relative importance of weights
was of interest, the regression intercepts were calculated but were not reported
as they have no value for interpreting the results. Multivariate linear regressions
were performed using the “bigglm” R statistical package, intended for large
generalized linear models (Lumley, 2009).
7.2.3 Mann-Kendall Trend Tests
Mann-Kendall trend tests were used to determine if certain time series tended
to be negative or positive over time. For example, the Stanford empirical data
posits a number of emotional trends, such as that prisoners’ emotions (as a group)
became negative over the course of the experiment. The Mann-Kendall test is
a non-parametric trend test, which analyzes a time series of values. The null
hypothesis for the trend test is that the data series consists of independent and
randomly ordered values. This test uses the Mann-Kendall statistic to calculate
the significance of a time-dependent trend and the direction of the trend. Mann-
Kendall tests were performed using the R statistical package “kendall” which
implements the Mann-Kendall trend test.
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In a respect, a standard Mann-Kendall trend test is non-ideal for emotions.
Emotions typically involve some level of cyclic behavior, which will reduce the
significance level of the basic Mann-Kendall trend test. However, the ground
truth statements from the Stanford Prison Experiment papers do not describe
emotional cycling of moods- they describe basic trends. For this reason, the
basic Mann-Kendall test was used. With that said, the original experiment’s
mood trends were based upon only two or three data points for each subject so
the confidence of the ground-truth data makes this analysis harder to interpret.
Despite these limitations, examining the correspondence of the Stanford Prison
Experiment simulation trends compared to the real experimental trends was an
interesting avenue to examine as part of the external validity testing.
7.2.4 Meme First Expression Ordering
First expression ordering analysis is a metric selected for externally validating
meme transmission against external data. The first time an agent expresses
a meme provides direct proof that an agent has learned a meme. While the
observed data may not provide the exact time the agent learned the meme, their
first expression provides an upper bound for the time that each agent learned
the meme. By definition, an agent A must know the meme at some tA value
before the time of an agent’s first expression TA, where TA > tA. As such, the
order of first expressions provides a metric that bounds the time span that each
agent could have learned the meme. This means that each agent can be ordered
by their time of first expression, as shown in Equation 7.6 (where it is assumed
agents are assigned a subscript according to their order of expression).
TA1 <= TA2 ... <= TAN (7.6)
If the cumulative probability of expression is an increasing function with
respect to the time passed after learning a meme, then the first expression time
provides information about the order that the each agent learned the meme. In
some circumstances, this information may be harnessed to estimate the order
that agents learned memes. This approach will not be used in this analysis,
however, since individual factors have a considerable impact upon the time
between learning a meme and expressing a meme (if it is expressed at all).
Instead, the times of first expression are considered as an ordering that ranks
a covariate combination of an agent’s learning of the meme and their motivation
to express the meme. As noted in Section 6.1.2, an order of first expression for
three potential memes was extracted from the Stanford Prison Experiment hourly
logs. Similarly, each simulation run produces an ordering for when agents first
performed each action. Comparing the simulated orderings against the observed
orderings provides a form of external validation.
CHAPTER 7. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 130
Inversion Count Algorithm
In principle, it is straightforward to compare two ordered series against each
other statistically. Any ordered series can be reduced to a set of ordered pairs,
and the sets of ordered pairs can be compared directly, with adjustments made to
adjust for duplicate information. In practice, the situation for meme expression
is much messier. Agents may not express a meme on a particular run, leading
to ambiguities at the tail of the ordered series. There is simply no way to infer
which agent expressed a meme first if neither expressed it. Additionally, even if
the series were always complete- it would be necessary to adjust for duplicated
information due to transitivity (ex. A > B and B > C implies A > C).
As a result, an algorithm was developed to statistically analyze the distance
between two ordered series, which allows for right censoring of both series and for
ties in both series. This algorithm is based upon the principle of series inversions.
An inversion count algorithm can determine the minimum number of single-
element swaps that are necessary to turn one ordering into another ordering.
Table 7.5 displays a simple example of inversion counting. Such algorithms are
frequently used to measure the distance between sequences, such as in DNA
chains. The inversion number of a random permutation follows a distribution
somewhat similar to a normal distribution (Margolius, 2001). The mean inversion
count for random permutations is half the maximum inversion count, giving a
null-hypothesis condition when examining inversion counts.
Table 7.5: Inversion Counting Example
Sequence Inversion Tabulation
Real Sequence [A,B,C] -
Permutation [C,B,A] -
[B,C,A] +1
[B,A,C] +1
[A,B,C] +1
Inversion Count 3
The algorithm takes advantage of these principles by calculating the inversion
number to turn a simulation sequence into the ground-truth sequence and
comparing it to the maximum possible number of inversions possible, given
the simulation sequence and ground truth sequence. The algorithm handles
ambiguously ordered or simultaneously occurring events by removing ignoring
inversions within that subsequence when calculating the inversion number and
the maximum inversions. This retains the property that an above average number
of inversions would be more than half of the maximum possible inversions.
Table 7.6 shows the results of using the modified inversion distance algorithm
on some example sequences. For the sequence and permutation, the second
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Table 7.6: Modified Inversion Count Examples
Sequence Permutation Inversions (I) Max Inversions (M) Nearness (1 - I/M)
[A,B,C,D] [A,B,C] 0 3 1.00
[A,B,C] [B,C] (A) 2 3 0.33
[A,B,C] [B] (A,C) 1 2 0.50
[A,B] (C,D) [C,B,D] (A) 4 5 0.20
parenthetical list represents right-censored elements (with an unknown order).
These examples demonstrate some of the dynamics of the distance calculation.
The first example has no inversions, as the sequence is in the correct order. While
one element is not present, it is not considered unless one designates it as being
censored in some way. The second example demonstrates what happens when
an element is censored from the permutation sequence. Since only one element
is censored, the sequence might as well be fully observed (since the order is fully
known). The third example has two right censored elements, meaning there is
one less observable inversion. In this case, both the number of inversions and the
number of possible inversions are reduced by one. This reduces the distance and
improves the nearness score, since the inversion between A and C in the prior
example has been replaced by uncertainty. The last example demonstrates the
ability to have censored elements in the ground truth sequence. Ties are handled
similarly to censored elements, with no inversions counted by either the inversion
count nor the maximal inversion count. Appendix I notes some additional
properties of the algorithm. As noted, given a random permutation with random
right-censoring (the null hypothesis), the nearness calculation approaches 0.5 for
this metric. A nearness above 0.5 means that a sequence is closer than chance.
This modified inversion number algorithm provides a useful metric for
comparing the distance between an individual simulation sequence against the
ground truth, while naturally normalizing this distance and adjusting for censored
data and ties. It provides a way to determine which experimental cases are
closer to the ground truth data, and a way to tell if the simulation as a whole is
performing better than chance at predicting the order of first expression for each
meme.
Median Expression Position
A second metric for comparing simulation expression orderings with ground truth
orderings is by determining the median order for each agent’s first expression.
This ordering is determined by calculating an agent’s order within a given
simulation run, as compared to its peers. For each agent, this generates a set of
data in the form [O1, O2, ..] where O1 is the order that the agent took the action
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in the first run and O2 is its order for the second run, etc. Due to the possibility
of ties, an agent may share its order with another agent on a given run. In this
case, all simultaneously acting agents are assigned to the average of the slots
they would have occupied as a group (ex. three agents tied for fourth would all
be marked as 5, the mean of [4,5,6]). From an agent’s expression position across
multiple simulation runs, an agent’s median expression position can be calculated
by taking the median value.
Table 7.7 displays a set of 3 example orderings and their resulting median
sequence. For reference, the indices of the sequences are shown in the first column.
As one can see, the positions in the median sequence are determined by the
median position of each term. A is the first element, since its positions were
(1,1,4). C and D share the third position, since their positions were (3,3,4)
and (2,3,4) respectively. This approach helps generate a typical ordering for the
elements, which is representative of those observed in the individual sequences.
Table 7.7: Median Sequence Example
Index Sequence 1 Sequence 2 Sequence 3 Median Sequence
1 A B A A (1)
2 B D B B (2)
3 C C D C, D (3)
4 D A C
Using the median values of agent’s expression positions, an expression order
can be generated that indicates the typical positions that agents first expressed
a meme. This provides an alternative method for comparing the simulation
orderings against the holdout data. It also provides insight into which agents
typically did not express a meme, since their median expression position will be
“Never.” Additionally, since this produces an expression ordering the inversion
count method can be applied to the median position ordering as well.
7.2.5 Diffusion Rate Analysis
Measuring the spread of affordances can be treated as a diffusion of innovation
problem. The Innovation Decision Process (IDP) theory can be used to frame
this analysis. This theory has five stages: knowledge (awareness), persuasion,
decision, implementation, and confirmation (Rogers, 1995). These parameters
are present within the simulation framework, as shown in Table 7.8. This means
that the diffusion analysis focuses on the Knowledge and Implementation phases
of the IDP theory, noted by asterisks in Table 7.8. This analysis considers three
possible states for PMFServ agents with respect to a meme: unaware, aware but
not expressing (knowledge), and expressing (implementation). Learning occurs
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when agents move from unaware to aware. Expression occurs only when an agent
actively engages in the afforded action. Measuring the reproduction dynamics of
memes requires monitoring agents as they transition between these states.
Table 7.8: Innovation Diffusion Analysis Metrics
IDP Theory Stage Measurement
Knowledge* Existence of meme in agent memory
Persuasion Utility of expression at each time step
Decision Decision choice of agent
Implementation* Action implementation and result
Confirmation Transitions between expression and non-expression
Classical diffusion of innovation models have only two states, adopters and
non-adopters (Rogers, 2002). This is based upon the assumption that an adopter
not only adopts a practice but continues to use it. Since memes are only
intermittently expressed, this is not a good assumption for simulation. Instead,
diffusion is examined separately at the learning level and the expression level.
For each of these properties, the total count of agents who have reached these
states is plotted over time to examine the diffusion curve and adoption rate.
This provides insight into the rate of acquisition and of initial adoption. This
allows comparing the simulation diffusion curves against the classical S-curve of
adoption from Rogers (1962).
7.2.6 Granger Causality Test
Related to diffusion, the time-causality between learning and first expression is
of interest. Clearly, learning is necessary for expression. Likewise, expression
is necessary for new learning- a chicken and egg problem. While learning and
expression must be mutually causal, a first expression is not necessary for learning
because later expressions can also promote learning. With that said, the first
expression by an agent may be more causal for learning due to its potential to
reach new agents who are socially well-connected to the agent who is expressing
for the first time. It is worthwhile to analyze if learning and first expression are
significantly causal to each other within these simulations, as well as to examine
the immediacy of this causality (i.e. are people expressing right after learning,
or much later).
The Granger Causality test can perform this sort of analysis because it is a
statistical test that determines the likelihood that one time series (
−→
X ) is causal
to another time series (
−→
Y ), based upon a fixed lag factor (Granger, 1969). A
Granger Causality test is a special type of regression. First, an autoregression is
performed on the time series of the caused variable (
−→
Y ) to capture the variance
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of prior terms in the series in predicting the current value, where prior terms
up to the lag factor are considered. Next, a second regression is run using the
significant prior terms of
−→
Y and also the corresponding prior terms from
−→
X . A
statistical test is applied to the final regression where the null hypothesis is that
none of the lagged terms from
−→
X add to the explanatory power of the regression.
Effectively, this test checks if the prior terms from the time series
−→
X help predict−→
Y as opposed to terms from
−→
Y alone.
The Granger Causality test was applied to test the causality of learning on
first expression and on the causality of first expressions on learning, for each
simulation run in the Stanford Prison Experiment. For each causality test, the
lag factor was varied over a fixed range of lags representing time values from 10
minutes of simulation time later to one hour of simulation time later.
If learning appeared strongly causal to first expression, this meant that agents
tended to express a meme not long after learning it. If first expression was
causal to learning, that indicates that new agents expressing a meme are reaching
otherwise resistant agents- ones who had not learned from other agents expressing
the meme. This second effect is of particular interest- the possibility that an
agent’s first expression helps reach previously unreachable agents. This sort of
effect is observed in real life. For example, if a friend with no taste in movies
constantly recommends a movie they may be ignored repeatedly. However, if
they get someone whose opinion you trust to see the movie and the trusted
person recommends it, you may pay attention to the title of the movie.
To explore these causality relationships, the Granger Causality test was
chosen (Granger, 1969). The particular implementation used was the
“grangertest” implemented in the R “lmtest.” This variant uses a Wald model-
comparison test in the background, which allows either F-test or Chi-Squared
test statistics to be employed. For these analyses, the F-test variant was used.
From these tests, the probability of a causal relationship in each direction was
examined.
7.2.7 Sub Group Analysis
Of key interest are the differences between agents who tend to learn certain
memes and express certain memes. To examine these differences, each agent’s
time of first learning and time of first expression were calculated across all of its
simulation runs during a specific experimental condition, for each meme. The
first learning was the first time that the agent acquired the meme. The first
expression time was the first occurrence when an agent performed the meme
action. These two parameters were used to segment the total agent population
into subgroups based on their learning and expression rates.
Two methods were used to segment agents into subgroups. The simplest
approach examined each property separately and segmented agents into quartiles.
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Quartiles are a common approach used for simple classification based upon a
single property. The highest and lowest quartile groups were compared against
each other. So then, attempts were made to discover the differences between
agents who most frequently expressed a certain meme as compared to those who
seldom expressed the same meme. This method was applied to the Stanford
scenario, where the number of agents was small.
The second method of segmenting agents into groups was a model-based
clustering algorithm which employs normal mixture modeling. Clustering was
applied to the Hamariyah Iraqi village because the number of agents was
significantly higher, making it infeasible to break the agents down into quartiles
and examine each agent individually. Additionally, clustering techniques have
the benefit of being able to handle more than one variable simultaneously. This
allowed categorizing agents with respect to both their speed of learning and first
expression.
Normal mixture model clustering was chosen over a variety of other clustering
techniques available. Normal mixture clustering tends to generate elliptically
shaped clusters for two dimensional data. From looking at the raw data
plots, many of the Hamariyah experiments appeared to have clusters of that
approximate shape. As such, normal mixture model clustering was chosen
to classify agents into subgroups. K-means clustering was considered as an
alternative but was not used due to its strong dependence on the number
of clusters selected. Given the solid effectiveness of clustering using normal
mixtures, k-means were not needed to classify agents in the Hamariyah Iraqi
village.
The clustering algorithm used for clustering was mClust, a package
implemented in R (Fraley & Raftery, 2003). mClust was chosen because it is
a flexible and tested normal mixture model clustering package. mClust was used
to generate clusters among the agents based upon their average learning time
and average first expression time for memes. The mClust algorithm takes a
matrix where each row i represents a data point in the form (xi, yi, ...). For this
analysis, each data point represents different properties of the same agent. This
means that each row of the matrix is in the form (FirstLearningTime of Agenti,
FirstExpressionTime of Agenti). Based upon this matrix, the mClust algorithm
uses Bayesian techniques to apply the appropriate mixture model, assign points
to clusters, calculate the cluster means, and calculate a variety of other factors
such as uncertainty of assignments. This software also provided built-in graphing
capabilities which were used to generate the cluster maps presented. A cluster
analysis was completed for each meme (GiveInformation and PlantIED) under
each experimental condition (Hypothesis and Random).
Exploratory analysis of the generated clusters was performed to discover
reliable differences between clusters, based upon agent properties and contexts.
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Cross cluster analysis was performed to compare the distributions of agent
property values between clusters. The properties examined were the group
memberships of the agents, the agents’ opinions of other groups, their employment
levels, their authority, and their personality traits (from the GSP Tree, as
explained in Section 5.2). ANOVA analysis helped detect properties that had
significant differences between other clusters. A Scheffe post-hoc test was run to
determine the significance of differences between each pair of clusters, for each
property. These differences are discussed to explain why certain clusters were
early or late adopters, for either learning or expression. The ANOVA analysis
was completed using the SAS statistical software.
7.3 Internal Validity
Internal validity testing is an important part of verifying that the agent cognitive
model works as expected. This testing is intended to make sure that the
computational model works as described in Chapter 5. The agent cognitive
model is constructed from a set of interacting cognitive components, as explained
in Chapter 5. Two types of internal validity testing were performed, as noted in
Table 7.9.
Table 7.9: Internal Validity Analyses Performed
Analysis Findings
Test the relationships
in cognitive model
Components that affect attention and learning work in the
correct direction (i.e. match the social science studies used to
extend the PMFServ agent cognitive model).
Components that affect attention and learning work have the
correct relative weights (i.e. match the attention salience
weights assumed in Table 5.7).
Check if the same
relationships are
observable in the
simulated scenario
data
Cognitive component relationships are unclear using same
analyses, due to collinearity between cognitive components.
Situational factors significantly affect which components
covary.
Novelty’s relationship with attention is masked due to
negative feedback between novelty and learning.
Ingroup membership and valence tended to covary (people
tend to like those in their ingroups).
The first test is a simple sanity check, that proves the models are implemented
correctly. This first check tests that the computer code to implement the model
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is working properly. The second part of internal validity analysis examines how
the components appear to interact, from data collected from the Stanford Prison
and Hamariyah simulation data. This second analysis is intended to test if the
implemented relationships would be obvious within the collected data from an
experiment. This test examines if the regression approach would be appropriate
for examining these relationships, if human attention incorporated these factors in
a similar way. This is important because the current linear weights of the inputs
to attentional salience are “best guess” weights. If an experiment could be run
to infer these weights experimentally, the cognitive model could be substantially
improved. As such, the simulations provide a useful testbed for examining if this
sort of regression might help determine better weights for the attention salience.
Internal validity testing differs from external validity testing in two ways.
Firstly, internal validity testing only checks that the PMFServ agent cognitive
model works as intended. They are compared against the assumptions and
empirical relationships used to build the model. On the converse, external validity
testing compares simulation outcomes against relationships not directly used to
construct the cognitive model or scenario.
This test ensured that the cognitive model for agents oriented attention
consistently with the weights given to each component of attentional salience,
as defined in Section 5.2.5. This internal validity analysis used a single agent
with a special test framework, rather than a full scenario. The importance of
each salience factor for attention was calculated using a logistic regression and
compared against the weights defined in Table 5.7, which shows the weights given
for each factor into the attention salience calculation. This ensures that the
agent’s cognitive model properly implemented the empirical relationships used to
design cognitive components. This analysis found that the agent cognitive model
did handle learning and attention as intended.
Secondly, the same regression analysis was performed on the collected
affordance transmission data collected from the simulations, as defined in Table
7.4. Since the same underlying cognitive models are used by the simulations
and the test framework, the underlying weights are also the same. However,
performing this analysis showed that in a more complex scenario it is much more
complicated to determine the relative weights. This is because in both scenarios,
certain structural elements created collinearity between the different components
of attentional salience. For example, even though cognitive model considered
valence and ingroup membership to be independent, both scenarios showed a
strong correlation between these factors. Certain interesting findings were found
in this analysis, which are noted. These findings indicate that even if attention
was handled similarly to the proposed model, inferring the values of these weights
would be non-trivial.
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7.3.1 Verifying Event Salience Component Weights
As noted in Section 5.2, attention and learning are mediated by a set of
cognitive models that model social influences (authority, conformity, ingroups,
reference groups, similarity, valence), action characteristics (motivated attention,
transferability), and general attentional factors (novelty, selection) that affect the
likelihood that an agent will learn from an observed event. Each of these factors
was chosen because it was based upon an empirical study which showed that
the factor had a positive correlation with the probability of being able to recall
a message or event. This analysis verifies that the components of the cognitive
model capture the relationships they are intended to model.
Table 7.10: Event Salience Component Weights (Copy of Table 5.7)
Component Assumed Weight Source Process
Authority 0.33 Mantell (1971) Peripheral
Conformity 0.34 Tanford and Penrod (1984) Peripheral
In-Group 0.30 Tajfel (1982) Peripheral
Motivation (central) 0.47 Roskos-Ewoldsen and Fazio (1992) Central
Novelty 0.21 Johnston et al. (1990) Mixed
Reference Group 0.30 Kameda et al. (1997) Peripheral
Selective Attention 0.32 Simons and Chabris (1999) Mixed
Similarity 0.47 Platow et al. (2005) Peripheral
Transferability 0.10 Bandura (1986) Central
Valence/Halo 0.38 Hilmert et al. (2006) Peripheral
Earlier in Chapter 5, the cognitive components were described which are
used to determine if an agent learns from an event that they can physically
observe. Learning from an event requires that an agent must pay attention to
the event, after which learning occurs probabilistically. As noted, under the
current settings all attended events result in learning. As such, attention is
the key factor that controls which events are learned. Attention to an event
is determined probabilistically as a function of the attentional salience of that
event. Table 7.10 displays the assumed importance of each cognitive component
in determining if an event is attended. Attentional salience for an event is a
weighted sum of each of those inputs, as weighted by the displayed weight.
As mentioned earlier, these weights are not necessarily empirically true but
are modeling assumptions that form the “best guess” from examining the stated
studies. As noted in Section 5.2.5, no empirical study has examined all these
factors simultaneously. As such, the linear structure of the attentional salience
calculation and the weights must be considered as modeling assumptions. The
true structure and relative importances of these factors in determining attention
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and learning still has considerable ambiguity. This is an area where more
empirical research could significantly improve the model quality.
However, the calculation of attentional salience does capture some important
information. This analysis is intended to test for the following:
1. Firstly, according to the empirical studies, all of the factors in Table 7.10
should have a positive relationship with learning from an event.
2. Secondly, the computational agent cognitive model components should
affect attention with these relative weights. This is an important sanity
check that the cognitive model is wired correctly.
3. Finally, this analysis should demonstrate that relative weights can be
calculated based upon observable data without needing to know their values
a priori. This is important because it shows that an empirical study could
be designed that would improve these weights, if attentional salience could
be approximated by a sum of linearly weighted components.
Separate from the simulation runs, a test was made using the attention model
alone. Events were passed to an agent for which each salience component was
selected from a uniformly random distribution in [0,1]. A set of one hundred
thousand randomly generated events were passed to the attention model, with
the outcome recorded (attended vs. not attended). This attention model used
an inattention salience of 8.0 (same as Hamariyah) and presented one event at a
time.
A test system was implemented which examined an individual agent’s
attention by passing it events with randomized salience component inputs. Figure
7.1 displays the system that was used to test that the agent’s cognitive model was
handling attention correctly. The attention model was shown a series of individual
events, each of which was specifically designed to have a particular value for
Novelty, Similarity, and all other components used for calculating attention
salience as noted in Table 7.10. A data set was generated by presenting one
hundred thousand events to the attention model, where each event had random
and independent inputs to the salience calculation.
Attended(e) =β0·Novelty(e) + β1·MotivatedAttention(e)+
β2· SelectiveAttention(e) + β3·Transferability(e)+
β4·Authority(e) + β5·Conformity(e) + β6·Similarity(e)+
β7·Valence(e) + β8· InGroup(e) + β9·ReferenceGroup(e) +m+ ε
(7.7)
The data set was processed using a logistic regression, shown for reference in
Equation 7.7 (a copy of Equation 7.3). This regression returns raw regression
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Figure 7.1: Event Salience Test Setup
β weights. These raw β weights do not directly correspond to the true salience
coefficient weights shown in Table 7.10 because attention is the output variable,
rather than attentional salience. As noted in Section 7.2.2, attention is a
probabilistic function of the sum of salience terms for observed events as well
as inattention salience. While the raw β weights will not match the true salience
weights, if each set of weights is normalized to sum to 1, then they should match
up.
For example, the maximum attention salience occurs when all inputs are
equal to 1 and sums to 3.22 (the sum of the weights in Table 7.10), with the
contribution from novelty being 0.21. If the raw β weights sum to 6.44 (excluding
the intercept), then the β weight from novelty should be 0.42. If the cognitive
model is working properly, then Equation 7.8 should hold for the salience input
weights where βi represents a raw β regression weight and wi represents the true
salience input weight for the input i. If this holds, the test has demonstrated
that the agent pays attention to events because of the factors in Table 7.10 and
that the relative importance of each factor corresponds to its salience weight.
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βi∑
i βi
≈ wi∑
iwi
∀i ∈ {SalienceInputs} (7.8)
To make this easier to examine, the raw regression weights for attention are
multiplied by a factor of
∑
wi
|wi|∑
βi
|βi| . While not changing the importance of the
weights relative to each other, it allows them to be directly compared against
the underlying weights in the attention salience model (True Coefficients). The
results of the regression are presented in Table 7.11. This table shows the raw
β coefficients, the rescaled β coefficients, the true model coefficients, and the
difference between the rescaled β weights and the true salience weights.
Table 7.11: Component Weights for Attention (Random, Indep. Components)
Raw Rescaled True Model
Salience Input Coefficients (βi) Coefficients Coefficients (wi) Rescaled - Actual
Authority 0.21 0.34 0.33 0.01
Conformity 0.22 0.36 0.34 0.02
InGroup 0.18 0.29 0.30 -0.01
Motivation 0.27 0.44 0.47 -0.03
Novelty 0.13 0.22 0.21 0.01
Reference Group 0.19 0.31 0.30 0.01
Selection 0.20 0.31 0.31 0.00
Similarity 0.30 0.48 0.47 0.01
Transferability 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.01
Valence 0.23 0.37 0.38 -0.01
This verifies that the attention model integrates the attention salience
components as designed. Each component has a measurably positive
contribution toward learning, meaning that the cognitive components are
correctly implemented. It also shows that, given the model design, a logistic
regression can tease out the relative impact of different inputs to the attentional
salience despite its low predictive utility. This means that if human attention
was directed by such a process, the relative weights could be inferred.
7.3.2 Event Salience Component Weights (Simulation)
A logistic regression analysis was also done on the data from a case from the
Hamariyah scenario (Randomized Condition) and from the Stanford scenario
(Hypothesis Condition). The analysis performed was similar, with the only
difference being the source of the events analyzed. While the prior case examined
specially generated events which randomized all inputs to attentional salience, the
events for these conditions resulted from the actual running of the simulation.
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Likewise, whether the attention paid attention to that event was the real outcome
within the simulation during that run. Figure 7.2 displays the setup used to
examine the salience component weights from the simulation data.
Figure 7.2: Event Salience Simulation Data Collection and Regression
The Hamariyah Iraqi village operates similarly to the randomized test
condition. Agents observe only one event at a time, which competes with the same
level of unrepresented noise (inattention salience of 8.0). The Stanford condition
is different due to the fact that agents process multiple events simultaneously
and can perceive up to 4 events. The inattention salience is small, so multiple
events will be typically be perceived. However, this will result in some interaction
between events, since events are competing for attention against each other.
Table 7.12 displays logistic regression weights estimated from the Hamariyah
village scenario and the Stanford scenario. The Hamariyah regression is
calculated over approximately 5 million observations where an agent could
perceive another agent taking an action, while the Stanford regression was taken
over approximately 2.75 million observations. This large number of observed
cases for each is a result of the number of observations being a function of: #
runs × # actions per agent × (#agents)2. Only one condition for each scenario
is presented, as they are representative of the other cases using the same scenario.
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Table 7.12: Actual and Regression β Weights for Attention
Actual Stanford Hamariyah
Model (Hypothesis) (Randomized)
Salience Input Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
Authority 0.33 0.08 0.24
Conformity 0.34 0.61 0.72
InGroup 0.30 0.42 0.13
Motivation 0.47 -0.24 -4.31
Novelty 0.21 0.06 -0.16
Reference Group 0.30 -0.04 0.47
Selection 0.31 0.26 0.36
Similarity 0.47 0.13 0.41
Transferability 0.10 0.82 -0.34
Valence 0.38 0.80 0.51
It is evident that these weights in a real simulation differ significantly from the
fully random condition. Since the cognitive model hasn’t changed at all between
the Hamariyah condition and the random test, the difference comes from the
inputs: there is no longer an assurance that the inputs are independent. This
indicates that the issue is multicollinearity- the inputs covary and are explaining
the same variance in attention. To test if collinearity between factors made it
impossible to infer the weights using a regression, two analyses were applied. The
first analysis was a set of regressions applied on subsamples of the simulation data.
This helped identify which factors were unstable or had other sampling bias that
confounded the full regression. The second analysis was a correlation analysis to
examine covariance between each pair of factors. This analysis helped explore
which factors might have interacted.
7.3.3 Subsample Regression Analysis
The subsample regression analysis was performed to check for collinearity or time-
dependence in the observations. If collinearities exist, these should result in large
swings in the β weights for the inputs that are collinear. Since the simulation
data set size is large (millions of observations), it is possible to run regressions
on multiple random subsamples of observations to check for such instability. To
check for time-dependence, a series of regressions was performed on evenly-sized
time intervals of the full simulation data sets. The data for each time slice was
drawn from the same time range across many runs. By subsampling over time,
this analysis examined if the β weights appeared to have a trend through the
simulation.
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Detecting Collinearities: Random Subsample Regression Analysis
The random subsample analysis completed utilized the same form of regression
displayed previously in Equation 7.7. It also used the same data sets used earlier
in Section 7.3.2, the Hamariyah Randomized Condition attention data and the
Stanford Hypothesis Condition attention data. However, instead of computing a
single regression each full data set, this analysis computed a number of regressions
on subsamples of observations from each full data set. This was intended to
expose unstable β terms in the regression that might result from collinearity.
Each smaller regression consisted of 10,000 observations. These observations
were sampled from the full data set under that condition, which consists of
observations from numerous different runs and observations within those runs.
The subsamples were generated independently, sampled from the full data set
under that condition. As such, each of these random subsets is a limited but
representative sample of the full set of observations (
−→
O ) used to calculate the
regression coefficients shown in Table 7.12.
−→
OSample(k) = choose(
−→
O, k) (7.9)
P (
−→
OSample(k) = x) =
1(
N
k
) (7.10)
Each subsample was obtained by using a Choose k algorithm, where each
subsample consists of k observations sampled from the full set. In generating a
single subsample, the observations are sampled without replacement (a subsample
will not have any duplicates). Across samples, there is no restriction on re-using
elements, all subsamples are generated starting with the full set of observations.
So then, assume each subsample (
−→
OSample(k)) consists of k elements from the
full set (
−→
O ) that consists of N elements. The function to select a subset can be
stated as in Equation 7.9, where the probability of any given subsample is noted
in Equation 7.10.
Since these subsamples were random and independent, it is possible that the
same observation might be included in one or more subsamples. However, such
cases are unlikely due to the size of the subsample sets (10,000 observations)
compared to the full data sets (2.5 to 5 million observations). Since these less
powerful regressions should still have enough power to be representative, high
instability in the β values imply collinearity issues.
Regressions were applied to 100 subsamples, where each sample consisted of
10,000 observations. Table 7.13 displays the mean and variance of the regression
β values for each of the attention salience inputs, for subsamples of the Stanford
Hypothesis and Hamariyah Randomized conditions (same conditions used for
the full simulation regressions). Looking at these regressions, it is evident that
significant instability exists for all coefficients and major instability exists for
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Table 7.13: Subsample Regression β Weights for Attention
Stanford Hypothesis Hamariyah Randomized
Salience Input Average β StDev β Average β StDev β
Authority 0.26 0.13 0.20 0.11
Conformity 0.09 0.13 0.88 0.06
InGroup 0.41 0.14 0.08 0.09
Motivation -0.23 0.27 -3.68 0.28
Novelty -0.01 0.29 -0.30 0.11
Reference Group -0.02 0.74 0.54 0.31
Selection 0.83 0.13 0.42 0.42
Similarity 0.63 0.26 0.42 0.08
Transferability 0.15 0.13 -0.43 0.05
Valence 0.79 0.16 0.56 0.08
some coefficients. From looking at these trends, the majority of β weights
have standard deviations greater than 0.1 in both conditions. This indicates
that collinearity is a problem for the regression, leading to unstable β weights.
Additionally, the regression algorithm itself seems to tend toward assigning
more extreme β weights rather than distributing weights more evenly. This
is a documented issue with typical regression approaches in the presence of
multicollinearity (Lipovetsky & Conklin, 2001). As such, even the seemingly
stable weights may be improperly biased. Given that collinearity appears to be
an issue, the relationships between the factors will be examined in Section 7.3.4.
Detecting Time Trends: Time-Interval Regression Analysis
To detect issues resulting from time-dependent interactions, the full data sets
were also split into subsamples based on their simulation time step values. Unlike
the prior analysis, these subsamples are deterministic and non-overlapping- no
observation from one subsample could be present in another subsample. This
analysis also used the same regression displayed previously in Equation 7.7, as well
as the data sets used earlier in Section 7.3.2 (Hamariyah Randomized Condition
and Stanford Hypothesis Condition). A Mann-Kendall trend test was applied to
the β coefficients for each salience input, examining the trend of each coefficient
across different periods of each simulation.
The subset samples for the time interval regression were created by splitting
up the full set of observations based upon their simulation time step value (listed
as “Step” in Table 7.4). This value determines when the action occurred during
the simulation. For each time step, multiple observations exist. This is because
there are multiple runs, meaning the same time point occurs in each simulation.
Additionally, many agents can observe the same action and determine if they pay
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attention to it. This allows even a small slice of simulation time to have many
associated observations.
The observations for each simulation condition was split into subsets that
covered time intervals that approximately equal in time length. Each of these
subsets consisted of data from multiple simulation runs that started using the
same experimental condition. Assume
−→
O r[t] represents the observations for run
r that occurred at the Step value (t). If the time interval length is assumed to be
L and there were Z runs in that condition, the data will be split into subsamples
as shown in Table 7.14.
Table 7.14: Time-Interval Subsample Approach
Step (t) Run 1 Run 2 ... Run Z
Subsample 1
1
−→
O 1[1]
−→
O 2[1] ...
−→
OZ [1]
...
...
... ...
...
L
−→
O 1[L]
−→
O 2[L] ...
−→
OZ [L]
Subsample 2
L+1
−→
O 1[L+ 1]
−→
O 2[L+ 1] ...
−→
OZ [L+ 1]
...
...
... ...
...
2L
−→
O 1[2L]
−→
O 2[2L] ...
−→
OZ [2L]
...
...
...
... ...
...
...
...
...
... ...
...
A logistic regression, in the same form as shown in Equation 7.3, was applied
to each of these subsets to estimate the β coefficients for each input to salience.
For each input to salience, the associated β coefficients were considered as a time
series based upon the time period for the subset. For example, the Hamariyah
regressions assigned Ingroups a β value of 0.32 the step 1 to L subset, a β of
0.26 for step L+1 to 2L subset, and so on. If the distribution of observations
is time-invariant, there should be no significant trends in the β coefficients for
each of the inputs to attention. To test for this, a Mann-Kendall trend test was
applied to each β time series to determine the association (trend direction) and
the probability of the null hypothesis (no trend).
For the Hamariyah Randomized data set, the data was split into slices 72
steps in length (L = 72). This length was chosen because it was the number of
steps required for each agent to take one action. This created 48 non-overlapping
subsets, each with approximately 100,000 observations. Table 7.15 displays the
Mann-Kendall trend analysis of the regression β values calculated for each time
interval. In this table the Tau coefficient displays the direction and strength
of the trend, while the p value indicates the probability of the null hypothesis
(no trend). From looking at this table, it appears there are potentially significant
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trends occurring over time. Motivation, novelty, and valence appear to experience
a negative trend in their β values over time, making them less indicative of
attention. All the other factors appear to have increasing coefficients, except
for InGroups, which appear to have a stable influence. This indicates that the
collinearities between inputs experience some time-dependent trends. The next
section, which explores correlations between factors, examines why some of these
trends might occur.
Table 7.15: Interval Regression β Weights for Attention (Hamariyah
Randomized)
Salience Input Tau Coefficient p
Authority 0.17 0.09
Conformity 0.19 0.06
InGroup 0.10 0.34
Motivation -0.56 2 · 10−8
Novelty -0.17 0.10
Reference Group 0.17 0.08
Selection 0.27 0.01
Similarity 0.17 0.10
Transferability 0.20 0.04
Valence -0.28 0.01
The Stanford Hypothesis condition data was also analyzed using a similar
technique. Each time slice consisted of 12 steps, creating 58 subsets which each
contained approximately 50,000 samples. However, due to the changing guard
shifts, it is harder to interpret the β coefficients. Since a change in guard shifts
may change some of the collinearities, there will be a degree of periodicity in
the β coefficients. In order to accommodate this, a Seasonal-Kendall trend test
was applied. This test works similarly to the Mann-Kendall test, except that it
preprocesses each season by finding the median and then looks for trends across
the seasons. For this analysis the guard shifts were treated as “seasons” of the day,
so that a 24 hour day consisted of 3 seasons (guard shifts). While this technique
loses some temporal information, it is necessary to accommodate the periodic
nature of guard shifts. The trend test implementation used was developed by the
US Geological Survey (USGS) and its details are described in Helsel, Mueller,
Slack, and Geological Survey (US) (2006).
Table 7.16 displays the trends in the β coefficients for the Stanford Hypothesis
condition attention components. The Stanford Prison experiment appeared to
have less clear time-dependent trends, possibly due to the periodicity of the guard
shifts. However, it still showed a few strong trends in the β values over time.
Valence and reference group influence appeared to have less power for attention
over time, while similarity appeared to increase its β values significantly. Overall,
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Table 7.16: Interval Regression β Weights for Attention (Stanford Hypothesis)
Salience Input Tau Coefficient p
Authority -0.13 0.67
Conformity -0.07 0.89
InGroup 0.07 0.89
Motivation -0.20 0.48
Novelty -0.20 0.48
Reference Group -0.53 0.03
Selection 0.40 0.12
Similarity 0.87 0.01
Transferability 0.27 0.32
Valence -0.80 0.01
this data is harder to draw clear conclusions from but it indicates that some time-
dependent changes in collinearity occurred in this simulation as well.
Looking at the Tau correlation coefficients from both experiments, a few
trends seem to emerge. Firstly, the InGroup β values appear to be fairly
consistent with respect to time- neither increasing or decreasing in importance.
This indicates that any collinearity involved with these does not have a time
component. The motivation, novelty, and valence terms had negative correlation
coefficients in both conditions, especially in the Hamariyah condition which
was far less noisy. This indicates that for some reason other factors may to
increasingly overshadow these coefficients over time (i.e. other, collinear inputs
to attention get higher β weights while theirs decrease). The factors that increase
appear vary between the simulations, indicating that negative feedback may occur
for certain factors. Negative feedback could occur due to the dynamics between
factors. It could also occur due to feedback between a factor and attention. The
correlation analysis in the next section will attempt to examine what relationships
might exist that cause these trends in the β values.
7.3.4 Summary of Correlation Analysis of Simulation
Correlation matrices were generated to help examine which parameters covary.
The full analysis is contained in Appendix J.1, since the full details are tangential
to the core purpose of the internal validation. From examining these correlation
matrices, it is clear that multi-collinearity is the reason that this approach
inferring the salience weights ineffective. In both the Stanford Prison simulation
and the Hamariyah simulation, a significant number of factors covary. As such,
in a complex environment where such influences do not tend to be linearly
independent, these weights cannot be easily inferred from the observable data.
From an empirical standpoint, this has interesting implications for attempting
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to determine the relative importance of these factors in affecting learning and
attention. This analysis indicates that attempting to infer the interaction between
such cognitive components using empirically collected data would require careful
experiment design and should probably involve collecting data from multiple
contexts. This is important because currently no experimental data gives a good
idea on how these cognitive components truly interact. This analysis shows that
even for a simple model, getting a good picture of such interactions would be
difficult.
The correlation analysis also produced some interesting results with respect to
which factors covary together in each simulation. From examining the correlations
in Appendix J.1, two interesting correlations were found in both the Stanford
Prison simulation data and the Hamariyah data. The first relationship was
between novelty and attention, while the second was between valence and ingroup
membership.
The first interesting pattern was found with how Novelty interacted with
attention and the other components. In short, novelty correlates negatively with
almost everything else. This relationship is extremely counter-intuitive at first
glance. From the model design and initial analysis performed in Section 7.3.1,
we know that increased novelty of an event increases its salience for attention.
However, over the course of many events more novel events are less likely to be
paid attention to.
Looking deeper into this pattern, it appears to be caused by a negative
feedback between novelty and learning. Novel events are ones that are unfamiliar.
Events can be unfamiliar (novel) because one has never been exposed to them,
or because when exposed to them, one did not pay attention to them. This
second reason for novelty is at the heart of the matter. A significant portion of
novel events may remain unfamiliar because they were otherwise uninteresting.
The negative feedback between attention and novelty occurs due to their shared
relationship with learning. Attention is required in order to learn. Learning
about an event decreases its novelty. So then, events salient mainly due to their
novelty will lose novelty and be less salient. This means that even though novelty
increases attentional salience, an event will only stay novel if the agent doesn’t
learn about it enough to become familiar with it. This means that persistent
novelty of events indicates that those events are otherwise uninteresting. This is
an interesting pattern, since it seems likely to occur in most adaptive systems-
humans included.
The second interesting pattern was that membership in the same ingroup was
correlated with higher valence. This makes intuitive sense, in that it would be
expected that people sharing an ingroup would like each other more than people
in outgroups. This dynamic matches with a significant body of research on social
identity theories, which posit a preference toward people who appear to be in the
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same ingroup (Tajfel, 1982).
These two regularities may give some insight into empirical analysis of these
cognitive phenomena. These are interesting and unexpected findings that show
that the complete cognitive model provides some additional insight beyond the
individual parts, an important part of any systems model. In particular, the
relationship between novelty and attention appears to be a robust one. Finally,
this analysis shows that it to be difficult to determine the relative impact of
different factors that affect learning and attention. This analysis indicates that
situational collinearity may cause certain factors to mask others, even to the
point of some factors appearing to have a negative contribution even when it is
known that they increase the likelihood of attention or learning.
7.3.5 Internal Validity Summary
The first analysis of the internal validity of the model showed that the
computational model of agent cognition was implemented as intended. This
shows that the model used by the simulations works as intended, from Chapter
5. This means that the computational model captures the empirically derived
relationships used to design this model. It also showed that such relationships can
be derived from the operation of agent cognitive model, by correctly estimating
the relative attentional salience weights used by the model. This analysis confirms
that the computational model works as expected.
The second analysis showed that a regression analysis could not derive these
salience weights from either simulation data, due to situational collinearity
between the factors. This was shown to not be an isolated effect, but one that
should be expected in analyzing many contexts. In particular, it was notable
that novelty will typically correlate negatively with attention if given enough
time. This is due to the negative feedback between novelty and learning emerges
in a complex environment (i.e. less attention → less learning → higher novelty).
Secondly, membership in a common ingroup was observed correlate with higher
valence. This may also be a typical relationship that would make it difficult
to distinguish between the contributions from ingroup membership and valence
(like/dislike).
Finally, many correlations between factors were different depending on the
scenario. This result highlights the difficulty of inferring the relationships between
different factors simultaneously. Since relationships between factors may be
environmental rather than representative of cognitive factors, empirical studies
on how these factors interact would need to be wary of how the experimental
context can introduce collinearities. This is an important finding, since cognitive
modeling can greatly benefit from broad scale studies that examine how large sets
of factors interact. However, such experiments would only produce generalizable
data for cognitive modeling if they avoid having high levels of situational
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connections between the factors being studied. The combination of the first
and second internal validity analyses indicates that designing an experiment to
improve upon this cognitive model design is theoretically possible, but great care
would be required to develop appropriate experimental design.
7.4 Stanford Prison Experiment Simulation Analysis
The Stanford prison experiment produced a variety of results. The first results
presented are the external validity measures, comparing the simulation results
against the prison dynamics noted in the published papers and archival data.
Next, a brief discussion of exploratory results is presented to examine how memes
are transmitted in the social network.
7.4.1 External Validity Measures
Each external validity measure here compares data collected from the model
against trends or data from the actual Stanford Prison Experiment. Table 7.17
lists the external validity measures that were applied to the Stanford Prison
Experiment simulation and the ground truth empirical relationship. These
measures were selected prior to observing the recorded data, and so can be used
to determine how the recorded data corresponds with the ground truth. Each of
these tests will be described briefly in the following section, and the results will
be summarized at the end of the section in an analogous table.
Relative Action Proportions
The relative action frequencies are how often each action occurs, in comparison to
other recorded actions. While the simulation was not intended to directly match
the relative action frequencies, these frequencies were used to calibrate the first
day of the experiment so some correspondence should be observed.
This analysis looked at the relative action frequencies in the simulation,
among those that were coded from the Stanford Prison Experiment videos.
As noted in Section 6.1.1, the following actions were implemented in the
simulation and recorded: commands, information, insults, questions, resistance,
physical aggression, helping, threats, use of instruments (threatening with a
baton). The Stanford Prison experiment empirical data had counts of commands,
helping, information, insults, resistance, and use of instruments. Due to reasons
mentioned earlier (time discretization, background actions), it is impossible to
directly compare raw counts. Instead, the raw count of each action is normalized
by the total count of all these actions- generating the fraction of record actions
that fall into each category. For the simulations, which had many runs, these
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Table 7.17: External Validity Tests
Measure Empirical Ground Truth
Relative Action Frequency Examine how common actions are, compared
to each other.
Command Command was the most frequent action
observed (≈ 38 % of actions)
Help Help was the least common action observed (≈
1%).
Information Giving information was commonly observed
(≈ 18% of actions)
Insult Insults were commonly observed (≈ 18% of
actions)
Resist Prisoner resistance was somewhat common (≈
9% of actions)
Threaten Threats were somewhat common (≈ 9%)
Use of Instruments Use of instruments was moderately common
(≈ 8%)
Group Differences: Action Frequency Examine which subsets of agents perform
certain actions more than other agents.
Insult (S 13 vs Other Guards) S 13 used more insults than other guards
Insult (Night Shift vs Other Shifts) The night shift guards used more insults than
guards in other shifts.
Command (Night Shift vs Other Shifts) The night shift used more commands on
prisoners than guards in other shifts.
Emotion Tests Examine how emotions vary over time
Average Guard Emotions Average guard emotions were slightly negative.
Average Prisoner Emotions Average prisoner emotions were negative
(about 3 times more negative than guards)
Guard Emotions Over Time Guard emotions had a slight negative trend.
Prisoner Emotions Over Time Prisoner emotions had a negative trend.
Meme Expression Ordering Test which simulation condition best captures
the order of first expression (if any).
ThrowInHole First Expression Test which simulation condition(s) best
predicts the order that guards throw their first
prisoner in the hole.
Resistance First Expression Test which simulation condition(s) best
predicts the order that prisoners actively resist
guards.
FeelImprisoned First Expression Test which simulation condition(s) best
predicts the order that prisoners feel that they
are imprisoned and cannot escape.
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fractions were averaged across runs. Table 7.18 shows the relative proportions of
each type of action.
Table 7.18: Stanford Action Frequency Proportions (Mean)
Ground Fully Known Hypothesis Authority
Action Truth Condition Condition Condition
Command 0.38 0.27 0.29 0.29
Help 0.002 0.05 0.05 0.04
Information 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.16
Insult 0.18 0.05 0.03 0.03
Resist 0.09 0.29 0.30 0.30
Threat 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.01
Use Of Instruments 0.08 0.16 0.17 0.18
Looking at the data, it appears that despite the calibration over the initial
portion of the experiment, the simulation runs showed significant deviations
from the expected action distributions. Commands, Help, and Information each
fall into their expected ranks- with Commands being a very common action,
Information being somewhat common, and Help being uncommon. Commands,
while still the most common guard action, were less common than in the actual
experiment. Helping was slightly more common, but still very uncommon.
Information showed almost an exact match. Insults were significantly less
common in the simulation, as were threats. Instead, the use of instruments
became a more popular action- picking up the slack for these. Since Use of
Instruments, Threats, and Insults were functionally similar within the simulation,
this is notable but not particularly interesting.
Resistance was significantly more common than in the actual experiment.
To an extent, this was expected. During the actual experiment, a number
of prisoners were dismissed early, while the simulation tended to retain the
prisoners for the duration. The reasons for this difference are explained in
Appendix H. The lower release rate resulted in more total prisoners, increasing
opportunities for resistance. It is also possible that tuning based upon the first
day made resistance more attractive than intended, since the original experiment
showed little resistance on the first day. This may have caused resistance to
be more common in the later portions of the experiment. Chart 7.3 supports
this interpretation. Over the first 20 hours of the experiment that were used for
calibration, the median resistance occurred at 1.31 resistance actions per time
step. Over the full experiment, this value averaged 1.73 actions per time step- a
33% increase.
It appears that this is due to resistance occurring in a cyclic fashion. In
particular, resistance is least prevalent during sleep periods and most common
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Figure 7.3: Median Prisoner Resistance Over Time (Full Knowledge Condition)
during the count-off periods that follow meal times. It should be noted that
different simulation runs showed slightly different trends in behaviors. In some
simulation runs, resistance was minimal for the first three days of the simulation,
while in others resistance was endemic across the experiment. If resistance in the
actual experiment occurred in cycles, this would make exact frequency matching
unlikely since only a small amount of the experiment was taped. Overall though,
resistance is overexpressed within the model. This means that the later diffusion
analysis for this meme will probably be significantly faster than might have
occurred in the real-life situation.
Between-Group Action Proportions
The Stanford Prison Experiment states a number of empirical relationships found
in action frequency, in terms of certain subgroups taking certain actions more than
other subgroups. The simulation model should capture some of these dynamics, if
it is appropriately modeling the situation. Three trends were noted: Guard S 13
used more Insults than other guards, the night shift (to which S 13 belonged)
used more Insults than other shifts, and the night shift used more Command
actions than other shifts.
Looking the Insult action, a secondary factor of interest was that S 13 tended
CHAPTER 7. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 155
to use insults more than other guards. Table 7.19 shows the mean number of
expressions of this action in the simulation, for S 13 and the remaining agents.
It also shows the p-value for a t-test that tested if the number of insults from
S 13 was significantly higher than the average of other guards. An independent
t-test was performed for each condition to test the probability that S 13 tended
to use insults more. In the t-test, the first set of values was the number of insults
performed by S 13 in each run and the second set of values was the average of
other guards. The ground truth values are provided for reference, since they
capture the relative proportions. However, these are not directly comparable
to the simulation values since the ground truth are frequency rates while the
simulation values are displayed as raw counts.
The simulation data, as shown in the table, indicate that S 13 used insults
significantly more than other guards. In each of the experimental conditions, the
harshest and most innovative of the guards, S 13, lived up to his John Wayne
nickname in the simulation by showing a greater incidence of insults.
Table 7.19: Insult Frequency of S 13 vs Other Guards
Ground Fully Known Hypothesis Authority
Insult Metric Truth (Rate) Condition Condition Condition
S 13 (Mean) 11.29 10.2 10.9 9.67
Other Guards (Mean) ∼0.99 6.1 2.84 2.15
T-Test Result 0.001 0.06 6×10−25 9×10−19
Table 7.20: Insult Frequency of Night Shift vs Other Guards
Ground Fully Known Hypothesis Authority
Insult Metric Truth (Rate) Condition Condition Condition
Night Shift (Mean) 5.17 3.56 5.56 3.63
Other Guards (Mean) 2.29 7.72 2.83 2.59
T-Test Result - 0.95 7×10−10 5×10−8
The Stanford materials also note that the night shift in general performed
more insults. Table 7.20 shows the same analysis, comparing the night shift
guards with the other guards. This shows a similar correlation, except for the
Full Knowledge scenario. The Full Knowledge scenario had a modest increase in
insults by guards outside the night shift and a decrease in insults by S 20 in the
night shift. S 15, the final member of the night shift, was a “good guard” and
did not tend to use insults much, as displayed by the large shift. This indicates
that the night shift does not consistently evidence more insults, but instead that
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this dynamic hinges on the amount of insults used by S 20 who was the swing
member on the shift. Digging deeper into the data, S 20 had much more variance
in the Full Knowledge case than the other cases. Looking at the median level
of insults by S 20 indicates that this low mean value is dragged down by outlier
data, rather than being consistently different from the other cases. This indicates
that the night shift did tend to use more insults than members of other shifts.
Table 7.21: Command Frequency of Night Shift vs Other Guards
Ground Fully Known Hypothesis Authority
Command Metric Truth (Rate) Condition Condition Condition
Night Shift (Mean) 9.3 77.0 84.5 87.2
Other Guards (Mean) 4.04 73.0 82.08 82.0
T-Test Result - 0.28 0.09 1×10−18
Commands tended to be higher for the night shift than other shifts, across all
simulation conditions. However, this effect was not consistent in all conditions as
shown by the poor results on the t-test for the Fully Known and Hypothesis
conditions. While the night shift typically issues more commands in the
simulation, it is not as pronounced as was seen in the empirical data.
The body of action data from the simulation correlates moderately well with
that of the empirical data. While it is not fitting all values exactly, it captures
most of the trends shown in the empirical data. It should be noted that unlike a
statistical model or neural net, this cognitive modeling simulation is not prone to
overfitting a scenario because a majority of the structural assumptions are based
upon cognitive literature rather than the training data. From this perspective,
the level of correspondence is reasonable.
Emotional Trends
The Stanford Prison experiment journal papers present some general emotional
changes in prisoners and guards (Haney et al., 1973a, 1973b). In particular,
prisoners had more negative affect over time while guards had only a minor
decrease in affect. Since PMFServ uses emotions as part of its core framework,
these are being used to test for this sort of trend. This analysis assumes that the
Stanford Prison Experiment’s empirical data about emotions should correspond
to the aggregated emotions for agents in the simulated experiment, as defined in
Section 7.1.
Using the Aggregate simulation emotions of each agent has some limitations
compared to looking at the emotions individually. Firstly, it is possible that the
trends of the aggregate are not representative of certain trends of the individual
emotions. Secondly, it is possible that the Mood Adjective Checklist (MAC)
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trends are better represented by certain individual emotions rather than an
aggregated emotional term. Unfortunately, the raw data from the MAC was not
available so the only emotional trend data was derived from Haney et al. (1973a)
and Haney et al. (1973b). These papers do not interpret the mood in detail and
appear to be an aggregate emotional state of the subjects, hence the Aggregate
emotional state of the simulated agents was used for comparison. The Aggregate
emotional state is defined earlier in Equation 7.1 found in Section 7.1. Had more
detailed ground truth information been available, each simulation emotion would
have been analyzed and compared individually. This sort of analysis was not
completed, since it would be difficult to interpret the results.
The first analysis was intended to test if the average values of agent emotions
matched those from the empirical experiment. For each run, the average was
calculated for agents in the Prisoner group and for agents in the Guard group.
This was calculated to compare against the emotional trend data from the original
Stanford Prison Experiment.
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Emotions(Group)r[t] =
1
N
N∑
x∈Group
Emotion(Agentx)r[t]) (7.11)
To determine the emotional trends of each group, the emotions of the members
had to be combined into a representative set of time series for the group. This
was done by calculating the mean value of emotions for the group at each time
point, for each run. This generated a vector of average emotions for a group for
each run. Each element of the vector for any run r at a given time step t follows
Equation 7.11. Table 7.22 shows the mean, median, and standard deviation for
these values for each of the experimental conditions. It is evident in looking at the
table that both guards and prisoners were somewhat unhappy in the experiment,
on average. This matches the ground truth findings.
Table 7.22: Group Average Emotion Values
Group Mean Median Std Dev
Guards (Full Knowledge) -0.03 -0.05 0.05
Guards (Hypothesis) -0.05 -0.05 0.03
Guards (Authority) -0.05 -0.05 0.01
Prisoners (Full Knowledge) -0.11 -0.13 0.05
Prisoners (Hypothesis) -0.12 -0.12 0.03
Prisoners (Authority) -0.13 -0.13 0.02
T-Tests were run on emotion data used to generate Table 7.22 to test if the
guard emotions were higher than prisoner emotions, for each of the simulation
conditions. In all conditions, the probability of the null hypothesis was p <
1×10−6. This strongly indicates that guards were happier than prisoners in the
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simulation. Comparing the means, prisoners were between 2.3 and 3.4 times
less happy than the guards in the simulation. This corresponds well with the
Stanford findings, which estimated prisoners as being about 3 times less happy
than the guards. The average values of guards and prisoner emotions match with
the ground truth values.
Table 7.23: Stanford Prison Simulation Aggregate Emotion Trends
Group Negative Trend %
Guards (Fully Known) 7%
Guards (Hypothesis) 0%
Guards (Authority) 0%
Prisoners (Fully Known) 13%
Prisoners (Hypothesis) 10%
Prisoners (Authority) 3%
Emotions were also expected to get worse over time, particularly for the
prisoners. For each run, the group of agents of interest (guards or prisoners
currently in the experiment) had their emotions averaged and entered as a time
series. A Mann-Kendall test was used on each group’s time series, for each run.
Table 7.23 lists the number of runs in each experimental condition where the
Mann-Kendall test indicated that emotions decreased with p < 0.05.
This Mann-Kendall trend analysis strongly contradicts the expected result
from the empirical results. Emotions did not steadily worsen in the simulation but
were volatile and non-monotonic. For example, Figure 7.4 plots the mean value
of aggregate group emotions for prisoners and guards. Emotions for individual
subjects had similar patterns, where certain periods made them less happy than
others. The trends were not entirely time dependent, but in most cases some
level of emotional cycling occurred.
This means that the emotions in the PMFServ simulation cannot be
adequately compared with the Stanford Data. Since emotions in the Stanford
Prison experiment were only calculated in three (incomplete) point samples,
they provide limited correspondence information for comparing against a cyclic
time series. Even if the real life situation fit these curves precisely, any three
equidistant samples could produce a positive or negative trend. For this reason,
the trend analysis is inconclusive.
The validation based upon emotions showed mixed results. While guard
and prisoner emotions had appropriate average values, they appeared to work
cyclically rather than in monotonic trends. However, the ground truth stated in
Haney et al. (1973a) do not state that the trends are monotonic but explicitly
states that prisoners had significant emotional volatility. As such, it appears there
is insufficient ground truth data to draw any strong conclusions about validity
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Figure 7.4: Aggregate Group Emotions (Full Knowledge Condition)
on this aspect.
Meme Expression Ordering
The meme expression ordering is the most important external validity test. As
noted in Section 6.1.2, the order of first expression for three different memes
was inferred from the original data sources. The first analysis performed was to
calculate the median first expression orderings for agents expressing each meme.
Table 7.24 shows the ground truth orderings next to the median orderings from
the simulation runs under each condition. Tables 7.25 and 7.26 show these same
results for the Resist meme and FeelImprisoned meme respectively. As noted
previously, agents shown in parenthesis typically did not express the meme within
the experiment.
The orderings for each condition have significant similarities, both to the
ground truth condition and each other. S 11, S 12, S 13, and S 20 each tended
to express earlier than other agents. S 16 and S 19 tended to express later than
other agents. To an extent, this is influenced by the shift ordering. Following a
brief day shift, the night shift (S 13, S 15, S 20) takes over. Even when all guards
are aware of their ability to throw a prisoner in the hole, this does not tend to
happen until the evening shift takes over. However, the hypothesis condition
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Table 7.24: Stanford First Meme Expression Ordering Results (Throw In Hole)
Ground Truth Full Knowledge Hypothesis Authority
S 13 S 13, S 20 S 13 S 13, S 15
S 20 S 15 S 20 S 12
S 11 S 12 S 11 S 11
S 12, S 18 S 11 S 12 S 18
S 16, S 17, S 21 S 18 S 17 S 17
(S 15, S 19) S 17, S 21 S 15 S 21
(S 16, S 19) S 21 S 20
S 18 S 16
(S 16, S 19) (S 19,)
matches the ground truth slightly better- accurately reflecting the first 4 elements
of the sequence, and showing S 15 as later in the sequence rather than earlier.
S 15 was the “good guard” on the evening shift, who did not tend to imitate
S 13.
For this ordering, it is evident that the Full Knowledge condition performs
fairly well, but that the hypothesis condition may be capturing a key interaction
that allows S 15 to express the meme later. The Authority condition has
non-intuitive outcomes for the first shift, including the non-intuitive issues of
S 15 sometimes originating the meme and S 20 being one of the last adopters.
Otherwise, the Authority condition is very similar to the Full Knowledge
condition. Looking deeper at the data, this similarity is caused by a majority
of guards learning about the meme if it is presented to them by a figure of
high authority. Thus, the Authority condition typically starts with a majority
of agents aware of their respective memes. The median-value analysis seems
to slightly favor the Hypothesis condition, but Full Knowledge also gives a
reasonable median ordering.
Table 7.25: Stanford First Meme Expression Ordering Results (Resist)
Ground Truth Full Knowledge Hypothesis Authority
S 05 S 01 S 05 S 01
S 09 S 06, S 09 S 01 S 06
S 01, S 04 S 04 S 03, S 04 S 09
S 06 S 03 S 06, S 08 S 04
S 08 S 08 S 09 S 03
S 03 S 05 S 00 S 08
S 00 S 02 (S 02,) S 05
S 02 S 00 S 00
S 02
CHAPTER 7. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 161
As shown in Table 7.26, the Resist orderings show some similar trends.
The Full Knowledge and Authority conditions are more similar to each other
than to the Hypothesis condition. A notable difference is that the Hypothesis
condition is the only condition where S 05 is the first to express the Resist
action. Full Knowledge and Authority conditions place S 05 as expressing much
later. Secondly, the Hypothesis condition shows far more variance in its ordering
toward the middle (positions 3-7). S 03, S 04, S 06, and S 08 each have similar
median orderings that vary from run to run. Finally, the Hypothesis condition
predicts S 09 as being far later than either simulation condition or the ground
truth. No condition clearly outperforms another in the median value analysis
of resistance. The Hypothesis condition performs well, but it misses completely
on S 09 and shows uncertainty about the middle. The Full Knowledge condition
and Authority conditions are more certain in their orderings and place each agent
close to its appropriate ordering, but miss on S 05 who was one of the notable
resisters. Moreover while most orderings are close, the median condition for these
does not resemble the exact ordering of the ground truth.
Table 7.26: Stanford First Meme Expression Ordering Results (Feel Imprisoned)
Ground Truth Full Knowledge Hypothesis Authority
S 05 S 01 S 01 S 01
S 02, S 03 S 05, S 06, S 09 S 05, S 06 S 03, S 05, S 06, S 09
S 06 S 02, S 03, S 04 S 02, S 09 S 02, S 04
S 01 S 00 S 03 S 00
S 09 (S 08) S 04 (S 08)
S 00 S 00
(S 04, S 08) (S 08)
For the FeelImprisoned meme, all experimental conditions show a similar
ordering for the median condition. This is expected, since the FeelImprisoned
meme had the same starting set of agents aware of the meme across all conditions.
As such, this consistency between conditions is expected. All conditions show
high variability toward the middle and indicates that S 01 expresses feeling
imprisoned much earlier than the ground truth condition. In general, the
FeelImprisoned meme does not appear to be captured as accurately as the other
memes.
fInv = 1−
Inversions
MaxInversions
(7.12)
To look at this from a different perspective, the inversion distance was
calculated between simulation run orderings and the ground truth orderings. For
each run in each condition, the inversion count algorithm was run- calculating
the number of inversions and the maximum number of inversions, given the
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observed sequence. This nearness is defined in Equation 7.12, where Inversions is
the distance metric defined in Section 7.2.4 and MaxInversions is the calculated
value of the farthest the sequences could be apart. For each action under each
experimental condition, the average nearness was calculated across the set of runs
in that condition. This gives a metric for how close the ordering was the actual
order, with a value of 1 being a perfect match and a value of 0 being the worst
possible match. As a result, a higher nearness value is better.
Table 7.27: Stanford First Meme Expression Order Nearness
Full Knowledge Hypothesis Authority
Meme Avg(fInv) StdErr(fInv) Avg(fInv) StdErr(fInv) Avg(fInv) StdErr(fInv)
ThrowInHole 0.79 0.013 0.66 0.017 0.78 0.017
Resist 0.71 0.009 0.75 0.015 0.70 0.008
FeelImprisoned 0.64 0.018 0.65 0.017 0.68 0.014
Table 7.28: Stanford First Meme Expression Nearness: % fInv >0.5
Meme Full Knowledge Hypothesis Authority
ThrowInHole 100% 100% 100%
Resist 100% 100% 100%
FeelImprisoned 87% 97% 100%
Table 7.27 lists the average nearness of the 30 simulated orderings to the
ground truth ordering, along with the standard error term. Table 7.28 displays
the percent of runs which do better than chance (>0.5) for each meme, to display
the consistency that runs performed better than chance. Tables 7.29 and 7.30
show these same statistics, but ignores the first element from the ground truth
sequences. This is because the first element gives the hypothesis condition an
advantage, since that agent must be the first one to express the meme (since
they are the only one to start with it). This means that the innovators noted
in the prior sections are not considered in this analysis. For ThrowInHole, this
involved removing S 13 from analysis, for Resist S 00 and S 05 were removed,
and for FeelImprisoned S 08 was removed.
Looking at the ordering analysis, the first conclusion that can be drawn is
that all conditions perform significantly better than chance. These results are
consistent, with the ordering performing better than a random sequence at rates
ranging between 57% and 100%. In particular when using the full orderings,
Resist and ThrowInHole perform better than chance in 100% of the runs. As
was evident in looking at the median orderings, the expression orderings for
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Table 7.29: Stanford First Meme Expression Order Nearness (No Innovators)
Full Knowledge Hypothesis Authority
Meme Avg(fInv) StdErr(fInv) Avg(fInv) StdErr(fInv) Avg(fInv) StdErr(fInv)
ThrowInHole 0.74 0.015 0.54 0.023 0.74 0.020
Resist 0.77 0.016 0.55 0.026 0.77 0.012
FeelImprisoned 0.54 0.022 0.55 0.021 0.58 0.017
Table 7.30: Stanford First Meme Expression Nearness: % fInv >0.5 (No
Innovators)
Meme Full Knowledge Hypothesis Authority
ThrowInHole 100% 57% 100%
Resist 100% 57% 100%
FeelImprisoned 67% 60% 77%
FeelImprisoned were less accurate while ThrowInHole and Resist were fairly
accurate.
Running the inversion analysis on the median orderings shows even better
correspondence, with the Hypothesis condition and the Full Knowledge condition
there are marked improvements in the correspondence. By using the median
ordering to obtain a typical run, correspondences are higher than the average
across individual runs. Table 7.31 shows the correspondence of the median
sequences to the ground truth sequences, with and without innovators. This
analysis also indicates that the Full Knowledge and Hypothesis conditions appear
to perform better than the Authority condition.
Table 7.31: Stanford First Meme Expression Inversion Results (Median
Sequences)
Full Knowledge Hypothesis Authority
Meme All No S 13 All No S 05 or No S 00 All No S 08
ThrowInHole 0.82 0.77 0.85 0.81 0.67 0.58
Resist 0.71 0.84 0.79 0.61 0.69 0.80
FeelImprisoned 0.69 0.59 0.75 0.68 0.73 0.63
Looking at the totality of the ordering analyses, the Full Knowledge condition
appears to have the best overall performance. For ThrowInHole, the Full
Knowledge condition performs well on the individual sequences and on the
median-ordered sequence. The Hypothesis condition works very well on the
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median-ordered sequence, but it performs worse on the individual sequences than
Full Knowledge. The Authority condition performs as well as the Full Knowledge
condition, at best.
The Resist orderings are more complicated. The Hypothesis condition
performs the best when looking at the full orderings, with modestly better
correspondence than Full Knowledge. However, removing S 00 and S 05 pushes
the Hypothesis condition down to barely better than chance. Again, this
reinforces the median-ordering analysis which showed the Hypothesis condition
to perform a bit worse toward the middle. Correspondingly, the Full Knowledge
condition performed worse on S 05 and improves when that subject removed from
analysis. Each condition performs similarly on the FeelImprisoned ordering and
shows a modest correspondence that is better than chance.
The Full Knowledge worked reliably on both Resist and ThrowInHole
potential memes. For the ThrowInHole meme, it appears possible that all
agents knew about their ability to throw a prisoner in the hole at the start.
This means that their orderings were probably determined by the nature of
how they interacted with the prisoners, their personality differences, and the
ordering of guard shifts. Additionally, the Full Knowledge condition is more
reliable for representing the ordering of resistance among prisoners. This makes
Full Knowledge a plausible condition.
The Hypothesis condition’s strong performance on the median-orderings
supports it as a plausible mechanism in the Stanford Prison. The Hypothesis
condition performed worse than the Full Knowledge condition on average, but
was very effective on the median-ordering analysis. Since the median ordering
provides a “typical run” and on the typical runs, the Hypothesis condition has
some advantages over Full Knowledge. However, on any particular run the Full
Knowledge condition appears to capture the orderings better.
The Authority condition was not as plausible as the other conditions for
simulating the order of first expression. Authority tends to perform similarly
to Full Knowledge, but slightly worse. Looking at the underlying data, the
Authority condition typically starts with a majority of the agents aware of each
meme. This means that limited learning could take place, and the transmissions
that did take place did not seem to improve the correspondence. As such, the
Authority condition is nominally plausible but seems less plausible than Full
Knowledge.
With that said, the Authority condition only tested the impact of a generic
authority figure as opposed to any specific individual. While this Authority
condition is less plausible, it is still possible that social learning of ThrowInHole
was the result of guards interacting with the prison warden or due to social factors
other than Authority alone. Unfortunately, these conditions are not testable since
it is both infeasible and inappropriate to model the experimenters for involved in
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the situation. This means that the Authority condition cannot be tested further
using this model and should be considered less plausible than the other conditions.
In conclusion, both the Hypothesis and Full Knowledge conditions are both
plausible and this simulation does not definitively show that one condition
was more probable than the other. Both perform well on different metrics,
but it is unclear which statistic has a better predictive power because this
is a newly implemented model. Finally, it is also possible that a mixed
condition existed, where social learning and imitation occurred differently than
the explored conditions. For example, a subset of guards might have discussed
the ThrowInHole action during orientation. This might explain why Hypothesis
and Full Knowledge appear to work in complementary ways.
External Validity Metrics Summary
As has been shown, a number of external validity tests were applied to examine if
the Stanford Prison simulation captures important dynamics from the empirical
study. Table 7.32 summarizes these tests, broken down by the performance of
the model on them under each condition. Each correspondence is rated as: Hit,
Close, Poor, Miss, or Unclear. Hits are defined as validity results that appeared
to capture the correct relationships and relative values. Close is used to rate
correspondences that did not capture the exact value, but they still capture
important relationships (such as ordinal comparisons). Poor correspondences are
validity metrics performed better than chance but are not very close to the right
values. Misses are tests that firmly assert a value that contradicts the ground
truth. Unclear tests are ones that could not be effectively evaluated, due to
ambiguous ground truth data.
Looking at the results, a few things are notable. Firstly, the simulation does
fairly well on the correspondence tests. There are a large number of metrics that
either provide near-exact matches or closely resemble the ground truth data.
While there are some misses, these situations are explainable within the context
of the model and could have been addressed if more training data was used to
tune the simulation. Secondly, the different simulation conditions perform fairly
similarly on most metrics. While there are some small changes, the only major
differences appear in the meme transmission. This indicates that the simulation
is fairly robust with respect to these different conditions.
The ultimate intention of this experiment was to examine the possibility
that memes might have been a factor in how events unfolded in the Stanford
Prison Experiment. Unfortunately, this analysis did not conclusively resolve
this question. Qualitatively from the median-ordering analysis, memes did
seem to provide a better match to the expected behavior. However, the
individual runs in the Full Knowledge condition had a better match with
the correct orderings. The important deciding factor between these measures
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Table 7.32: External Validity Test Results
Measure Full Knowledge Hypothesis Authority
Relative Action Frequency
Command (0.39) Close Close Close
Help (0.01) Close Close Close
Information (0.18) Hit Hit Hit
Insult (0.18) Poor Poor Poor
Resist (0.09) Miss Miss Miss
Threaten (0.09) Miss Miss Miss
Use of Instruments (0.08) Close Close Close
Group Differences: Action Frequency
Insult (S 13 > Other Guards) Close Hit Hit
Insult (Night Shift > Other Shifts) Miss Hit Hit
Command (Night Shift > Other Shifts) Poor Close Close
Emotion Tests
Average Guard Emotions < 0 Hit Hit Hit
Average Prisoner Emotions < 0 Hit Hit Hit
Average Prisoner Emotions Close Close Close
≈ 3×Avg Guard Emotions =
Guard Emotions Have Negative Slope Unclear Unclear Unclear
Prisoner Emotions Over Time Unclear Unclear Unclear
Meme Expression Ordering
ThrowInHole First Expression Close Close Close
Resistance First Expression Close Close Close
FeelImprisoned First Expression Poor Poor Poor
Verification Summary
Hit or Close 10 12 12
Miss 3 2 2
would be their predictive value: Is the median-ordering of multiple agent-based
experiments a better predictor of real-world events than the correspondence of
individual run orderings? Unfortunately, since this is a new model that question
remains unanswered. The result of this analysis indicates that memes are a
plausible mechanism for the progression of these behaviors in the Stanford Prison
Experiment, but that full knowledge of these actions was equally plausible.
Finally, while it is possible to test that meme transmission may have been a
mechanism in the Stanford Prison Experiment, this analysis cannot validate the
content of the memes. While there might have been a meme for knowing the
action of how to throw a prisoner in the hole, there could instead have been a
meme which made guards aware that no one would punish them if they threw a
prisoner in the hole. As is typical with studying learning, the exact content of
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the learning can be hard to infer. As such, while memes have been shown to be
potentially plausible- this external validity testing cannot speak to the content
of memes. It has simply showed that memes related to these actions can be a
plausible mechanism for looking at the Stanford Prison Experiment.
7.4.2 Exploratory Analysis
The exploratory analysis for the Stanford Prison Experiment was intended
to examine two issues. First, an examination of the diffusion dynamics was
conducted. As noted in Section 7.2.5, it is valuable to know the rate that different
memes diffuse through the population. A second analysis was conducted to
determine the transmission dynamics, in particular which agents tended to learn
about a meme from which other agents. This section will focus on the Hypothesis
condition, as it demonstrated most diffusion of memes.
Diffusion Dynamics
The diffusion dynamics memes can be looked at from two standpoints: learning
and expression. Within the simulation, different memes have different diffusion
rates and different amounts of delay before they are expressed by other agents.
Figures 7.5 and 7.6 show the number of agents aware of the Resist and
ThrowInHole memes over time respectively, for the Hypothesis condition. The
thick central line of these figures indicates the mean value, while the dashed lines
show the progression from individual runs. It should be noted that these figures
show learning by all agents, not just the ones able to express the memes.
Figure 7.5: ThrowInHole Learning
Diffusion
Figure 7.6: Resistance Learning
Diffusion
Both curves can be approximated using s-curve form, as expected.
Additionally, the individual runs tended to be similar to the average run with
only a few deviant outliers. This was typical for diffusion results using this
cognitive architecture in general. Looking at the learning-diffusion charts, it is
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evident that ThrowInHole had a slower diffusion rate. Logistic curves were fit to
the mean-value curve in each of these graphs, which confirm this interpretation.
SciPy, a scientific package for Python, was used to fit generalized logistic curves
to each mean-value curve. The learning rate for ThrowInHole was 1.37, while the
learning rate for Resist was 3.45. This is approximately double. A major factor
in this is that Resist occurred more often than ThrowInHole. This happened for
two reasons. Firstly, ThrowInHole was an action that placed a prisoner in the
Hole until they were released. With the problem prisoner removed, there was less
need to express the meme. Secondly, Resist occurred more often than expected
by the ground-truth for reasons as previously explained in Section 7.4.1.
Figure 7.7: ThrowInHole Learning
Diffusion (Guards)
Figure 7.8: Resist Learning Diffusion
(Prisoners)
This difference in learning rate is greatly increased if one looks only at the
agents who can express each meme. Since guards worked in shifts, there are
distinct periods where information is exchanged. By comparison, the prisoners
were in a common environment for the entire simulation. Figure 7.7 shows the
number of guards who are aware of ThrowInHole over time in the Hypothesis
condition, while 7.8 shows the number of prisoners aware of the Resist action
over time. The learning rates for guards in this case are 1.45, while the
prisoner learning rate is 10.8. Moreover, the graphs show that the learning was
qualitatively different. The individual runs for guard learning show that learning
tended to happen mainly at shift transitions, but also at sporadic points during
shifts. Conversely, prisoner learning tended to occur in sharp bursts. Once three
or more prisoners became aware of the Resist meme, the rest of the prisoners
became aware of it within hours during the simulation.
Having looked at the learning rates, it is logical to examine how these relate
to the number of agents who have expressed the meme at least once. Figure
7.10 shows the counts of first expressions over time for prisoners taking the
Resist action. Interestingly, while prisoner learning diffuses quickly, this does not
necessarily correlate to all prisoners resisting. While at least five prisoners tend to
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Figure 7.9: ThrowInHole First
Expression Diffusion
Figure 7.10: Resist First Expression
Diffusion
express resistance fairly quickly after learning it, not all prisoners use resistance
and the times at which they first decide to resist are variable. Figure 7.9 shows
the counts of first expressions over time for guards taking the ThrowInHole action
for the Hypothesis condition. Guard first expression times correlate strongly with
shift changes, as was seen with learning. This indicates that learning related to
the ThrowInHole action could have been an influence for when particular guards
started throwing prisoners in the Hole.
Figure 7.11: ThrowInHole Learning vs
First Expressions
Figure 7.12: Resist Learning and First
Expressions
Figures 7.11 and 7.12 compare the mean values for learning and first
expression counts for ThrowInHole and Resist, respectively. From these, it is
clear that the first expression times for agents correlate with the learning times.
However, these graphs do not establish how much each one causes the other.
Learning the meme is a causal factor for expressing it. However, an agent
expressing a meme for a first time may help it reach agents who previously were
not paying attention to it. In this way, an agent’s first expression can be a causal
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factor for learning.
To test for this, Granger causality tests were applied to the time-series of
learning and first expression sequences for each run. The tests were run in both
directions, to examine which sequence showed better causality for the other. Since
Granger causality tests are sensitive to the lag parameter, each test was iterated
over a sweep of lag values between 1 and 6 (one hour of simulation time) to
find the optimal lag for each test. Table 7.33 shows the results of this analysis
for the Hypothesis condition. The percent of runs where the causality test was
significant (p < 0.001) is indicated for each meme, as well as the average lag time
which was optimal in those significant cases.
Table 7.33: Causality: First Learning vs First Expression
Learning First Expression
Meme % p-value<0.001 Avg(Lag) % p-value<0.001 Avg(Lag)
ThrowInHole 97% 3.96 (39.6 min) 21% 3.5 (35 min)
Resist 100% 3.66 (36.6 min) 86% 3.32 (33.2 min)
This analysis indicates that in both cases, first learning appears causal to first
expression. This is as expected, since learning is necessary for first expression.
The lag indicates that typically agents tend to use the action within 40 minutes
after learning it. However, when using a more full sweep with lags up to 1/3 the
length of the simulation, optimal lags as long as a full day were found. These
might indicate cases where agents tended to learn the ThrowInHole action, but
did not take it until their next guard shift.
First expressions are also causal for first learning for Resist, but seldom for
ThrowInHole. This may indicate that ThrowInHole was transmitted mainly by a
subset of agents, whose expression was a key causal factor for learning. Resistance
did not show this trend. This indicates that the first expression of resistance for
an agent was a more strongly causal factor for learning. This could mean that
first expression is more likely to reach new agents for learning, but it may also
result from first expression correlating with the number of expressions in general.
To examine this, it is important to look at how agents learned memes, which is
the focus of the next section.
Meme Transmission Dynamics
This section explores the who and why of meme transmission. This is an
interesting feature of the model, since it allows detailed analysis of who was
spreading memes and when they were most effective. The question of who was
expressing memes will be examined by breaking down the agents into classes
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based on their tendencies to learn and express the meme. Using these classes,
the question of why is examined by looking at the differences in personality factors
between agents in different classes.
Figure 7.13: Typical Adoption Curve Positions
Rogers (1962) separates adopters into 6 categories: innovators, early adopters,
early majority, late majority, and laggards. These indicate the different phases
of adoption on the s-curve, as shown in Figure 7.13. Due to the low number
of agents, early adopters and early majority will be lumped together. The first
analysis performed was a quartile ranking of agents’ relationship to the meme that
they could express (Resist or ThrowInHole). Quartiles were calculated for the
following metrics: the average time an agent first learned the meme, the average
time they first expressed it, the average number of exposures they took to learn
it, and the average fractions of their actions that expressed the meme once it was
known. Note that for the number of exposures to learn a meme, multiple agents
act simultaneously so multiple exposures can occur in the same step. As such, all
exposures in the step where they learn are counted, including the ones they learn
the meme from. The full tables of these quartiles are contained in Appendix J.3.
These helped provide the insight for the following analysis.
The first learning and first expression times were used to examine which
agents could be considered the early adopters versus the laggards. Table 7.34
shows this information for the Resist action under the Hypothesis condition. For
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Resist, prisoners all tended to learn quite quickly- on average less than an hour
apart. They were effectively all early learners. However, expression was phased
out much differently. Certain agents such as S 01 and S 04 were much quicker to
resist once it was demonstrated to them. Conversely, agent S 02 did not tend to
resist until much later, if at all. This is notable, since S 02 was the agent whose
strategy was to vigorously go along with the guards.
Table 7.34: Resist Adopter Categories
Learning
Expression Innovators Early Late Laggard
Innovators S 05
Early S 01, S 04, S 06, S 08
Late S 03, S 09
Laggard S 00 S 02
Table 7.35: ThrowInHole Adopter Categories
Learning
Expression Innovators Early Late Laggard
Innovators S 13 (E)
Early S 15 (E), S 20 (E) S 17 (D), S 21 (D)
Late S 11 (N), S 12 (N)
Laggard S 16 (D), S 19 (D) S 18 (N)
The ThrowInHole meme worked very differently, as seen in Table 7.35. Due
to the shift boundaries and attention issues, the meme rolled out in a much more
staged fashion. To show the effect of shifts, each guard is followed by their shift:
Day (D), Evening (E), or Night (N). S 13, the innovator, was part of the evening
shift. S 16, S 17, S 19, and S 20 appear to learn during their first cross-over
period, where they are leaving their shift and S 13 is starting. One interesting
aspect of this is that the more pacifist agents, S 16 and S 19, learned the meme
before the ones who expressed the action earlier, S 17 and S 20. To a lesser effect,
this was also seen with S 18 versus the other evening shift guards. Guards who
were less likely to use the ThrowInHole action were quicker to attend to it. This
is an interesting and counter-intuitive effect.
A second question of interest is the matter of who are resistant to the meme
and who are more likely to express the meme once they know it. These two
factors are interesting to look at together because they show who will tend to
be the expressive early adopters, passive carriers, resistant but later expressive,
or holdouts. By knowing these factors and the network topology, it would be
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possible to get a good estimate of the diffusion rate: resistance shows the number
of exposures needed to acquire the meme, while the expression rate gives the
output of exposures. The number of exposures required to learn the meme was
considered to be a resistance factor- more exposures indicates the agent was less
susceptible to the meme in this condition. The intermediate processing of this is
contained in Appendix J.3 also.
Table 7.36: ThrowInHole Meme Resistance vs Expressiveness
Expression
Resistance Highest Higher Lower Lowest
Lowest S 11 S 13
Lower S 12 S 15 S 19
Higher S 20 S 18
Highest S 21 S 17 S 16
Table 7.36 shows each guard agent’s resistance (# exposures to learn) and
its expressiveness (fraction of actions producing the meme) for the ThrowInHole
meme. This analysis reproduces much of what had been expected. S 15 and S 19
(“nice” guards) learn the meme readily, but don’t express it very often. On the
converse, guards such as S 21 take some additional exposures before learning the
meme but regularly throw prisoners in the Hole once they learn it.
The same analysis was applied to the Resist action and the prisoners, with
the results as shown in Table 7.37. Unfortunately, while the ThrowInHole results
were quite reasonable- the Resist results show some of the issues that were present
in the internal validity checks: the expression of the Resist action happens a bit
too often, but does not occur quite often among the innovators. S 05 and S 00,
while expressing the meme at a reasonable rate, do not express it quite as high
as some other agents. This may indicate that the simulation did not capture a
factor beyond their basic personality traits led to increased Resist actions from
these agents. Both agents had an ideological background, with S 00 believing
in meditation and S 05 supporting Marxist-type ideology. In other respects, the
classifications seem reasonable. S 02 is shown to be the holdout, both for learning
the meme and expressing it. Agents that were known to use Resist with some
frequency, such S 04 show up as more expressive than other agents.
At first glance, it seems as if the early adopters take more exposures to
learn the meme, on average. To look into this further, a metric was devised
to look at the fraction of exposures that lead to learning as a function of the
number of agents aware of the meme. This metric only counts new learning, and
any exposures on agents with the meme are ignored. This gives an estimate of
the exposure efficiency, its ability to cause new learning. Figure 7.14 plots the
exposure efficiency of ThrowInHole on guards as a function of the number of
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Table 7.37: Resist Meme Resistance vs Expressiveness
Expression
Resistance Highest Higher Lower Lowest
Lowest S 00 S 05
Lower S 03, S 06
Higher S 04, S 08 S 01
Highest S 09 S 02
agents knowing the meme. Figure 7.15 shows exposure efficiency for the Resist
action on prisoners. In these charts the solid line represents the mean of the
points, while the dashed line shows a fitted 2nd-order polynomial. This analysis
indicates that the first learners are not disadvantaged with respect to salience.
This is supported by looking at the median resistance levels, where the early
adopters show lower resistance rather than higher resistance. The reason why
they take more exposures to learn, on average, is due to having longer tail
distributions. While later adopters may get multiple simultaneous exposures,
helping to smooth the distribution, the early adopters generally only see one
exposure at a time.
Figure 7.14: Exposure Efficiency for
ThrowInHole
Figure 7.15: Exposure Efficiency for
Resist
The efficiency curves are interesting in their own right. Both figures show
a slight U-curve, where efficiency is lower between the early adopters and the
early majority. This is an interesting effect, since it implies that diffusion occurs
slightly differently than a traditional diffusion curve. This may indicate that in
a social environment memes may tend to have an initial growth spurt, followed
by a lull. This makes some intuitive sense- the most interested parties will pay
attention early. Despite this, the overall diffusion rate is faster as more agents
learn because there are typically more total expressions- even if they are less
effective per expression. This is an interesting lead, which may be worth looking
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into in future experiments.
Stanford Prison Experiment Summary
Overall, the Stanford Prison Experiment simulation has provided a number of
interesting avenues for future research. Firstly, it has demonstrated an effective
simulation of a real-life scenario. Secondly, it has demonstrated the ability to
extend classical diffusion of innovation simulation. This simulation takes into
account both physical and social environments, combining social influence and
physical barriers (such as shift change) into a common framework. Thirdly,
this simulation has shown unique capabilities beyond typical diffusion-of-ideas
research. This fine-grained analysis allowed identifying the different phases of
adoption for individuals, as well as to determine their relative level of output
value. This is very different from a classical diffusion model, which seldom models
the background actions that agents can take instead of expressing a meme.
Finally, it has opened new avenues of simulation and empirical research. For
example, the internal validity analysis showed that novelty correlates negatively
with attention in a complex environment. While initially counter-intuitive, this
is a useful finding that appears likely to be reproducible within an experimental
setting. The internal validity analysis on attention also highlighted the ability of
an agent-based model to help explore how situational factors could affect trends
in data. This demonstrated the ability of the model to be a test-bed for mocking
up an experimental condition.
7.5 Iraqi Village Simulation Analysis
The Hamariyah Iraqi Village simulation was intended to examine a much more
focused issue that the Stanford scenario could not capture: meme competition.
While the Stanford prison simulation had two defined groups who were only able
to express one of the memes, the Hamariyah scenario allows all agents to perform
both memes: Give Information and Plant IED. The first meme involves going
to a US-owned building to provide a tip about insurgent activity. The second
meme involves volunteering to plant an IED on a US-owned building. As noted
in Section 6.2.2, the meme actions were calibrated to help distinguish between
agents who preferred only one of the memes, liked both memes, or disliked both
memes. This allows for cross-class comparison to determine the personality and
situational characteristics common to these groups.
7.5.1 Diffusion Dynamics
The simulation dynamics give an overview of how the memes progressed. Both
memes progressed faster than would be expected in a real-life scenario, for
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learning and expression. This was due to modeling choices noted in Section 6.2.2,
where the model was designed to discriminate which memes agents were likely
to learn and express, rather than intending to model the base expression rate
accurately. As such, this section differs slightly from the previous examination
of diffusion. While the prior section showed raw diffusion rates, this one will
attempt to explore the differences in relative rates of learning and expression.
As noted in Section 6.2.4, the Hamariyah village was run under two different
starting conditions: random agents aware of the memes (Randomized Condition)
and a chosen subset of agents being aware of the memes (Hypothesis Condition).
The Hypothesis Condition started with a fairly homogeneous subset of agents
aware of each meme, who would be more prone to express the meme. The
Randomized Condition started with a random set of agents aware of each meme,
so there was less initial predisposition to spread the meme but might reach more
people.
Table 7.38 shows some basic demographic information about the agents who
know the meme in the Hypothesis condition, for reference. The GiveInformation
initial agents are mainly Heremat members, whose group has a weak positive
relationship with the US group. The Heremat group is well-positioned in society,
but is a minority group with only 11 members. By comparison, the Shumar group
has 38 members and the Yousif group has 23 members. The agents starting
with GiveInformation have jobs such as public officials and policemen, or had
experience in these fields before becoming unemployed. The PlantIED meme
starts with a group of militants, some of whom are also tradesmen. Only half of
them are currently employed and they strongly dislike the US Group.
Table 7.38: Hypothesis Condition: Meme-Aware Agent Demographics
Demographics GiveInformation PlantIED
% Shumar Group 16.3% 33.3%
% Heremat Group 66.7% 0%
% Yousif Group 16.3% 66.7%
% Employed 66.7% 50%
Avg. Valence Toward US Group 0.07 -0.6
Authority 0.17 0.0
Figure 7.16 shows the percentage of each group that learned the
GiveInformation meme over time, as the mean of the 20 runs done in this
condition. The x-axis shows the number of events that occurred within the
simulation, which correlates with time passing. To avoid bias from the initial set
of agents aware of the meme, this chart only considers agents who did not start
knowing the meme. To help examine the learning region, this chart is truncated at
the point where saturation was typically reached (all agents aware of the meme).
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Next to it, Figure 7.17 shows this same statistic for the Randomized Condition.
While these charts only show the mean value across runs, the individual runs
tended to be much more similar to their own mean run than to the mean runs
of other groups. As such, the mean run seems to show a typical progression in
this case. While the difference between each group’s awareness of each meme is
small, it was persistent across runs. Additionally, it should be stressed that these
Figures include only new agents learning the meme and exclude the initial set.
When taking into account the initial set, the differences between groups are far
larger for the Hypothesis condition.
Comparing Figure 7.16 and Figure 7.17, it is evident that changing the
initial set of agents changes the adoption curve of each group. Under the
Hypothesis condition, GiveInformation is initially known by a significant number
of Heremat agents. Due to this initial advantage, other Heremat agents tend to
learn the meme more. In the Randomized Condition, this adoption advantage
reverses. The Yousif group members and the Shumar group members tend to
show advantages in learning the GiveInformation meme. In both conditions, the
difference in learning only holds through the early adopter and early majority
phases. Once the late majority phase starts, no particular group shows a
significant advantage. Despite which group has an advantage, the diffusion rate
of the meme is fairly similar- reaching saturation after approximately 1250 events
(a bit more than a day).
Figure 7.16: % of Group Learned
GiveInformation (Hypothesis Cond.)
Figure 7.17: % of Group Learned
GiveInformation (Randomized
Condition)
The same comparison is shown for the PlantIED action, shown in Figure
7.18 (Hypothesis) and Figure 7.19 (Randomized). In both conditions, the Yousif
group had an advantage in this meme. For the Hypothesis condition, a significant
number of the initial carriers are members of the Yousif group. This allows them
to better transmit the meme among their own group. However, even in the
Randomized condition the Yousif group was slightly more favored in learning
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Figure 7.18: % of Group Learned
PlantIED (Hypothesis Condition)
Figure 7.19: % of Group Learned
PlantIED (Randomized Condition)
the meme. This indicates that the Yousif are in general more likely to learn
this meme. Additionally, the rate of learning the PlantIED meme was greatly
impacted by the starting condition. When given to a random set of agents,
learning of this meme takes twice as long to saturate the population. It is also
slower during the steeper learning curve, consistently lagging behind. This means
that the starting set for PlantIED is more successful in getting awareness of that
meme to the population than a random subset of agents would be.
RelativeExpressionRH(t) =
∑
t{#ExpressionsR(t)−#ExpressionsH(t)}∑
t #ExpressionsH(t)
(7.13)
This effect could either be due to an increased effectiveness of the starting
agents in spreading that meme, or it could indicate that those agents simply
express the meme more frequently. To examine this, a comparison was made
between number of expressions of PlantIED in the Hypothesis Condition as
compared to the Randomized Condition. Figure 7.20 charts the fraction of
difference in expressions between the Hypothesis Condition and the Randomized
Condition, for the cumulative number of expressions up to that time point. This
means that for each point at time t on this graph, the value is determined
by Equation 7.13 where H represents the Hypothesis Condition, R represents
the Randomized Condition, and #ExpressionsX(t) represents the number of
expressions that occurred during that time event period, on average, for a
Condition X. Looking at this graph, it is clear that during the Hypothesis
condition there are more expressions during the early portion of the simulation
runs. These additional expressions are at least partly due to the Yousif group’s
strong negative relationship (valence) with the US Group. This could account
for the advantage to learning conferred by having the Hypothesis agents aware
of the meme.
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Figure 7.20: Fraction of Difference of Cumulative PlantIED Expressions,
(Randomized-Hypothesis)/Hypothesis
The alternative possibility for why PlantIED has much faster learning during
the Hypothesis case is that other agents are more prone to learning from the
starting set for this condition than they would be for a random set of agents.
To look at this possibility, exposure efficiency graphs were generated. These
graphs follow the same format as those in Section 7.4.2. Figure 7.21 and Figure
7.22 show the exposure efficiency graphs for the Hypothesis and Randomized
conditions, respectively. Looking at these charts, the Hypothesis condition has
a significantly higher efficiency for the first three or four agents who learn the
meme. While this may be a modest gain, a small gain early in a diffusion process
can lead to a faster tipping-point overall. From this analysis, PlantIED spreads
better in the Hypothesis condition because the initial set of agents express it
more and because other agents pay attention to them more when they express
that meme.
Figures 7.21 and 7.22 also show slightly U-shaped curve as was noted in
the Stanford diffusion analysis. It seems that this may be a general dynamic
of how memes spread, based on the cognitive model design for the agents. To
verify this, the exposure efficiency charts for GiveInformation are shown as Figure
7.23 and Figure 7.24 for the Hypothesis and Randomized conditions respectively.
These charts also indicate a slight U-shaped curve. Unlike the PlantIED action,
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Figure 7.21: Exposure Efficiency for
PlantIED (Hypothesis)
Figure 7.22: Exposure Efficiency for
Plant IED (Randomized)
however, there is little advantage for GiveInformation during the Hypothesis
condition in terms of exposure efficiency. This indicates that agents starting with
GiveInformation in the Hypothesis condition were not as effective in spreading
their meme. This is probably due to many of the initial members belonging to
Heremat, a minority group with only 11 total members.
Figure 7.23: Exposure Efficiency for
GiveInformation (Hypothesis)
Figure 7.24: Exposure Efficiency for
GiveInformation (Randomized)
This analysis indicates that diffusion of learning of these memes is occurring
within the model. Comparing the two memes against each other, it appears that
PlantIED transmits through the population much faster than GiveInformation.
Looking at the relative number of expressions, however, PlantIED has only a
modest advantage. The ratio of PlantIED to GiveInformation is 52:48 on average
during the runs, with a standard deviation of approximately 0.8 for the ratio.
A t-test was run to test for the probability that there were more PlantIED
actions than GiveInformation actions for both experimental conditions, with
the results shown in Table 7.39. The samples for this test were the number
of expressions for each meme on each run, so the degrees of freedom for the test
CHAPTER 7. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 181
were 19 since there were 20 runs. The t-test strongly indicates that PlantIED
was more common than GiveInformation. For reference, the table displays the
confidence interval and average additional expressions of PlantIED compared to
GiveInformation. This indicates that PlantIED is a significantly more popular
option than GiveInformation in both conditions. It also indicates that the
Hypothesis Condition has a slightly higher advantage, due to the initial set of
agents as explained earlier.
Table 7.39: Expression Comparison of PlantIED vs GiveInformation
Metric Hypothesis Randomized
t-test: p-value 7×10−9 7×8−7
Avg(# PlantIED - GiveInformation) 31 27
Having established which meme was more successful within the village, the
next question to answer is why. The next section will examine the factors that
make each meme desirable to different groups.
7.5.2 Meme Transmission Dynamics
This section explores the who and why of meme transmission. The first
step was figuring out which agents were most influential in spreading memes,
a classification problem. From these classes, cross-group comparisons were
performed to determine which personality and social properties differed
significantly between the classes. This analysis only considered initial-condition
factors, so these properties can be used as a priori profiles for key agents in the
transmission of each meme.
In order to establish who are key agents in spreading each meme, agents were
examined using the adoption factors presented during the Stanford Transmission
Dynamics discussion (Section 7.4.2). These factors were: average time of first
learning and average time of first expression. As before, first learning and first
expression were examined together. Since this simulation is much larger than
the Stanford simulation, quartiles were not used. Instead, the mClust clustering
algorithm was used to generate an optimal set of clusters based upon the pair of
variables. Unlike the previous section, the innovators (agents initially knowing
the meme) are included in this analysis.
To examine the differences between these clusters, a set of demographic
properties was collected from the agents belonging to each cluster. The set of
properties used for clustering are shown in Table 7.40. These properties include
GSP personality tree factors, group memberships, valences toward other groups,
authority, and employment level. The full set of GSP nodes is not enumerated in
this section for the sake of brevity, but a brief summary of each node is contained
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Table 7.40: Demographic Properties for Cross-Cluster Analysis
Property Data Type Description
Group Valences
- Valence(US Group) Continuous Like/dislike toward the US group
- Valence(Heremat Group) Continuous Like/dislike toward the Heremat group
- Valence(Shumar Group) Continuous Like/dislike toward the Yousif group
- Valence(Yousif Group) Continuous Like/dislike toward the Yousif group
Group Memberships
- Member of Heremat Dichotomous True only if agent in Heremat faction
- Member of Shumar Dichotomous True only if agent in Shumar faction
- Member of Yousif Dichotomous True only if agent in Yousif faction
Social Properties
- Authority Continuous Authority of the agent in his/her group
- EmploymentLevel Dichotomous If True, agent is employed and typically goes
to work during the day
GSP Personality Factors Continuous Personality traits, as defined in Appendix H
in Appendix H, Table H.1. Instead, each node will be briefly described in-text
if it shows a particular significance for analysis. For all continuous properties, a
one-way ANOVA was run to detect any significant differences between clusters.
After this, a Scheffe post-hoc test was applied in order to examine the specific
differences between individual clusters. For dichotomous variables, a chi-squared
test was run to detect differences.
7.5.3 Adoption Indicators
This section focuses on adoption: the first learning and expression of each meme.
Since there is no assurance that an agent will learn or express the meme, an agent
who never expresses the meme is placed at the last step of the simulation for the
purposes of averaging (step 3456). Any cluster in which no members expressed
the meme will be labeled as “Never” to differentiate it from clusters in which some
members expressed the meme. The clustering results for GiveInformation in the
Hypothesis and Randomized Conditions are shown in Figure 7.25 and Figure 7.26
respectively. The diffusion between these conditions is different not only in the
structure of the clusters, but in the number of clusters overall. The Hypothesis
condition shows a total of 5 clusters. Clusters will be referred to by their means
during the discussion, in the form (First Learning Time, First Expression Time).
The cluster in the lower left hand (0,256) is the initial set of agents aware of
the meme, who tend to express it relatively early. At the upper right hand of the
graph (517,3448) is a significant number of agents who learn the GiveInformation
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meme late and most never express it. Of the remaining three clusters, the those
centered at (517,993) and (487,2580) were diffuse but (581,1284) was very dense.
The Randomized condition was much simpler- containing only two diffuse groups
for learning and expression located at (412,956) and (419,2983). Interestingly
in this case, both clusters have similar learning time centers but very different
expression times.
Figure 7.25: GiveInformation First
Learning and First Expression Clusters
(Hypothesis Condition)
Figure 7.26: GiveInformation First
Learning and First Expression Clusters
(Randomized Condition)
Table 7.41: Demographics for GiveInformation Learning and First Expression
Clusters (Hypothesis Condition)
Cluster Primary Learning Expression
Cluster At Size Groups Adoption Adoption
(0,256) 3 Heremat Innovator Early Adopter
(517,994) 27 Shumar Late Majority Early Majority
(581,1284) 12 Yousif Laggard Late Majority
(487,2580) 19 Shumar, Heremat Early Majority Laggard
(517,3448) 11 Yousif, Shumar Late Majority Holdout
Table 7.41 shows the basic information about each cluster, including its size
and dominant groups represented. Also, each cluster is categorized into its
adoption category. One additional category is used here that was not used in
the Stanford analysis, which is the Holdout category. These agents generally did
not express the meme at all. In this respect, they were not laggards but simply
were unlikely to express GiveInformation at all.
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GiveInformation first learning and expression time clusters were analyzed
using an ANOVA based on five groups, one for each cluster, for all continuous
properties noted earlier in Table 7.40. Discrete properties noted in that same
table were each analyzed using chi-squared tests. A very large number of
differences were statistically significant between clusters (p < 0.05), so only those
that most uniquely identified each cluster will be discussed. As such, key identifier
properties noted are significant at the 0.05 level in differentiating them from other
clusters, based upon the Scheffe post-hoc test. The largest deviations between
clusters were shown for the two corner clusters: (0,256) and (517,3448). In
addition to being different from each other, they were both significantly different
from other groups on a number of measures. By comparison, the clusters centered
at (412,956), (419,2983), and (581,1284) were fairly similar. Table 7.42 shows the
properties which distinguish groups from other groups in the scenario.
Table 7.42: Key Identifiers for GiveInformation Learning and First Expression
Clusters (Hypothesis Condition)
Cluster At Property Defining Characteristics
(0,256) Valence(User Group) Likes User Group more than others
(0.067 vs -0.47 outside cluster)
Group Membership Primarily Heremat (2 out of 3)
GSP(Be Task Focused) Less focused on problem solving, more
focused on building relationships
GSP(Physiology) Values basic needs more than others.
GSP(None r Sensitive) Less regard for human life than others
(517,994) Group Membership Dominantly Shumar (75% of cluster).
GSP(Friendly Faction) Less happy to see friendly factions
succeed
(581,1284) Group Membership Dominantly Yousif (75% of cluster)
GSP(Symbolic) Values symbolic payoffs less
(487, 2580) Group Membership More Heremat than other groups (5
members out of 19)
Valence(Yousif) Dislikes the Yousif group, especially
compared to (581, 1284)
(517,3448) GSP(Safety) Values personal safety more
GSP(For The Self) High preference to preserve self
GSP(Life Res r Sensitive) High value for human life
GSP(Help...) Higher value for all “Help” GSP nodes,
regardless of group
GSP(Enemy Is Outgroup) Less inclined to treating enemies poorly
GSP(Esteem) Less value for self-efficacy
GSP(Be Controlling) Values sense of control much less
GSP(Symbolic) Values symbolic payoffs more
Looking at the clusters, it appears that group membership and personality
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are the strongest determinants of being in a particular cluster. The innovator
cluster at (0,256) is small and not very influential. Even among agents initially
aware of the GiveInformation meme, not all of them reliably express it. The
reliably different characteristic of this subgroup is that it likes the US Group. All
other clusters dislike the US, to varying degrees. There are some other significant
personality differences, but these may be unique to the small sample size for that
cluster. Most of the remaining Heremat members are part of the (487, 2580)
cluster. These agents are some of the first ones to learn the meme but among
the last to try it. One of the differences between the innovator group and this
cluster is that the innovators give a higher importance to relationship-building.
A more task-focused agent will tend to see less value in contacting a third party
to express problems.
At the opposite end of the spectrum is the holdout cluster at (517,3448). This
cluster is not very different from the other three more moderate clusters in group
membership or in learning time. Examining the differences from the ANOVA
analysis, it is clear why this group does not express the GiveInformation meme.
Members of this group place a very high value on personal safety and preferences
for the self (high Safety goals and For the Self preferences). They also have a
much lower inclination to control their environment, as shown by low importances
for Esteem and Be Controlling. Overall, this cluster of agents shares a personality
type that is not inclined to take risks. Considering that becoming an informant
is a dangerous endeavor, these agents would simply rather stay home.
The remaining clusters for the Hypothesis Condition are gathered tightly
around group membership. (517,994) is a Shumar-dominated group and
(581,1284) is a Yousif-dominated group. These clusters are not as well
distinguished from the other clusters, both in the cluster sharpness and in
demographic properties. The difference in learning time is probably explained
by the poor relationship between the Yousif group and Heremat group, who
dominate the innovators. In general, this analysis does not capture the factors
that appear causal to these smaller differences, however. It seems likely that
these clusters form due to a mixture of factors, rather than the strong indicators
seen for the other groups.
Table 7.43: Demographics for GiveInformation Learning and First Expression
Clusters (Randomized Condition)
Cluster Primary Learning Expression
Cluster At Size Groups Adoption Adoption
(412,996) 45 Mixed Majority Early Majority
(419,2983) 27 Mixed Majority Late Majority
By contrast, the Randomized Condition shows a much flatter and more diffuse
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set of clusters. Table 7.43 shows the basic information for the clustering of the
Randomized Condition shown in Figure 7.26. The differences between these
clusters lie almost entirely on the time of first expression. The earlier group
expresses during the first third of the simulation, while the other group consists
of agents who express much later or not at all.
The trends seen in the Hypothesis condition disappear in this condition.
Without the initial social biases, the memes spread across groups fairly evenly.
Between these clusters, the only significant differences were in personality. Group
membership and even group valence toward the US were not as significant as the
personality factors leading agents to be willing to provide information to the US.
The most influential factors for determining membership in the earlier expressing
cluster high levels of the GSP personality traits: Be controlling, Be Open,
Bring About Greater Good, Assert Individuality, and Physiology. This indicates
a personality type that seems prepared to bring about changes and is concerned
with matters of power and control. While Be Open and Be Controlling are
technically competing nodes on the GSP tree, they come from a common node
about how to exercise power and control. As such, it seems reasonable that both
could be positive expressing this meme. The high level for The high importance
of Physiology goals appears to be due to a negative correlation with Safety goals.
Since a low importance of personal Safety is one of the strongest indicators for
early meme expression, this appears to be a secondary indicator.
On the converse side, traits that most associated with late expression were:
Safety, Materialism, Respect for Life, Keep One’s Word, and Grow Economy.
This reinforces the findings from the Hypothesis condition, which indicates that
agents strongly concerned with safety and material goods will tend to avoid giving
information if possible.
The PlantIED meme showed some similarities in its learning and first
expression dynamics. Figure 7.27 and Figure 7.28 show the mClust cluster graphs
for PlantIED for the Hypothesis and Randomized conditions, respectively. As
with the GiveInformation meme, the Hypothesis Condition showed much cleaner
clusters than the Randomized Condition. However, the Randomized Condition
for PlantIED showed much more nuanced behavior than the Randomized
Condition for GiveInformation.
Table 7.44 shows the basic demographics for the Hypothesis clusters and
their approximate adoption positions. Even more so than GiveInformation in the
Hypothesis condition, the clusters closely correlate with group membership. The
majority of Shumar and Heremat learn the meme later and wait much longer
to express it, if at all. Conversely, a subset of the Shumar and Yousif quickly
move to express the meme. The PlantIED meme in this Condition is interesting
because learning and first expression track each other quite closely. The agents
who are last to learn this meme are also the least likely to want to express it. This
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Figure 7.27: PlantIED First Learning
and First Expression Clusters
(Hypothesis Condition)
Figure 7.28: PlantIED First Learning
and First Expression Clusters
(Randomized Condition)
Table 7.44: Demographics for PlantIED Learning and First Expression Clusters
(Hypothesis Condition)
Cluster Primary Learning Expression
Cluster At Size Groups Adoption Adoption
(0,116) 6 Yousif, Shumar Innovator Early Adopter
(113,361) 30 Shumar, Yousif Early Adopter Early Majority
(117,2931) 23 Shumar, Heremat Early Majority Late Majority
(124,Never) 13 Shumar, Heremat Late Majority Holdout
is at a contrast with GiveInformation, where holdouts uninterested in expressing
the meme still learned it about as fast as other agents. In this case, attention
correlates well with the motivation to imitate.
Table 7.45 shows the identifiers for the clusters for the PlantIED action under
the Hypothesis condition. This analysis shows a fairly sharp distinction between
the types of agents in each of these categories. The (0,116) innovators of the
PlantIED action are prone to expressing the meme because they feel it will benefit
their group’s future, as well as to satisfy their own needs for esteem and asserting
their individuality. They also place a low importance on their own safety. They
are also primarily Yousif group members, and share a negative valence toward
the US Group.
The cluster at (113,361) is similar, with low importance weights on safety and
heightened weights on individuality and esteem. However, they differ slightly in
that their long term preferences are more oriented toward symbolic outcomes
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Table 7.45: Key Indicators for Learning and First Expression PlantIED Clusters
(Hypothesis Condition)
Cluster At Property Defining Characteristics
(0,116) GSP(Safety) Personal safety is much less important
GSP(Esteem) Respect and esteem is very important
GSP(Assert Individuality) Individuality more important
GSP(For the Group) Good long-term future for group more
important
GSP(Use Asymmetric Attacks) More prone to using asymmetric maneuvers
GSP(Belonging) Higher need for belonging
(113,361) GSP(Assert Individuality) Individuality more important
GSP(Esteem) Respect and esteem more important
GSP(Symbolistic) Symbolic outcomes more important
GSP(Use Asymmetric Attacks) More prone to using asymmetric maneuvers
(117,2931) Valence(User Group)* More positive toward US group (*not Scheffe-
significant)
GSP(GG Economy) Greater importance to economic growth
GSP(For the Self) More interested in a good future for the self
GSP(For Everybody) More interested in everyone’s future
GSP(Conform to Society) More prone to conforming
GSP(Own People) Less interested in ingroup’s future
(124,Never) GSP(Safety) Very concerned with personal safety
GSP(Life Res r Sensitive) Strong respect for life
GSP(For the Self) More interested in good future for self
GSP(Respect Authority) Higher respect for authority
GSP(Be Task Focused) Lower task focus, higher relationship focus.
GSP(Bring About Greater Good) More interested in good for all
GSP(Enemy is Out Group) Less inclined to discriminate against enemies
GSP(Materialistic) Less interested in material goods
rather than outcomes that benefit their own group. This difference appears to
be influence of the Al Qaeda Iraqi (AQI) members in the village, from looking at
the individual agents. Overall, these agents waste little time between learning of
the meme before volunteering to plant an IED.
The clusters that resist the meme are quite different in nature. The (117,2931)
cluster, which is partially resistant to expressing the meme, appears to be
business-oriented. It places high importance on growing economic resources, on
conforming to society, and on getting positive outcomes for the self. It also places
a higher importance on safety than the IED-active clusters, but not as high as the
other resistant cluster at (124,Never). Additionally this cluster has the highest
opinion of the US group, the only cluster that conclusively likes the US Group.
The cluster at (124,Never) contains resistant agents who appear to be self-
interested good guys. Their primary identifying characteristics are that they
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are interested in their own safety and the respect of life in general. They
are also much more interested in their personal long-term outcomes than the
PlantIED adopters. However, they also tend to be less materialistic, more
interested in the greater good, and assign less value to treating outgroups
badly. Interestingly, this cluster does not include any of the GiveInformation
innovators nor does it disproportionately favor agents that tended to express
GiveInformation significantly earlier. As such, some of these members actually
overlap with the resistant agents for the GiveInformation meme. This is probably
because both memes both have negative activations for safety.
Table 7.46 shows the amount of overlap between each cluster from the
GiveInformation Hypothesis condition and each cluster in the PlantIED
Hypothesis condition. This supports the prior intuition that many of the same
agents tend to not express in both cases. Additionally, this table also shows that
late expression agents did not tend to become early expression agents, for either
case. It also shows that a significant number of agents willing to plant IEDs
might also be willing to give information tips to the US, in certain circumstances
(e.g., when gangs inform on each other).
Table 7.46: Hypothesis Cluster Overlap for Learning and First Expression Times,
GiveInformation vs. PlantIED
GiveInformation
PlantIED (0,256) (517,994) (581,1284) (487,2580) (517,3448)
(0,116) 0 2 3 1 0
(113,361) 0 12 9 9 0
(117,2931) 3 13 0 5 2
(124,Never) 0 0 0 4 9
The Randomized Condition for PlantIED also shows interesting behavior.
Table 7.47 shows the cluster overlap for the clusters in the Randomized Condition
with those in the Hypothesis condition of PlantIED. This table shows that
the Randomized Condition does significantly influence the learning and first
expression times. As with the GiveInformation action, using Randomized initial
sets washes out most of the differences in learning- leaving only minor differences
between the clusters. For both memes, the Hypothesis Condition shows a strong
bias in learning where agents in the same group tend to learn together. The
internal validity analysis performed much earlier as part of Section 7.3.2 showed
that this interaction also existed in the Randomized Condition, where attention
correlated with membership in the same ingroup. However since a different set of
agents start with the meme for each run in the Randomized Condition, no group
had an advantage for learning. This shows that no group is innately more likely
to learn each meme, but that the biases in learning result from memes being
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transmitted through the social structure.
Some agents have also moved from typically expressing earlier to typically
expressing later. For many of the cases, this is a small re-shuffling, but in other
cases it may lead to more significant consequences. For example, the Hypothesis
cluster at (117,2931) breaks into two smaller clusters. One of those clusters
(160,3183) has a much longer amount of time before first expression while the
other includes four additional subjects (142,1861). Table 7.48 shows the basic
demographics for the PlantIED action under the Randomized Condition, for
comparison against Table 7.45 which contained the Hypothesis data.
Table 7.47: PlantIED Cluster Overlap for Learning and First Expression Times
Randomized
Hypothesis (146,190) (154,417) (142,1861) (160,3183) (159,Never)
(0,116) 4 2 0 0 0
(113,361) 13 13 4 0 0
(117,2931) 3 0 10 11 2
(124,Never) 0 0 0 0 13
Table 7.48: Demographics for PlantIED Learning and First Expression Clusters
(Randomized Condition)
Cluster Primary Learning Expression
Cluster At Size Groups Adoption Adoption
(146,190) 17 Yousif, Shumar Early Majority Early Adopter
(154,417) 15 Shumar, Yousif Late Majority Early Majority
(142,1861) 14 Shumar, Heremat Early Majority Late Majority
(160,3183) 11 Mixed Late Majority Laggard
(159,Never) 15 Shumar, Heremat Late Majority Holdout
Looking at the ANOVA and chi-squared analysis, it appears that the
Randomized Condition leads to shifts in the cluster indicators as well. For
example, the cluster at (142, 1861) has higher EmploymentLevel and Authority
level compared to other groups. These additional work responsibilities may play
a role in that subgroup’s delay in first expression. Most of the prior indicators of
early or late first expression still hold. In particular, higher personality traits for
Assert Individuality Belonging, Esteem, Enemy is Outgroup, and For the Group
are still solid indicators that an agent may be more likely to express the PlantIED
meme. Conversely, For the Self and Safety are still good indicators that an agent
will not tend to express the PlantIED meme. While these indicators get stronger,
weaker indicators such as Conform to Society wash out. Those indicators were
probably unique to that particular configuration and are not reliable predictors
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for the meme in general. Alternatively, this might mean that those indicators
were related to learning rather than expression. The next section summarizes the
indicators which were reliable for both the Hypothesis Condition and Randomized
Condition, for learning and first expression times. These will be referred to as the
Key Indicators for the type of agent and situation which leads agents to adopt
GiveInformation or PlantIED.
7.5.4 Key Indicators for Meme Adoption
The prior analysis showed that it is possible to determine the statistically
significant differences between faster versus slower adopters, on different metrics.
Table 7.49 summarizes the key indicators that differentiated early learners versus
late learners, for the GiveInformation and PlantIED memes. From this analysis,
the early learners tend to be differentiated primarily by their social network (e.g.,
ingroup) which accounts for most of the variance in learning. Their interest in the
meme is a small secondary influence on top of this. The Randomized Condition
cases showed that giving a meme to a purely random subset tends to lead to
fairly equal learning rates, on average.
Table 7.49: Key Indicators for Determining Meme Learning in Iraqi Village
Give Information PlantIED Learning
Key Indicator Learning Time Change Time Change
Same Ingroup as Innovators Faster Learning Faster Learning
Group Likes Innovator Group Slightly Faster Learning Slightly Faster Learning
Innovators Express Earlier Faster Learning Faster Learning
Less Prone to Express Meme No Clear Connection Slightly Slower Learning
On the converse, personality factors dominate which agents tend to express
memes earlier. Table 7.50 shows the key indicators that help determine if an
agent will express a meme earlier or later. Membership in a group which likes
or dislikes the US Group is the only consistent non-personality key factor that
influences expression of either meme in this simulation. Higher employment may
have also been an environmental influence, but was not statistically significant.
Otherwise, expression was almost entirely determined by the personality factors.
Safety goals were a key limiting factor for both memes, an obvious connection
for dangerous actions. However, seemingly unrelated factors such as long term
preferences for oneself and materialism have a significant influence as well. This
indicates that these memes are competing with day to day activities such as going
to work and pursuing economic endeavors.
The inferred factors that affect learning and expression of these memes appear
to form a reasonable set of properties within this situation which could. While
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Table 7.50: Key Indicators for Determining Meme First Expression in Iraqi
Village
Give Information First PlantIED First
Key Indicator Expression Time Expression Time
↑ Valence Toward US Earlier expression Slower expression (or None)
GSP Goals (Short Term Values)
↑ Safety Prevents expression Prevents expression
↑ Esteem - Earlier expression
GSP Standards (Preferred Methods)
↑ Assert Individuality Earlier expression Earlier expression
↑ Be Task Focused Slower expression Earlier expression
↑ Be Controlling Earlier expression Earlier expression
↑ Bring About Greater Good Earlier Expression -
↑ Use Asymmetric Attacks - Earlier expression
GSP Preferences (Long Term Wants)
↑ For Own Group - Earlier Expression
↑ For the Self Slower expression Slower expression
↑ Materialistic Slower expression Slower expression
the Stanford Experiment showed that a real-world situation could be modeled
with reasonable fidelity, this simulation has shown that this model allows the
study of meme competition. Analysis of the factors that promote certain memes
in an environment gives insight into the personality and societal conditions that
promote or stifle certain memes. If the model can be shown to have predictive
value for modeling meme selection based upon real-world data, this could be a
powerful tool for examining trends that emerge in different sub-populations.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
This thesis set out to make a contribution to modeling memes, units of cultural
meaning that reproduce recursively through society. Memetics can be an
effective framework for studying the evolution of ideas and culturally transmitted
practices. However, memetics is still a relatively young approach to studying
culture and has been missing solid formalisms for the definition of memes, as well
as a solid connection to the cognitive factors that influence social transmission of
information. The main goal of this work was to expand the study of memes to
include relevant empirical research explaining the environmental and cognitive
mechanisms that drive meme evolution. The approach taken was to bring
a systems perspective to memes in order to develop a useful architecture for
modeling memes. This architecture was intended to be complete, holistic, and
workable for studying meme transmission and selection pressure.
8.1 Overview of Contributions
As stated in Chapter 1, the approach taken by this work was based on a Systems
Social Science development cycle. For reference, Figure 8.1, a duplicate of Figure
1.2, shows the development cycle used by this research. Each of the stages of this
development cycle was completed, helping to move from narrow bands of focused
knowledge toward a model capable of representing memes in a social system.
Each of these steps has provided meaningful contributions to the study of
memes. In the process, this research has also provided insight into general social
science questions and has produced a novel analytical technique. Figure 8.2 notes
the major contributions of this thesis, categorized by their stage in the systems
social science inquiry approach. These contributions will each be discussed briefly,
examining the significance of the contribution and how it might assist further
scientific endeavors.
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Figure 8.1: Systems Social Science Development Cycle. Adapted from Silverman
(2006)
Figure 8.2: Systems Social Science Development Contributions
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8.2 Studying Available Science
By working with the available science, empirical and theoretical work was
integrated to produce a few major contributions for the study of memes. This
body of work is described in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. These three chapters
consolidated and integrated a significant body of social science theories and
specialized reductive findings, showing how available science could enrich the
study of memes.
Firstly, a formal definition for memes was proposed which incorporated
theoretical and pragmatic concerns about the meaning of a meme. The next
major contribution was to synthesize a systems model for memes that connected
Social Cognitive Learning Theory and Information Theory in order to model
meme evolution (Bandura, 1986; Shannon, 1948). This contribution produced
a conceptual model for meme transfer that integrated many of the cognitive
components that explain meme transmission and selection. Additionally, this
definition and model were used to gain insight into how memes might be measured
and studied empirically. This is an important point for the viability of these
contributions, since memes must be linked to observable phenomena in order to
study them appropriately.
Finally, available science was also harnessed in order to model the Stanford
Prison Experiment. This contribution involved collecting and organizing archival
data from the original Stanford Prison Experiment. Through this work, a
significant amount of information previously only recorded on paper records was
digitized, de-identified, and organized. This work may assist future researchers
seeking to examine with these holdings at the Archives of the History of American
Psychology (AHAP) or seeking an additional perspective into the structure of the
Stanford Prison Experiment.
8.2.1 Formal Definition for Memes
Chapter 2 set out a formal definition for memes, with consideration of both
theoretical concerns and pragmatic concerns related to the empirical study of
memes. A number of scholars have voiced the need for clear and testable
definitions for memes (Blackmore, 1999; Finkelstein, 2008). In this literature
review, no formalized definition of memes was found that was expressed
algorithmically and was disprovable. The formalization put forth in this thesis
addresses this need. This definition frames memes as a form of semantic
information that is transmitted as the result of social behavior such as performing
actions, verbal communication, or written signs. In this way, the definition is
consistent with semiotic work on signs but also adds the additional constraint that
a meme must be able to recursively reproduce within a population. Additionally,
this definition is novel in that it defines a meme only in reference to a population.
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Surprisingly, this has not been a major characteristic in defining memes despite
the fact that different organisms and even age groups can differ significantly in
how they process information.
This formalization for memes provided a good working definition for this thesis
to build upon. Formal definitions are essential for examining memes, which could
otherwise be fuzzy and not well specified. The definition presented attempted to
balance issues of observability, the ability to measure memes, with ontological
adequacy, the ability of the definition to include all possible memes. The
definition created appears to adequately cover the concepts typically considered
memes, making it ontologically adequate. It also lends itself to measurement,
supporting observability. However, this definition does not necessarily imply
that all possible memes are observable. Overall, this definition was extremely
useful for framing analysis of memes cognitively and for connecting memes to the
empirical domain.
Hopefully, this formal definition will be of use to other researchers attempting
to model or measure memes. Additionally, it contributes to the larger ongoing
discussion of how to define memes. This discussion is a difficult one because it
requires balancing the philosophical concerns of ontological adequacy against the
pragmatic concerns of scientific study and measurement. This is still a very active
area. For example, Finkelstein (2008) recently proposed a pragmatic definition
of memes in terms of their measurable qualities: how much they reproduce
(propagation) and how long they reproduce (persistence). In this conference
paper, a stated goal of his definition was to encourage dialog that would
“eventually converge to a canonical definition that will be useful in establishing
a scientific basis for memetics” Finkelstein (2008, p. 16). The definition from
Chapter 2 provides a new and distinct viewpoint that can contribute significantly
to a canonical definition. As such, this was an important part of the work within
this thesis.
8.2.2 Systems Model for Memes
Chapter 3 used this definition as the basis for a systems model for examining
meme evolution within a social system, drawing from information theory and
social cognitive learning theory (Bandura, 1986; Shannon, 1948). A core intuition
that has guided this work is that a synthesis between Bandura (1986) social
learning theory and the Shannon (1948) information theory provides an effective
framework for studying memes. Bandura’s work, especially on observational
learning, provides an effective framework for examining how social learning and
imitation work at the cognitive level. Information theory provides an effective
framework for examining how memes transmit through the environment as
information. As shown in Chapter 3, these models can be connected to form
a socio-cognitive environment for memes.
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This systems model directly addresses the quote referenced in Chapter 3 by
Castelfranchi (2001), “Memetics needs cognitive modeling.” From front to back,
this approach to examining memes has been rooted in the domains of cognition,
information processing, and cognitive modeling. This research identified a robust
set of cognitive factors that influence meme reproduction, selection, and variation.
In addition to synthesizing a systems model for examining memes, the literature
review presented in Chapter 3 should be a useful resource for other researchers
attempting to examine memes from a cognitive standpoint.
A major contribution of this research was to develop a useful architecture for
studying memes. From a systems standpoint, usefulness requires three primary
criteria: completeness, holism, and workability. Completeness requires that the
system for examining memes must be able to explain each of its mechanisms. For
the architecture to be complete, it must be able to represent evolution of memes.
Holism requires the system to be more than the sum of its parts and that the
system cannot be broken apart without losing essential interactions. For the
architecture to be holistic, the constituent theories (Observational Learning and
Information Theory) must meaningfully interact to provide insight beyond either
one individually. Workability requires that the system be implementable and
practical for approaching its intended purpose. For the system to be workable,
it must be implementable and able to be applied to realistic problems.
This research has attained each of these goals and thus presents a useful
architecture for modeling memes. The systems model for memes has been shown
to be complete, holistic, and workable. The support for each of these claims is
shown below.
Demonstration of Completeness
Memes work according to evolutionary mechanisms, so a complete architecture
for modeling memes must be able to explain reproduction, variation, and selection
pressure. Chapter 2 addresses each of these aspects. In particular, Sections 3.2,
3.3, and 3.4 present mechanisms within the system that enable reproduction,
variation, and selection of memes.
Meme reproduction was explained as a natural outcome of the process
of learning from the environment and producing behavior based upon social
learning. In this context, the Bandura (1986) social learning theory explains how
an agent learns memes from the environment and reproduces them back into the
environment. Information theory provides an understanding of the processes that
influence a meme while within the environment, such as the transmission medium
and encoding (Shannon, 1948). Together, these processes were shown to form a
complete system in which memes can reproduce.
Variation was explained as being caused by three mechanisms: cognitive
mechanisms, transmission mechanisms, and production mechanisms. Cognitive
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mechanisms cause variations in memes due to differences in interpretation or due
to random errors in processes such as encoding and recall. Section 3.4.2 contains
a discussion of the implications of retention processes on meme variation, which
seem to be a major source of variation but one that is not well understood.
Transmission effects on variation are well-framed by examining them using
the Shannon (1948) Information Theory, which provides a general framework
for examining how errors are introduced into information during transmission.
Variation due to production mechanisms is addressed in Section 3.4.4, where the
influences of motor control are addressed. These three mechanisms seem sufficient
to examine a significant amount of variation introduced into memes.
Selection pressure was explained as being caused by both cognitive and
environmental factors. Information Theory provided a pivotal lens for examining
environmental selection, since it provides the conceptual underpinnings for how
the environment can limit the bandwidth of transmissions. Section 3.3 overviews
the theoretical reasons that memes may undergo selection during transmission.
The cognitive aspects of selection are the focus of the discussion of attention
effects, examined in Section 3.4.1. As such, both cognitive and information-
theoretic aspects are important for modeling selection pressure on memes.
As such, the synthesis of Bandura’s (1986) observational learning processes
and information theory appears to be complete with respect to representing meme
evolution. This does not mean that all the subcomponents are well understood,
however. This completeness extends to identifying the primary subsystems, but
as with any system there are other systems beneath these that are not fully
understood. This completeness indicates that the synthesis is sufficient to study
memes.
Demonstration of Holism
The synthesis of Information Theory and Social Cognitive theory provides a
holistic architecture for examining memes. As was explained in the demonstration
of completeness, all three major elements of evolution require both theories in
order to understand all the mechanisms involved in meme evolution. This is
because memes require the concept of an agent, with a separation between the
agent’s cognition and the environment. Under this formulation, it is impossible
to fully consider them in any architecture that cannot represent both an agent’s
internal cognition and the external environment for a meme. Since both theories
are necessary for the model to be complete, this approach is a holistic architecture.
Demonstration of Workability
Implementing the conceptual model within a cognitive agent simulation was done
to show workability. The intention of this implementation was to show that the
conceptual model could be used as a basis for building a workable system for
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simulating memes and that this system could be applied to looking at useful
situations. The PMFServ architecture was extended to include all the principal
elements of observational learning (attention, retention, motivation, production)
and all the elements of information theory transmission (source, transmitter,
medium, receiver, destination).
The Stanford Prison Experiment simulation showed the ability of the
implemented model to represent a real-world scenario that was grounded in
empirical data and to explore an unresolved question about the ground truth.
In this case, the question was the source of abuses such as throwing prisoners
in “The Hole” and also the source of prisoner resistance. This simulation of
the Stanford Prison Experiment showed that the PMFServ simulation could
effectively simulate many of the key aspects of the real experiment, as shown
in the external validity metrics presented in Section 7.4.1. Moreover, it showed
the ability of the cognitive architecture implementation to compare different
hypotheses about the origins of the ThrowInHole and Resist actions. While
this exploration was not ultimately conclusive, the framework showed promise
for looking at real world situations.
The Hamariyah Iraqi Village experiment demonstrated the utility of the
model for examining meme competition. While based on a fictional village, the
simulation examined a real problem that exists within peacekeeping efforts: the
competition between peacekeepers soliciting information from the populace versus
insurgents attempting to destabilize the region. These efforts were represented
through the GiveInformation (Pro-US) and PlantIED (Pro-Insurgent) actions.
The analysis of the Hamariyah simulation showed the ability of the architecture
to examine meme competition and selection pressures. This analysis showed how
personality factors that motivate agents to express certain memes and the social
environment that predisposes them to learning them.
This working implementation includes all aspects of the synthetic architecture
for memes. It also includes significant number of factors discovered during the
literature review that have been found to mediate attention and motivation
related to social information, such as the effects of authority, conformity,
and novelty on observational learning. The implemented realization of this
architecture was successful in representing and exploring both the Stanford Prison
Experiment and the Hamariyah Iraqi village. As such, this demonstrates that
the framework is workable and useful for examining memes.
Significance of the Systems Synthesis Model for Memes
This systems model of memes is significant, as to date no other model has applied
this level of cognitive modeling to memes. The conceptual model created as the
result of this research incorporates insight from dozens of studies and theories
that provide insight into the mechanisms that affect meme evolution. The
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computational implementation incorporates extensive attention mechanisms and
social influence mechanisms from the conceptual model, making it unique in its
capabilities for modeling meme transmission and selection. Both the conceptual
model and its computational implementation are pioneering work intended to
stretch the bounds of meme modeling and analysis.
In the larger picture, the formulation of the conceptual model is the more
important piece of work. The computational model, while useful, is only
one possible implementation of the larger systems model for memes. This
computational implementation was tailored to social learning of affordances, a
specific meme. By computationally implementing different components of the
conceptual model, simulations that focus on different cognitive and environmental
effects could be created. In particular, the current computational implementation
does not model mutation or other effects that create new variants of memes.
By implementing additional components that focus on the transmission medium
and learning effects, different types of analysis could be applied to memes. As
such, much of the potential of the systems model for memes remains untapped.
Additionally, through dialog with the larger scientific community it should be
possible to extend and improve upon the systems model for memes. As such,
this systems model for memes should help increase dialog about the factors that
impact meme evolution.
8.2.3 Observability and Measurement of Memes
Chapter 4 explored how memes could be measured and studied empirically,
based upon this new definition and systems model for examining memes.
This exploration was intended to make a foothold for later analysis using
the computational implementation. The significance of this work is that
it demonstrates that memes, as defined in Chapter 2, are an observable
and measurable phenomenon. This contribution explores two conditions that
significantly affect the study of memes: how they change behavior (activate vs.
inhibit) and if they are still reaching new carriers in the sample (reproducing vs.
equilibrium). It also describes in detail how socially learned affordances can be
studied as memes.
While this work presents a short examination of the methodologies used to
select and examine memes in this research, this remains a very open area. This
exploration did not address issues of measurement such as how to address memes
with multiple vectors of expression (e.g. verbal and written, for example). This
is an area where a meta-analysis of research from communications and semiotics
might be valuable. Secondly, measuring memes in the face of variation is only
briefly addressed in Section 4.1 and Appendix A. Since meme reproduction can
introduce changes in the semantic information, different “subspecies” of a meme
can emerge- posing problems for measurement. This is an issue that confronts
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researchers in the domains of linguistics and diffusion of ideas. As such, there
could be value in aggregating insights from these fields and finding general
approaches used for measuring memes in the face of variation. More research
on measurement methodology for memes is an important research topic, which
could extend empirical approaches to meme analysis.
8.2.4 Examination of the Stanford Prison Experiment Archival Data
As part of the Stanford Prison Experiment simulation design, a site visit was
made to the Archives of the History of American Psychology to access the
archived data for the Stanford Prison Experiment. Working on-site at the
archives, a significant amount of data was de-identified and organized in electronic
format from the original materials. These efforts to organize and aggregate
the raw and intermediate data from the Stanford Prison Experiment may have
historical value in terms of inventorying information from that experiment. This
contribution may help later researchers who hope to work with the Stanford
Prison Experiment holdings.
This thesis presents some of the information from the original data and papers
in Section 6.1.1 and also in Appendix H. This information provides a quantitative
and qualitative overview of the experiment. Reading these sections would be no
substitute for reading the original articles (Haney et al., 1973a, 1973b) or any
of Dr. Zimbardo’s materials, such as “The Lucifer Effect” (Zimbardo, 2007).
The authoritative articles are the best source for understanding the experiment.
With that said, this research has focused on the subjects and baseline activities
more than the original papers. As such, the discussion in Section 6.1 summarizes
information that might only be gleaned by thoroughly researching the experiment
or by accessing the holdings at AHAP.
8.3 Component Authoring
The next major contribution included authoring components for examining meme
transmission and competition, as described in Chapter 5. The computational
model built was consistent with the definition for memes defined in Chapter 2
and implemented a significant portion of the conceptual model for representing
memes defined at the end of Chapter 3. The component authoring process
explicitly specifies empirical and theoretical findings, forming the bridge between
the available science and a maintainable computational implementation. This
followed the component authoring process of implementing simple, atomic
cognitive components. These components represented first principles that would
affect meme transmission, such as selective attention and ingroup influence.
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8.3.1 Cognitive Effects Operationalized
Table 8.1: Cognitive Effects Operationalized
Cognitive Relationship Source Specification Details
Max Attended Events Cowan (2001) ∼4 Max Attended Items
Attention∼f(Novelty) James (1890) Positive Correlation
Attention∼f(Selection) Simons and Positive Correlation
Chabris (1999)
Attention∼f(Motivation) Fazio et al. (1994) Positive Correlation
Recall∼f(Exposures) Bornstein (1989) Sigmoid-Type Equation
∼10 to 20 Exposures → 100% Recall
Recall∼f(Repetition) Ebbinghaus (1913) Sigmoid-Type Equation
Recall∼f(Exposures) Ray and Sawyer (1971) Positive Correlation
Persuasion∼f(Exposures) Ray and Sawyer (1971) Unclear Correlation
Persuasion∼ |f(Exposures)| Ray and Sawyer (1971) Diminishing gains per exposure
Persuasion∼f(Social Influence) Petty and Positive Correlation
Cacioppo (1986)
Social Influence∼f(Conformity) Asch (1955) Positive Correlation
Conformity=e−4∗e
−S1.75
T
Tanford and Explicit equation, s.t.
Penrod (1984) S is # Sources,
T is # Targets
Social Influence∼f(Similarity) Platow et al. (2005) Positive Correlation
Social Influence∼f(Valence) Kelley (1955) Positive Correlation
Social Influence∼f(Authority) Milgram (2004) Positive Correlation
Social Influence∼f(In-Group) Tajfel (1982) Positive Correlation
Social Influence∼f(Reference Group) Kameda et al. (1997) Positive Correlation
Social Influence∼f(Transferability) Bandura (1986) Positive Correlation
Section 5.2 describes how the cognitive effects noted in Chapter 3 were
operationalized. While these components were implemented computationally for
use with PMFServ, this contribution has greater value than simply enhancing
a single cognitive architecture. Since a knowledge engineering approach was
used to categorize and represent these components, this process operationalized
knowledge from the original papers. In this context, operationalizing means that
key insights provided by a scholarly paper have been reduced to mathematical
relationships which can be represented formally. Operational descriptions form
the bridge between underspecified social science findings and implementable
computational models. An operational description of a finding or theory
captures the necessary core relationships that must hold true for any formal
implementation. Since this will frequently be underspecified, a large number
of possible implementations can be based on such work. In this way, the
operationalization of the these cognitive effects could be of value to cognitive
modelers using other architectures. By examining the fundamental relationships
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presented in Section 5.2, equivalent or alternative versions of these components
could be implemented in other frameworks.
Table 8.1 summarizes the main operationalized cognitive relationships
incorporated into this research, along with a summary of the relationship
captured. For many of the correlation-type relationships, the impact of the factor
with respect to attention or learning was estimated as explained in Section 5.2.5
and Appendix F where the attentional salience weights are explained. While
these operationalizations remain underspecified, they provide meaningful insights
into cognitive relationships that should be expected to affect attention, learning,
and social influence. By steadily operationalizing findings about cognition, the
expected behavior of a cognitive model can be specified with increasing accuracy.
These expectations for cognitive models allow them to better simulate human
cognition in a descriptive manner.
8.3.2 Attentional Salience Integrated Model
To integrate the operationalized findings, the attentional salience model was
used to integrate these factors. As previously noted, the attentional salience
calculation was built using the KISS (Keep it Simple Stupid) principle
(Axelrod, 1997). Using a simple weighted linear sum, attentional salience was
calculated using novelty, selective attention, motivated attention, conformity,
similarity, valence, authority, ingroup influence, reference group influence, and
transferability. This integration tied together disparate factors that would
affect the transmission and selection of memes, while capturing the appropriate
operationalized relationships. As such, this is a significant contribution in that it
was the basis of a workable computational model for examining memes that was
theoretically consistent.
However, using attentional salience to integrate disparate factors required
significant assumptions that were made entirely for the sake of parsimony.
Since attention is necessary for learning, factors known to impact learning were
integrated using attentional salience as well. This prevented adding additional
assumptions about how each factor affected attention and learning separately.
While this approach satisfied the operationalized constraints, the form of equation
does not make good intuitive sense. One would expect these factors to potentially
impact attention, learning, and motivation in distinct ways. Instead, only
attention makes full use of these cognitive factors and assumes that they are
all linearly independent.
This simplistic integration of cognitive components must be considered the
weakest part of the work accomplished, since little empirical data supported any
particular combination of cognitive components. This weakness is a direct result
of the weakness in empirical research that studies these factors, since studies do
not typically consider more than one such factor at a time. In this respect, this
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS 204
integration identified significant gaps in the available science. The interaction of
different cognitive effects have not been well integrated and their interactions are
not well understood. Expanding empirical studies to consider multiple cognitive
effects would be an important step toward understanding their larger role in
society.
8.4 Meta-Model Library
The meta-model library phase consists of where maintainable and re-usable
computational tools are implemented to help study social science problems. This
research made significant contributions to this area. These contributions included
implementing PMFServ cognitive component plug-ins, creating a Stanford Prison
Experiment scenario for simulation, and modifying the Hamariyah scenario to
examine meme competition. While these tools may be specific to PMFServ,
they can be used to model, simulate, and study hypothetical and real-life
situations. Additionally, the modified inversion count metric was implemented
computationally and is a tool that may have broader applications than examining
the order of meme transmission.
8.4.1 PMFServ Cognitive Component Plug-Ins
A major thrust in this research was extending the PMFServ cognitive architecture
to enable it to represent meme reproduction and selection effects. This research
built more than a dozen new cognitive components for the PMFServ architecture,
as explored in Section 5.2. These components incorporate the operationalized
cognitive effects, implemented to be consistent with the existing cognitive
components in the PMFServ cognitive architecture.
The new PMFServ plug-ins modeled attention, attentional salience,
associative learning, perceived novelty, selective attention (inattentional
blindness), motivated attention, conformity, similarity, valence, authority,
ingroup influence, reference group influence, and transferability. The internal
validity tests in Section 7.3.1 demonstrated that these components work as
intended and capture the key insights used to create them.
These components are re-usable and can be applied to other simulations and
experiments. The majority of these components are also capable of working
independently of each other, unless they directly use values from another
component. This means it is possible to create an agent who only implements
a learning model, for example. These components will advance research at the
ACASA lab and other organizations using the PMFServ cognitive architecture.
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8.4.2 Stanford Prison Scenario
The knowledge engineering for the Stanford Prison scenario was a considerable
piece of the total work for this research. Each of the principle actions for this
scenario were knowledge engineered, the typical schedule for the experiment
was represented, and agents were initialized with personalities based upon their
personality assessment data from the original experiment. This scenario now
exists in the library of modeled situations within the ACASA Lab and can be
analyzed to consider different thought experiments about the Stanford Prison
Experiment.
8.4.3 Hamariyah Iraqi Village Modifications
This research also produced a streamlined variant of the original Hamariyah
Iraqi village scenario. This variant reduced the total number of groups and
agents, but introduced the capability for meme transmission within the village.
While currently the Hamariyah scenario only includes the GiveInformation and
PlantIED meme, it is straightforward to add additional memes to examine
their diffusion and competition within the fictional village. This variant of the
Hamariyah Iraqi village has been added to the meta-model library of PMFServ
scenarios and can be applied to explore new research questions.
8.4.4 Modified Inversion Distance Algorithm
An additional tool implemented was the inversion distance algorithm used in
this research. This algorithm improves upon typical inversion count algorithms
in that it is normalized, so that it fits between 0 and 1, with 0.5 being the
average distance between a list and its random permutation. The algorithm also
adjusts for ties and right censored elements in either the test sequence or the
ground truth sequence. Existing inversion distance algorithms researched were
not able to handle censored elements, so this algorithm may have utility for other
researchers examining sequences of events. To this author’s knowledge, there is no
openly documented algorithm for using inversion counts to calculate a normalized
distance between sequences that can also accommodate ties, missing elements,
and right censored elements.
This sequence distance metric was a useful extension of standard inversion
distance approaches and may have value for other problems where censoring or
ties cause standard approaches to fail. With further study of the distribution
properties of this modified version of the inversion algorithm, it may also be
possible to turn this distance metric into a null-hypothesis test. Since the
distribution properties of inversion counts for random permutations were explored
with some success in Margolius (2001), it may be possible to build off of this
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research to produce a null-hypothesis statistic for sequence comparison that is
robust with respect to ties and censored data in both sequences.
8.5 Application Usage
The scenarios produced for this research produced meaningful research findings,
which have helped to give insight into those situations and into more general
scientific questions. The contributions from each experiment will be noted, as
each simulation provided unique and useful findings of significance.
8.6 Stanford Prison Experiment Simulations
The Stanford Prison Experiment was examined primarily to determine if social
learning played a significant role in the hostile environment, with a focus
on guards throwing prisoners in “The Hole” and prisoner resistance against
the guards. This analysis modeled these influences by modeling them as if
agents learned something that made them recognize their ability to take the
ThrowInHole and Resist actions (i.e. the affordances for those actions).
The simulations of the Stanford Prison Experiment showed that memes
starting with certain innovators were a plausible mechanism for explaining
the order that guards first initiated the action to throw a prisoner in “The
Hole.” However, they also showed the Full Knowledge condition was equally
plausible, leaving the question unresolved. In the absence of clear signs that
meme transmission significantly affected the order of first expressions, the Full
Knowledge condition appeared to be the most likely case. These simulations
and analysis of the data also showed that a demonstration of the meme by an
authority figure was unlikely, given the available data. However, this should
be taken with a grain of salt since the authority figure in the experiment did
not have any personality modeling. Agents might have responded differently to
an authority figure with a different personality, which would change how that
simulation condition unfolded.
While not conclusive, this examination still presented a novel approach to
examining memes within a complex environment. The diffusion analysis showed
how situational and personality factors both influence how memes operate in
a social environment. The Resist meme was shown to diffuse faster, since the
prisoners were always on-site during the simulation and also because it had to
be performed with greater frequency to accomplish the intended effect. The
ThrowInHole meme was shown to diffuse slower and in phases, since learning
was constrained by the limited interaction between different guard shifts.
Finally, the Stanford Prison simulation showed good correspondence with
the external validity tests that were completed. These tests showed that on
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the majority of metrics chosen a priori, the simulation reproduced the expected
results. This demonstrated that the approach for extracting data from the
Stanford Prison experiment captured many of the important aspects of the
scenario and might be useful for exploring other questions about the experiment.
8.7 Hamariyah Iraqi Village Simulations
The Hamariyah Iraqi scenario modeled the competition between the memes
GiveInformation and PlantIED within an environment populated by agents who
spend the majority of their day doing basic tasks in their village, such as going
to work or going to the market to buy food. As such, these memes compete with
each other and with the other actions available to agents in the scenario. These
memes were implemented on a backdrop where members of the village would
consider which one they would prefer to perform on a structure managed by US
peacekeeping forces in an unstable region.
Examining each of these memes found that both of them could spread within
the village, though expression of these memes was disproportionately associated
with certain members in the scenario. The Hypothesis condition made reasonable
assumptions about insurgents being aware of how to volunteer to plant an IED
and police and government workers being aware of how to give information to
the US forces. Under this condition, agents learned memes disproportionately
according to their group memberships. Agents tended to learn from agents in
the same ethnic group in this simulation. Considering Hamariyah was modeled
to be a heavily factional atmosphere, this makes intuitive sense.
This simulation indicated that PlantIED spread more effectively and was
expressed more commonly than GiveInformation. This was due to a few factors.
Firstly, the larger groups in the scenario disliked the US. Secondly, most of the
agents who avoided the PlantIED action also had personalities that led them
to avoid the GiveInformation action as well, because both were dangerous. In
short, the agents willing to risk their lives were more prone to violent actions
rather than relationship-building actions.
This raises questions about the concept of a “hearts and minds” campaign.
The problem may not be the hearts or the minds, it may simply be that the
friendly and non-violent portions of the population would simply rather take
the safest option available. This analysis indicated that providing security
for the population would be a key factor for improving the expression of the
GiveInformation meme. This finding is supported by some counter-insurgency
analysts, who state that assuring security for the populace is the most important
factor and necessary for a useful “hearts and minds” campaign (Krepinevich Jr,
2005). This simulation indicated that it might be possible to have agents who
dislike the US overall still provide intelligence if they find it beneficial for their
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long term preferences, but only if their safety can be assured.
Finally, certain factors that seemed likely to influence meme expression were
not found to be significant overall. Notably, employment level was not found to
be a significant factor for volunteering to participate in IED activities. This is
concordant with research such as Berman, Felter, and Shapiro (2009), who state
that higher employment does not appear to decrease the likelihood of violent
rebellion activities that result in civilian deaths.
This analysis showed that the model was effective for looking at competition
of memes within the fictional Hamariyah Iraqi village. Using the model, it
was possible to determine not only the effectiveness of each meme within the
population but also the key identifying factors that determined which agents were
adopting a particular meme. While this simulation was done on a fictional village,
it is not hard to imagine using this model to examine competing memes within
a real population. With appropriate data collection and knowledge engineering,
this model could be a useful tool for studying competition between memes in a
real life context.
8.8 Gaps In Science
Based on the body of research presented, this systems social science inquiry has
provided helped bridge gaps in scientific knowledge but has also exposed new
gaps that warrant scientific study. The contributions of this research on the gaps
in social science knowledge will be discussed briefly.
8.8.1 Existing Gaps Addressed By Research
A few significant research questions were approached through this research. The
major gap addressed by this research was to present one modeling approach that
applies cognitive modeling to examining memes. This research has helped to
integrate and organize the available science in order to build a systems model
that can explain many of the factors driving meme reproduction, selection, and
variation. Through this process, some corollary findings were discovered.
No Evidence that Memes Significantly Affected the Stanford Prison
Experiment
As noted in the contributions from the Stanford Prison Experiment simulation,
this research demonstrated that there was no specific evidence that memes
played a major role in how the behavior of the guards and prisoners played
out. While memes were not disconfirmed, they were not confirmed and therefore
seem unlikely to be the sole mechanism that affected transmission. Even if
ThrowInHole and Resist were passed as memes through the Stanford Prison
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Experiment, it seems likely that the overall impact of such memes would be low.
Since the subjects were in a confined situation (a prison), attention and guard
shifts were the major factor limiting meme learning. After a dozen exposures,
even an event of relatively low salience had a significant chance of being learned.
Since Resist and ThrowInHole occurred with some frequency, everyone would
eventually learn to perform the actions. This means that the main limiting
factor was expression- who was willing to initiate those actions. As such, this
analysis indicated that personality factors and interpersonal factors seemed to be
the primary effects that affected behavior, rather than social learning effects.
Negative Feedback Loop Between Novelty and Attention
Another general relationship of interest is that in a primarily static, complex
environment- novelty correlates negatively with attention. Stated in this way, this
is a very counter-intuitive relationship. However, due to the effects of attention
feedback, this finding probably generalizes to most situations. The reason for
this negative correlation is that even if novel events tend to draw attention more,
paying attention to them typically makes them less novel. This means that events
that are only interesting due to their novelty will eventually become uninteresting,
while events that are interesting due to other factors will retain their attention
salience.
In the long run, the events and entities that remain novel are novel for a
reason: they were uninteresting in other respects. For example, while a person
might be more interested in watching new movies, if they have owned a new movie
for five years without watching it then it probably means that there are other
factors that make it less appealing. This correlation discovered in the data was
unexpected, but appears to be robust and may be provable within the empirical
realm.
Diffusion Rates Show a U-Curve
The diffusion rate analysis for both conditions showed a shallow U-shaped curve
for the efficiency of diffusion of ideas. This is an interesting phenomenon.
This implies that the early adopters and laggards tend to be easier to reach
with memes, as compared to the majority. For the early adopters, this makes
intuitive sense because the first expressions will capture the people who are most
susceptible to the meme. However, it is interesting that following the initial
dip, efficiency of exposures rises for the last agents. This is an interesting effect
which could warrant further study. In general, the U-shaped efficiency curve for
exposures is an interesting phenomenon and it would be interesting to test the
conditions under which efficiency of exposures tends to follow this curve versus a
linear or convex curve. These theoretical results could then be used to design an
experiment to test if such dynamics are found in empirical data.
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Situational Collinearity Limits Model Calibration and Validation
Finally, it was discovered during the internal validity analysis that even a simple,
known model may be hard to infer from a limited data set. For example, the
correlations shown between different social and attention characteristics were very
different between the Stanford Prison simulation and the Hamariyah simulation.
This meant that each simulation appeared to have a different attention model, if
one only examined the Kendall correlations and logistic regression.
This is an interesting finding for the purposes of looking at social science
factors in an experimental setting. Even if all factors work based upon fixed
importance weights (as was the case for the attention model), collinearity between
inputs could stymie trying to determine these weights. One implication for
this finding is that standard regressions may be improper when estimating the
influence of attention and social factors, due to the potential for multicollinearity.
For this reason it might be more appropriate to analyze these factors with
regressions that try to account for multicollinearity, such as the Shapley Value
regression. The Shapley Value regression technique uses game theory to more
equitably and stably estimate β weights (Lipovetsky & Conklin, 2001). The
failure of an ordinary least squares regression to capture these factors in the
simulation setting has provided useful insight into the fact that such an estimation
technique would be inadvisable in an experimental setting for examining these
variables.
This indicates that simulated experiments might provide value for determining
the analytical techniques that would be robust in capturing important
relationships. Cognitive modelers often attempt to look at complex problems
and must operationalize relationships found through empirical research, which
often contains gaps and ambiguities (Silverman et al., 2001). The attention
model designed for this research was tested as if it was empirical data, through
experiments. It might be possible to extend this approach to prototyping
theoretical models, then using computational modeling to design experiments
that could also be implemented in the real world to test these models. This
would improve feedback between computational modeling and empirical research.
Such improved connections would ensure that empirical research would also be
directly implementable within a cognitive architecture, which could be used for
theory-based hypothesis testing.
8.8.2 Gaps Exposed By Research
While this research has produced some interesting findings, it has also opened
many new questions. From the empirical standpoint, there were many obstacles
encountered with respect to operationalizing cognitive models. This is a typical
struggle for cognitive modelers, since empirical research is not conducted with
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the intention to implement computational simulations (Silverman, 2004).
Units for Operationalized Constructs
A second major open question is the issue of operationalizing constructs that
utilize ambiguous units. This is also a common problem with constructing
cognitive models. When dealing with factors that have been measured according
to ordinal relationships (e.g. high/low authority), it is quite likely that only a
fraction of the total domain of the construct has been measured. This typically
leads to situations where research presents how certain conditions alter the
dependent variable by some magnitude, but give no knowledge of how great
the magnitude of the input variable has changed.
While such relationships can be operationalized, the operationalized version
can either be reduced to a simple correlation or else the operationalized version
will be representing the relationship from the specific experiment. The second
approach was used in this research when determining attentional salience weights.
As such, the minimum and maximum values of certain computational constructs
are actually representing those contained in the experiments. While it preserves
the largest amount of information, such magnitudes ultimately are not capturing
the true range of cognitive phenomena but are rather dealing with the limited
range found in an experimental setting. Without being able to at least infer a
global minimum or maximum level for such constructs, such an approach runs
the risk of overstating or understating the true impact of certain factors.
This also has important repercussions with respect to how factors should be
combined. This is a significant question, especially when considering how to
integrate multiple related factors. In order to properly weight cognitive models,
it is necessary to establish some form of generalizable units for constructs or to
measure all the related constructs in the same context in order to understand
how they interconnect. Clearly, the second approach is preferable but may be
more difficult. On the converse, it might be possible to establish workable units
for certain constructs that would give some insight into the relative importance
of different contributing factors to the same phenomenon. Even if such units
were coarse grained, they could greatly improve comparisons between factors.
Such experimental results would significantly improve operational descriptions,
without requiring grand-scale studies.
Methodology for Improving Upon KISS Models
Related to these obstacles, there are a number of open questions with regard
to the implementation of the cognitive model used by meme-capable agents in
PMFServ. The first question is if the factors that affect meme transmission
can be combined in a more appropriate way. While this model for attention
worked effectively for these simulations and captured some of the important
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relationships for learning memes, its assumptions were not entirely realistic. Part
of the cause for collinearity between components to the attention model is that
factors such as ingroups and valence probably do not work independently. While
this implementation assumed that attentional salience is mediated by a linear
combination of independent factors, realistically these factors should be modeled
using a different and more complex system of governing equations.
This research applied a KISS approach to integrating different factors that
affected meme transmission. With that said, integrating these factors according
to a more advanced model (such as a variant of ELM (Petty & Cacioppo,
1986)) might improve the performance and quality of results. However, there
are significant questions as to the appropriate methodology for selecting and
validating a more advanced model. This is a major open question with respect to
computational models of cognition. While the Keep it Simple (KISS) principle
is simple to follow, the Keep it Descriptive (KIDS) principle is more complicated
(Axelrod, 1997; Edmonds & Moss, 2005). We know the model should be more
complicated, but neither the KIDS principle nor the available science gives solid
guidelines to how to improve upon the KISS model.
Lack of Big-Picture Studies
Though the assumptions of the cognitive model oversimplify the situation, there
is insufficient empirical research to defensibly select a better model. As such, the
solution probably rests in better guidelines for when and how cognitive modelers
can best collaborate with experimental researchers that specialize in empirical
research. Ultimately, for cognitive modeling and social systems modeling to
produce its best work, empirical research must clarify the ambiguities and gaps
between sets of interacting factors. For this to occur, social systems modelers
must explain the need and utility of big-picture studies.
Unfortunately, experimental researchers working on socio-cognitive
phenomena do not typically design studies that consider large numbers of
inter-related factors. For example, it seems surprising to this researcher that
experimentalists have not spent more time measuring how all major factors of
social influence interact. The groundbreaking research that identified authority,
conformity, ingroups, reference groups, and the halo effect as significant to social
influence is well over twenty years old. With that said, not one study could be
found that measured half of these factors. Socio-cognitive research is an active
field, with a variety of good and interesting research that detects new cognitive
effects and relationships. If a subset of the field was informed of the needs of
cognitive modelers in this area, there might be a greater interest in studies that
examine larger numbers of factors simultaneously.
Cognitive modeling could be significantly improved by even a handful of such
studies that give real insight into how such factors interact. Even if such studies
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could not be easily broken down into “statistically significant” chunks, a large
number of analytical techniques exist for processing complex data. By having all
the available data in hand, different potential cognitive models could be tested
against such data using train-test approaches. While such studies might be
more expensive than the typical study, the benefits to science would seem very
meaningful.
Given the amount of expenditure used to analyze cognition using expensive
equipment such as fMRI machines, it seems reasonable that an equally significant
amount of money should be applied to figuring out how such cognitive constructs
interact. What would the point be to understand where constructs activate in
the brain, if one still had no idea how they interact as a group? While discovering
and exploring cognitive processes is important, it is equally important to study
how the known processes interact as parts of the same system.
Without such studies, cognitive modelers remain at a disadvantage for
building and validating models. One major challenge of this work was the search
to find an appropriate data set that could be used for validity testing. Ultimately,
the Stanford Prison Experiment was used because it was the only experiment
found that had detailed information about the personalities, context, behavior,
and had the potential for meme transmission during the study. Similar issues
are encountered when trying to improve and externally validate the cognitive
components for the agent cognitive model- the data simply doesn’t exist. With
that said, having such data would be a major boost to cognitive modeling in
general.
Effect of Memes on Culture Change
Finally, given the definition and conceptualization of memes presented in this
research there is the open question of how memes fit into larger frameworks of
society and culture. Giddens (1986) presents a view of society as being guided
significantly by the interaction of agency and structure, such as rules. Memes
appear to be a mechanism which can help model shifts within this structure.
However, the ways in which social structures and rules affect memes have not
been fully explored. The Tomasello (1999) ratchet effect view of cultural shifts
is a second super-system model which has implications for the cumulative effect
of meme evolution within culture. Super-system models of this nature provide
important context for meme transmission, since they frame and constrain the
macro-scale impact of memes within society. The larger implications of this sort
of model within such a super-system of shifting incentives warrant further study.
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8.9 Scientific Shifts
This research started out with the goal to produce a scientific shift in how
memes are formulated and modeled. Based upon the theoretical and applied
work completed, this goal appears to have been a success. This research is not
the last word on memes, but instead will hopefully initiate new dialog about
modeling memes.
8.9.1 Principal Scientific Progress
This work accomplished two major scientific shifts with respect to the study of
memes. Firstly, this research connected memes with a large body of social science
theory and empirical findings that are extremely important for understanding how
memes evolve. Due to the origins and relative newness of memetics as a field of
study, there has been a great unfilled need for such research (Heylighen, 1998).
Even with this significant foray into examining memes in this research, more
exploration is warranted to integrate cognitive science findings with memetics.
With that said, this research provides new insights into how cognitive and
environmental factors drive meme evolution. This research also provides new
avenues for dialog about how these factors specifically affect memes within society.
Secondly, the systems model for memes was created and shown to be a useful
model for studying meme evolution. Building off of a synthesis between the
Social Cognitive Learning Theory (Bandura, 1986) and Shannon Information
Theory (Shannon, 1948), this is a new approach to studying memes in that
it attempts to richly capture the effects of cognition while still considering the
effects of transmission and encoding. It is also novel in that it explicitly considers
memes to be defined in relation to a population. The systems model was used
to organize the empirical findings related to memes into a conceptual model for
examining meme transmission. This model has shown itself capable of producing
computational implementations that can be applied to real world questions, while
keeping a rich conceptualization of memes. This model should help open new
avenues of discussion and research for looking at memes within society.
8.9.2 Future Directions
There are a number of future directions for this research, following from the
theoretical work and the computational work. Firstly, as noted previously in
Section 8.2.1, the meme definition proposed in this work can be part of the larger
discussion to develop a canonical definition for memes that is both ontologically
adequate and supports empirical measurement. A second theoretical direction for
this work is to delve deeper into the relationship between memetics and semiotics,
in terms of scope and focus. In particular, it would be valuable to examine the
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relationship between memetic approaches to analysis as compared to semiotic
approaches to similar topics.
Another major theoretical question is how meme mutation could be modeled
in a generalizable and empirically-grounded manner. While the computational
model implemented for this research was sufficient to model meme reproduction
and selection, mutation mechanisms were not implemented. A significant reason
for this design choice was that the mechanisms for mutation found during the
literature review were typically specific to a particular medium, expression type,
or memory encoding issue. While Information Theory covers most of these cases,
the specific characteristics of the medium and noise must be modeled in order to
examine a real world scenario. As such, it would be interesting to find literature
that examines general, empirically validated effects that can help examine meme
variation.
The future direction that could most greatly benefit this type of work would be
richly detailed empirical experiments on cognitive effects, which take into account
many inter-related constructs. While such experiments might be avoided because
they are “messy” to interpret, cognition seems to be a rather messy business.
To understand how different cognitive factors interact, such experiments are
necessary. Moreover, the internal validity research noted in Section 7.3.4 and
Appendix J.1 indicates that, by not measuring such factors, one might infer
distorted relationships that are specific to the experimental context. Big-picture
studies that look at many related variables would be a major step forward
for understanding cognition, since these would give a glimpse into how many
parts interact rather than a focused view of only two or three parts at a time.
However, as observed in the difficulty of using a typical regression to estimate
the contribution of such factors, it is important to consider the analytical tools
being used to examine the parts.
Another avenue of further work would be to examine the larger implications
of this model of memes on the social system. Much of this research has focused on
how the social system affects meme reproduction and selection. The alternative
question is also very important: how do memes affect the larger system as
a whole? A modest application would be an implementation similar to the
Hamariyah scenario, but working with real-world data rather than a fictional
village. Such a study would be an excellent further external validity test and
would also allow the model to provide insight into real issues of meme adoption
and selection in a complex environment. The success of the model in such a
context would be a significant step forward for analysis of viral marketing issues
or even military strategy, such as the spread of a new IED design. In this way,
this research can be applied to significant hands-on problems in the short term.
Finally, a future application for this research would be to model a real-world
problem in tandem with an empirical experiment. By conducting an experiment
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and collecting appropriate data, it should be possible to better establish where the
computational implementation of this model succeeds and fails for representing
meme dynamics. A significant challenge to such research would be to collect
the amount of data necessary to initialize PMFServ agents, which was one of
the reasons why this design was not initially chosen to help validate the model.
However, given that the computational model has passed its initial tests it may
be valuable to apply it in tandem with empirical data collection which could help
test and improve the cognitive model for memes.
In theory, such an approach could even be done as a complement to a big-
picture study as mentioned earlier. As shown in the systems social science
development cycle, the exchange of information between systems modelers
and discipline specialists helps to advance science. By building big-picture
experiments specifically designed to produce operationalizable results, in tandem
with a cognitive modeling approach, a closer exchange of knowledge would be
produced. This sort of approach may ultimately be the future of cognitive
modeling– to tighten its connections with empirical research. For cognitive
research on more limited phenomena, such as reaction time or certain visual
attention tasks, this interconnection is already the state of practice. However, for
models of social phenomena this tight coupling is uncommon. This social systems
model for memes would be well-suited to pairing with an empirical equivalent,
hopefully as part of a scientific shift in socio-cognitive modeling in general.
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Appendix A
Speciation of Memes
Similarity of memes lacks a definitive metric. The problem of identifying
memes has correlates to the problem of identifying asexually reproducing species.
Biologists classify organisms using three types of information: DNA, phenotype,
and the ability to interbreed. Currently scientists classify organisms by genetic
features, but historically they have been grouped by behavior and physical
features. This change in paradigm has not caused sweeping changes in scientific
classifications (Lewin, 1997).
By analogy, phenotypical similarity for memes provide a necessary indicator
in defining the meme reproduction process. Similarity of memes can be measured
behaviorally, by physical characteristics. Variants of a meme should exhibit
physical similarities in behavior or resulting signs. The study of imitation in
behavioral psychology follows this paradigm (Zentall, 2007).
Unfortunately (or perhaps fortunately), humans possess a variety of means
to communicate the same information. The similarity of transmissions may be
neither necessary nor sufficient, but provides a basic metric. A more advanced
version of this analysis would involve developing sets of behaviors classified by
their likelihood of expression after some sets of observation. For example, a meme
promoting suicide bombing may be learned by watching a bomber, hearing about
a bomber, or reading about a bomber. Agents perceiving this meme should
be probabilistically more likely to engage in one or more of the transmission
behaviors. A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) could be appropriate for this sort
of analysis. Care must be taken applying such approaches however, because not
all contagious behavior involves a meme. Appendix B goes into great detail on
this matter.
Perception equivalence provides an alternative metric for similarity through
semantic traits. Classes of indistinguishable stimuli provide the backbone for
perceptual equivalence. The affordance theory of perception and attractor theory
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of neurological activation are consistent with this metric (E. J. Gibson & Pick,
2000; Mainzer, 2007). This metric implies that if memes are perceived similar,
they are similar. This methodology allows a much broader range of behavior
to be classified as the same meme, but depends greatly on whose perception is
used for classification. This introduces confounds when dealing with a sufficiently
heterogeneous population. Due to cultural grounding a researcher may classify
behaviors along different lines than the target population, a problem of great
attention in anthropology (Herskovitz, 1952). Such problems do not negate the
usefulness of this approach, but do indicate a need for caution.
Neither metric for meme similarity holds the same convenience for analysis
as DNA in genetics, but the existence of quantifiable similarity metrics allows
for evolutionary analysis. Placing bounds on a similarity metric allow behaviors
to be classified into a single meme. Classification grants the ability to measure
meme proliferation and evolution.
While using similarity to define memes may seem overly relative, the same
argument could be made for genes. Gene instances contain small mutations
when compared to the parent. Even during human cell division, the telomere of
chromosomes shorten after each replication- one of the proposed causes of aging
(Tsuji, Ishiko, Takasaki, & Ikeda, 2002). Equivalency of gene sequences follows
a similarity metric, requiring a certain level of differentiation before defining a
new entity. Foregoing classification of memes would be akin to studying biology
without a taxonomy- every organism wholly separate and ungeneralizable.
Appendix B
Imitation and Other Behavioral
Transmission Mechanisms
Multiple mechanisms describe the content of learning, if any, that can explain
the spread of behavior through a population. These mechanisms are listed in
Table B.1. Humans possess the ability to learn using all these mechanisms,
while other animals have been shown to pass knowledge using a subset (Zentall,
2007; Whiten et al., 1999). Complicating matters, behavior can spread
through mechanisms like contagion that transmit no semantic information.
Reflexive smiling and yawning fit this pattern. Other mechanisms pass semantic
information, but indirectly related to a behavior. For example, stimulus
enhancement is capable of transmitting a meme giving increased attentional
salience to an object. Differences in objects and perception could result in
evolution of which object receives increased attention through a population,
without evolution of individual behaviors.
As can be noted, a number of mechanisms that allow behavior to spread are
not not actually meme reproduction. Those marked as “Maybe” do indicate
social learning, but the content of the learning does not consist of a meme to
be expressed. Instead they pass basic environmental information which gives
support to express a behavior. If this piece of knowledge is passed from one
agent to another as a result of behavior affected by this information, it is a
meme. The meme in this case is not an action, but a piece of environmental
awareness. These would be memes that do not necessarily involve any imitation.
The uncertainty around discriminated following is analogous to the Chinese
Room problem, which hinges on the meaning of understanding (Searle, 1980).
This is because an agent can store and replicate a behavior, but with no knowledge
of semantic information. Searle would say in this case that an agent does not
know the meme in that case. However, the agent can still express the meme. The
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Table B.1: Imitation Mechanisms (Mitchell, 1987)
Mechanism Description Meme? Semantic Information
Mimicry Genetically predisposed
response where agent
appears like another
organism
No None
Contagion Genetically predisposed
response to perform
a certain action when
observing signs of that
action (ex. flocking)
No None
Social
Facilitation
Motivation changes due to
presence of other agents
No None, behavioral
semantics rediscovered
Incentive
Motivation
Motivation changes due to
knowledge of results of a
behavior
Maybe Existence of a reinforcer
(contextual information)
Local
Enhancement
Attentional salience
increases for areas where
another agent acts
Maybe Existence of a location
(contextual information)
Stimulus
Enhancement
Attentional salience
increases for manipulated
objects
Maybe Existence of an object
(contextual information)
Discriminated
Following
Miming the product of a
behavior (ex. matching
sound pitch)
Unclear None retained internally,
but syntax can evolve.
Observational
Conditioning
Pavlovian learning of a
stimulus-outcome pairing
Maybe Existence of a relationship
between stimulus and
outcome
Affordance
Learning
Discovery of a new action
in the environment
Yes Action opportunity
between agent and object
Behavior
Imitation
Reproduce actions
involved in a behavior,
without feedback for
matching
Yes Relationship between
action and outcome
Behavior
Emulation
Reproduce outcome of
an action using different
capabilities
Yes Relationship between
action and outcome
Goal
Imitation
Behavior to achieve a
similar demonstrated goal
Yes Relationship between
motivation and outcome
Symbolic
Imitation
Behavior demonstrating
similar relationships as
another agent’s behavior
but in a different medium
or syntax (ex. language)
Yes Relationships between
syntactic elements
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designation for discriminated following is ambiguous as a result.
True imitation is always a meme, but can take different forms. Individual
differences between agents of different capabilities create systemic differences in
behavior. For example, a taller person stoops to reach a shelf but a person half
their height must stretch to reach the same item. Certain forms of social learning,
particularly action learning, may operate under two distinct modes during this
process. Imitation can occur between organisms of similar capabilities, through
the use of mirror cells (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Systemic variations require
emulation. Emulation achieves the same outcome in an environment, but with
adapted behavior. Symbolic imitation is the most advanced form of expression,
which maintains the relationships of behavior but through a different set of
symbols. Transcribing spoken words is an example of symbolic imitation.
Appendix C
Effects on Expected Outcomes
on Memes
C.1 Attribution of Control
The attribution of control for an agent determines their perceived level of control
over their environment (Bandura, 1986). An internal attribution of control
indicates that an agent feels very capable of changing their environment. An
external attribution of control causes an agent to feel that external forces guide
their life and they give very little input. Since attribution of control is a perceived
level of control, it may not correspond with the realities of an agent’s environment.
Psychological discussion of control frequently concentrates on control the most
probable outcome, rather than the distribution. This conceptualization of control
differs slightly from control over the distribution. The bulk of this discussion will
define control as affecting the distribution of outcomes, with a brief note about
control over expectation and most probable outcome.
Attribution of control can be generalized or specific. Generalized attributions
about control correspond to psychological factors such as locus of control and
self-efficacy. Locus of control ranges from internal to external, and indicate the
amount that an agent believes their actions control the environment (Bandura,
1986). Individuals with learned helplessness often have external locuses of
control, feeling that the environment holds almost full control (Alloy, Peterson,
Abramson, & Seligman, 1984). Self-efficacy determines an agent’s perceived
ability to complete appropriate of actions to achieve goals (Bandura, 1986).
Self-efficacy requires confidence in the ability to carry out certain behaviors and
affect the environment, a superset of internal locus of control. For high internal
attributions of control, an agent must believe they can control their behavior and
that their behavior will control the environment. No research could be located
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linking generalized attributions of control to memes, but the potential exists that
individual differences in these factors may effect meme spread at the societal
level.
Attributions of control often to correspond to specific contexts and actions.
Even individuals with significant feelings of helplessness may indicate confidence
in certain settings. Attribution of control will be considered to be an agent’s
perceived ability to express a particular meme effectively.
Attribution mediates an agent’s motivation by altering the level that an
agent’s influences the system. An external attribution of control may have a
damping effect on the value of a behavior, reflected as apathy or inhibition
(Barrowclough & Hooley, 2003). From a systems standpoint, this means an agent
cannot drive the distribution of outcomes towards an intended outcome using
that behavior. A meme expression which does not appear to invoke meaningful
changes will lose magnitude for its motivator payoffs.
U(M)− U0 = UFailure + p((USuccess − UFailure) + (U∗ − U0)) (C.1)
The loss of value does not reflect a strict decrease, but a decrease in
magnitude. Equation C.1 displays the difference in value between expressing
a meme (U(M)) and not expressing it (U0), with p representing the probability
of driving the system to a given distribution of outcomes with utility U∗ from a
distribution of outcomes. USuccess and UFailure represent any value independently
assigned to successfully or unsuccessfully expressing the meme. Desire for self-
efficacy should generally cause the success and failure terms to be positive and
negative, respectively. However, no assurance exists that the value of expressing
a meme will outweigh suppressing it.
p can be thought of as an agent’s perception of control. At its maximum,
the failure term drops out and only the success term and the outcome terms
remain. Where the intrinsic value of successfully completing an action is small,
this reduces to the change in value in outcomes. In this case, a meme with
highly motivating outcomes will be attractive. However when the attribution of
control is external, both sets of outcomes may be essentially irrelevant and only
the potential failure term will matter.
If meme has poor outcomes, feeling powerless could make it more attractive.
For example, a person with little sense of agency might feel little connection
outcomes. Breakdowns in normal standards observed in the Milgram (2004)
experiment and the bystander effect (Darley & Latane, 1968) are consistent
with such a circumstance. In populations where agents lack much attribution
of internal control, memes expression might be primarily guided by the path of
least resistance and responsibility.
When attempting to control the most probable outcome, an agent may
feel capable of generating change but still have poor self-efficacy. Under these
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circumstances, outcomes regain relevance because the baseline outcome differs
from the failure outcome. Agents perceive their actions as having an effect,
but not a useful effect. The implications of attribution of control under these
circumstances becomes less clear.
Since memes must compete for expression, the specific distortions of each
behavior’s distribution outcomes could influence their fitness. Distortions may
omit outcomes or distort their likelihoods. Strategies of minimal regret employ
distortion by omission, ignoring all but the worst results of a decision. The
distortion of probabilities could cause the perceived probability of outcomes to
have a high magnitude of correlation with their expected results. If such a
strategy is applied to a single meme, it will be reduced greatly in fitness. If
such a distortion results from a generalized attribution, such as external locus of
control, memes of least regret may be the most prevalent.
C.2 Probability and Uncertainty
The effects of probability and uncertainty on memes must be considered distinctly
from the concept of control. Given a realistic perception of self-efficacy, some
probability and uncertainty must exist when attempting to express a meme.
Humans do not handle probability normatively or even consistently.
Prospect theory, the matching law, and risk preferences provide different
perspectives on the handling of probability. Prospect theory provides an shape for
a curve relating actual probabilities to perceived probabilities. The exact values
of this curve have some covariance with the outcomes and circumstance. The
prospect theory probability curve underestimates low probabilities, overestimates
high probabilities, and rounds extremely low or high probabilities (Kahneman &
Tversky, 2004).
The matching law indicates a second handling of probability, or lack thereof.
In the matching law, options have an appeal based upon the ratios of their
expected benefits (Bradshaw, Szabadi, & Bevan, 1976). Under the matching
law, probability collapses into the expected benefit and the behavior itself
reflects the likelihoods. Reinforcement learning supports this form of outcome,
where probabilities affect strength of acquired associations rather than explicit
inferences (Sutton & Barto, 1998).
Explicit preferences about risky behavior could also play a role. If
consideration of probability weighs outcomes, as is seen in utility theory, prospect
theory would seem to apply. Where probability effects only play a role as
situational cues, these might better be thought of as a special type of motivator.
In this case an agent might consider intrinsic motivators for participating in
risky behaviors, without weighing the extrinsic outcomes as a function of their
likelihoods. Uncertainty tends to exert influence in this manner, with most people
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being averse to actions with uncertain outcomes (Epstein, 1999).
Appendix D
Effects on Payoffs of Motivators
on Memes
Figure D.1: Decision Theory Mapping of Motivators (From Chapter 2)
D.1 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivators
Many motivational theories differentiate between intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation (Malone & Lepper, 1987). Contradicting sets of intrinsic motivators
have been proposed, as well as flat out denials of intrinsic motivation (Reiss,
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2004). Second order conditioning experiments on motivator devaluation indicate
that a portion of motivation becomes intrinsic to a trained behavior, implicating
a role for intrinsic motivators (Colwill & Rescorla, 1990).
Intrinsic motivation means that behavior directly generates a psychological
reward or penalty. Theorists such as Combs (1982) propose that intrinsic rewards
build or maintain a self image. Extrinsic motivators provide benefit contingent on
the environment’s response to behavior. Reinforcers in instrumental learning are
generally extrinsic, as these can be controlled. Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
are non-exclusive; most behaviors include elements of both.
It is important to look at motivators from the standpoint of the agent, not
the experimenter. Intrinsic motivation exists when an agent is attracted to a
behavior independently of its outcomes. Outcomes alter the value of the intrinsic
component through feedback, but are not considered in terms of outcomes at the
time of the decision. Intrinsic motivation could be considered as assigning value to
being in a goal state, enjoying the chase if you will. For expressing memes, sure-
bet extrinsic motivators will have very similar influences on behavior as intrinsic
motivation. However, they could have very different valuation dynamics. For
example an extrinsic motivator could be devalued independently of a behavior (ex.
less value to money), while intrinsic motivation requires devaluing the behavior
itself (ex. less value to work).
Ma(Env) =
(
MIntrinsica
MExtrinsica (Env)
)
(D.1)
An expression for the total motivation M for an agent a in environment
Env is posed in Eqn. D.1. Intrinsic motivation (M I) means that some payoff
exists for expressing the meme, regardless of external feedback. Memes with
high levels of intrinsic motivation for reproduction can be expected to transmit
in more contexts than those with primarily extrinsic motivation. This does not
necessarily indicate that intrinsically appealing memes will be transmitted more
frequently, but in more varied settings.
High extrinsic motivation should cause a meme to depend strongly on its
environment and an agent’s perceived ability to produce positive outcomes.
Extrinsic motivation has been studied in detail by behavioral economists and
psychologists alike, through with very different methods (Camerer, 2003).
Extrinsic motivators reflect the perceived outcomes of how behavior will alter
the state of the environment. Some of these outcomes will be perceived as
rewards and punishments, while a vast majority of environmental changes will be
simply ignored. Outcomes salient to an agent should drive behavior. Extrinsic
motivators can be split into a multitude of subcategories, down to individual
changes to the environment. The important subclasses of extrinsic motivators will
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be discussed in the following sections on physical-social and biological-cognitive
motivators.
An important characteristic of extrinsic motivation is that the designation
and valuation of an external motivator can be highly subjective. Cognitive
bias research studies effects of this nature, which is given a good treatment in
(Pohl, 2004). Reference point research has shown that an expected gain that
falls through may be perceived as a loss. So then an agent may be motivated
towards behavior to prevent losses of gains they have not yet received. Prospect
theory indicates that acting to protect a loss of an equivalent amount will have
greater utility than acting to produce a gain of an equivalent value (Kahneman
& Tversky, 2004). While valuation of external motivators is subjective, ongoing
work continues to expose these processes. Additionally, many situations allow
for simplifying assumptions and still produce useful models. Economic models
routinely apply methodologies such as rational choice and multi-attribute utility
which explain considerable variance in valuing external motivators.
High intrinsic motivation might cause meme related behavior to be observed
in contexts which seem either chaotic or universal. Intrinsic motivators rely on
the environment to afford the action and nothing more. So while other memes
might be changing value dynamically based on the environment, an intrinsically
motivated meme keeps the same meaning at all times. This meme is expressed
due to no other meme having a sufficiently positive set of external influences to
exceed its value at that time. If the meme has very high intrinsic motivators,
an agent might express it in every environment. Otherwise, the meme will crop
up as a function of its alternatives. Since little direct correlation exists between
highly intrinsic memes and the environment, any analysis of these will depend
extensively on the competing behaviors presented.
Changes in meaning for each type should be reflective of learning processes.
Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation reflect different types of information, the
former assigning meaning directly to the behavior and the later assigning it
through intermediary outcomes. Literature comparing stimulus-response (S-
R) and response-outcome (R-O) learning addresses a similar distinction which
may be connected to this question, as in Rescorla (1991). S-R learning assumes
that an agent associates a certain environmental factor with an action. Agents
remember the behavior on seeing the cue and feel drawn to express it without
precisely knowing why. Habit-based behaviors fit this paradigm. R-O learning
assumes that an agent has learned that a certain behavior produces certain
outcomes. Agents will be drawn to the behavior as long as they are drawn to the
outcomes. Intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation appear differentiated
in a parallel fashion, one adding value to the behavior and the other to the
outcomes. Methodologies employed by learning researchers in this domain could
be employed to analyze memes as part of subject-based research. It also provides
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a body of literature which gives clues as to why certain memes might become
intrinsically motivated or extrinsically motivated.
Altering extrinsic motivation for behavior follows a learning process which has
been approached from many angles. Public policy, psychology, and marketing
have explored the topic extensively. Incentive structures, operant conditioning,
and persuasion respectively have input into these processes. Consensus opinions
state that extrinsic motivation depends on a correlation, preferably causal, with
a beneficial or negative event (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). This association
may be direct or through a network of associations. Certain events and stimuli
already have value and the learning process defines how the behavior relates to
an outcome.
For memes, extrinsic motivation indicates learned outcomes for expressing a
meme within a context. Memes expression, like other behavior, will be expressed
when environmental cues promote a perceived benefit to the behavior. Since
extrinsic motivation depends on an outcome, devaluing the outcome should also
devalue the meme. In this way, memes with high extrinsic motivation should
respond to incentive structuring. Also, it should be possible to change the value of
a meme by altering its connection to outcomes, such as by punishing an expression
that was once rewarded.
Confounding the discussion, behaviors can be motivators for other behaviors
(Premack, 1963). Two mechanisms explain this phenomenon. One explanation
relies on contingencies. In this view a behavior does not motivate another
behavior, instead the agent chains together sequences of behavior which are
weighed based on their final outcomes (Townsend & Busemeyer, 1995). Decision
tree approaches take this route, a common normative technique. The second view
involves assigning a value or preferred frequency for a behavior directly, which
can motivate other behaviors (Premack, 1963). Intrinsic value for a behavior falls
under this category. Since the extrinsic and intrinsic motivations of contingent
actions are considered, motivation has a form of limited recursion.
Developing an intrinsic motivator involves an association which changes the
value of a behavior without any reliance on intermediate outcomes. Classical
stimulus-response theories posit that environmental stimuli link directly to
behavior (Dickinson, 1985). Assuming that no learning of outcomes occurs,
pure S-R learning is intrinsic motivation for behavior. This means that intrinsic
motivation may be acquired through conditioning (Cameron & Pierce, 1994).
Intrinsic motivators may act as compensatory motivation, making a behavior
desirable enough to reach its extrinsic payoffs. Attribution theory explores
this concept, where extrinsic and intrinsic motivators work in a complementary
fashion.
Terror tactics can be framed as a meme, following adoption characteristics
(Weitz & Neal, 2007). Recognizing intrinsic motivators or the lack thereof could
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be very significant in determining the memes that will be adopted by insurgents
at different levels. Zealotry recruiting relies upon a cycle of intrinsic motivation
reinforced by completion of goals such as attacking enemies and defending against
perceived victimization (Atran, 2003). However, the leaders of militant groups
seek extrinsic payoffs such as economic aid or redress of symbolic grievances
(Hafez, 2006). Understanding the salience of different motivators is a major step
in understanding how memes will circulate.
D.2 Physical and Social Motivators
Extrinsic motivation can be split into physical and social components. Every
behavior in society has two sets of consequences, physical consequences and social
responses. Physical consequences act as a pure reaction to behavior and the
environment. Physical events have beneficial or negative consequences, such as
satiating hunger or causing pain. Many consequences rely upon the action of
other agents, such as laws or courtship. Agents may also value social status or
popularity, independently of physical outcomes. Bandura (1986) defines these
non-physical reactions as “arbitrary” but in this context they will be termed
as social. Since both physical and social events depend on consequences they
may be represented as components of the extrinsic term for motivation, shown
in Eqn. D.2.
Ma(Env) =
 M
Intrinsic
a
MPhysicala (Env)
MSociala (Env)
 (D.2)
A physical outcome is any outcome relating to a change in the physical
world, excluding psychological changes in other agents. Physical motivators
include regulation of bodily processes and changes to the state of physical objects.
Victory in total war may be considered a physical outcome. Physical motivators
of memes depend on an agent’s physical environment, valuation of outcomes,
and self-assessed efficacy to produce outcomes. Physical outcomes may be
probabilistic or poorly understood, but they are not goal-oriented. Memes with
primarily physical motivation should vary based upon the utility of the concrete
environment for their expression. A separation exists between the laws of physics
and process of decision making for agents, dividing outcomes from the decision
process.
A social outcome induces a change in the psychological state of another agent,
such as a change of opinion or goals. Social motivators include physical reactions
of other agents and regulation of social relationships. Victory in a war of attrition
may be considered a social outcome. Identifying the social consequences of
behavior often provides more insight than the direct physical results of behavior.
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Social motivators create game-theoretic situations, due to other agents’ action
and beliefs. Game-type situations introduce equilibriums and behaviors based
upon the perceived social context (Ullmann-Margalit, 1990). Expected social
payoffs and punishments depend on the models an agent has for other agents,
rather than physical systems.
Categorizing outcomes into physical and social bins has psychological and
analytical appeal. Psychologically, humans perceive social outcomes differently
than physical ones (Grassian, 1992). For example, being hungry due to a famine
is perceived differently than due to being denied food. These differences lead to
different emotional states, which have effects on motivation (Ortony et al., 1988).
Analytically, this distinction helps identify which aspects of the environment
are most essential for meme expression. Knowing when to influence the social
environment versus the physical environment has significant policy implications.
D.3 Cognitive and Biological Motivators
Extrinsic motivation can also be categorized by the origin of value for a motivator.
Being motivated by a biological need as opposed to a cognitive goal could provide
significant differences in behavior. A meme expressed to satisfy hunger may be
readily controlled, while one expressed due to religious views could be intractable.
Consequences of action will only be motivating if they hook into goals and needs.
Biological motivators depend on sensation, either internal or external.
Classical theories of motivation such as the (Hull, 1943) drive reduction theory
have analyzed behavior using purely physical motivators. Since biological
motivators depend on sensation, they depend on the current state rather than
the anticipated state. For example, an animal does not eat with the anticipation
of being full but instead eats to reduce its hunger. A biological motivator may
be considered as an internal sensor that indicates a need to be filled.
From the standpoint of a meme, biological triggers provide a strong driving
force to cue expression. For example, the Japanese expression “itadakimasu” is
predictably expressed before eating. Depending on a meme causally to satisfy
biological needs would make this connection even more direct. If agent must
express a meme before eating, that meme will be very likely to spread when an
agent is hungry. Memes conveying affordances for obtaining basic necessities
should be expected to spread based on these patterns, such as chimpanzee
communities learning to catch and eat ants using sticks (Whiten et al., 1999).
Spread of courtship behavior and ideas could also have correlations to biological
states.
A cognitive motivator consists of a goal or preference state for an agent.
By assigning value to world states, an agent can work towards anticipated
consequences. Cognitive motivators differ from biological needs as goals involve
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the creation and maintenance of semantic meaning, rather than being hardwired.
For this reason, an agent can theoretically be motivated by almost any event or
world state.
The consequences of a goal provide only part of its motivation. Regulation of
self-efficacy generates a motivation to complete meaningless or even destructive
goals. By completing a goal an agent affirms its ability to complete goals and
exert agency over the environment, increasing perceived self-efficacy (Bandura,
1986). Goals then provide an intrinsic payoff when completed, for resolving the
goal state. This is different than assigning intrinsic value to behavior, giving
intrinsic value to a world state.
Commitment to a goal may implicitly increase the value of expected
outcomes and its impact on self-efficacy perceptions. Sunk cost and endowment
effects provide examples where increased commitment increases perceived value
(Kahneman & Tversky, 2004). Cognitive dissonance can also create positive
feedback between goals and motivation, with increased commitment forcing
increased valuation.
Cognitive motivation should be expected to be less universal than biological
motivation. While biological motivators will have almost universal appeal, the
value of a particular goal or world state will vary culturally and individually.
Cognitive motivators express and change the values of an agent. Identity is a
key concept in examining values and beliefs , which can be leveraged to analyze
expression of memes. From an expression standpoint, agents should be expected
to express memes that draw them towards their internally preferred identity
(Tajfel, 1982). They should also be expected to express memes which reinforce
this identity among other members in society (Berger & Heath, 2007). The
concept of identity will be examined more fully in the discussion of motivator
valuation.
Appendix E
Implementation Paradigms
The exploration of memes in Chapter 2 approaches memes from a theory
standpoint, attempting to synthesize the conceptual models from literature.
Two approaches will be discussed to address the problems of implementing a
model of this scope: model of models and separation of conceptual models
from programmatic models. After noting the underlying paradigms of the
implementation, the computational model will be explained.
E.1 Model of Models
Implementing a system for memes demands a model of models approach, since
memes are an emergent phenomenon from underlying processes. Creating
the model for examining memes requires two steps: laying out a composite
implementation of cognition and setting up the environment. A well calibrated
implementation of cognition should transfer to many different types of memes-
not just memes that are not affordances. The environment must be set up
for each scenario of interest, but generally involves physical models or other
well determined systems. This means that implementing appropriate agent
cognition allows moving the same agents to a variety of scenarios, with only
a straightforward implementation of the environment necessary. This is one of
the key advantages of agent based modeling. It is also an example of a model of
models approach, where the simulated model involves a model of the environment
and models of agent behavior.
Building a model implementation using sets of constituent models has
significant advantages. Silverman (2010) describes these advantages in detail.
The primary advantages of building a model out of submodels are flexibility,
validity, and explainability. Emergence provides the process that macro level
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phenomenon may be reproduced using micro level models, the key to these
advantages.
Without interacting subcomponents, emergence cannot occur by definition
(Holland, 1998). For example, economic growth can be modeled using dynamic
equations based purely on initial parameters. Alternatively, the underlying firms
and economic institutions can be modeled and generate similar macro-economic
parameters for analysis. Building a model of models can generate the same
output dynamics as a macro level model, but with a better correspondence to
the real phenomena being modeled (Lustick & Miodownik, 2009). Improved
representation of the model through submodels generates advantages over
implementing a single model.
A model of models has greater ability to build up from literature. Research
tends to generate an assortment of disconnected models. Multiple models exist
that explain the same phenomenon, with the similar inputs and outputs but
different processes. Rather than tweaking ad-hoc parameters, entire models may
be substituted that express a different proposed view of the same behavior. With
the theory encapsulated in a submodel, a new version can be implemented for
comparison of alternative models in a common framework. Using models of
models offers the flexibility produced by object oriented programming techniques
that foster reuse, subclassing, and common interfaces.
Employing submodels from literature provides two advantages. Firstly, each
model can be based on a tested and peer reviewed research (Silverman et al.,
2001). If literature produces new findings that update a submodel, an updated
version of the submodel can be applied and tested independently rather than
potentially invalidating the entire model. Submodels based on literature have
the advantage of external validation done within the field of expertise. Secondly,
the submodel can be tested to ensure that its characteristics match that of the
source material. This means that each submodel can be independently examined
for its correspondence with literature before attempting validation of the full
model of models. If an implementation fails validation tests, this can expose
assumptions made in the original model concept that may not have been stated.
These effects combine to form positive feedback between computational models
and conceptual models, strengthening both.
Finally, a tiered approach to modeling offers clearer explanations for events.
An experimenter may drill down into the model to find parameters in the
underlying theory that are pivotal to the macro model behavior (Silverman,
2010). These connections reveal new research opportunities for empirical study
and theorizing (Lustick & Miodownik, 2009).
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E.2 Separation of Concepts from Computation
Separation of conceptual models from the programmatic implementation offers
distinct opportunities. Ideally models from literature could be easily implemented
as distinct mathematical models and connected to form a system for simulating
memes. In such an implementation, a conceptual model maps to an object in
code. Realistically, operationalizing and connecting models from literature does
not allow such convenience.
Confounds exist for implementing models from literature. A single model
from literature may have ambiguous parameters definitions, unknown bounds,
unstated assumptions, or unclear scales of measurement (Silverman et al., 2001).
Ambiguities require assumptions on the modeler’s part, attempting to reproduce
the characteristics and intent of the model. While difficult, resolving ambiguities
analyzes where the model may be unclear and ultimately informs literature
(Silverman, 2004). Additionally, known conditions may exist where the model
generates erroneous results. Depending on the purpose of the model, fixes for
these problems could require an altered version of the conceptual model. Unless
informed by newer literature or an expert in the field, attempting to correct a
model’s failures damages the model’s utility in research. While the new model
may be more accurate, disconnecting it from the original research makes it hard
to compare expected and actual behavior (Silverman, 2004).
Resolving ambiguities and fixing problems related to a conceptual model in
order to generate an implementation causes a new confound: the implemented
model is better specified than the original. Multiple implementations could
operate significantly different, even in meaning and number of inputs and outputs.
Implementing a useful model can require testing multiple alternative realization
following the same conceptual basis. For an independent model, this process
allows comparison of implementations that ultimately inform literature. For
example, a multitude of variants on prisoner’s dilemma in game theory analyze
the same payoff structure. Without such research, emergence of the tit-for-tat
strategy would not have been discovered (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). For the
total model, alternative versions genuinely contribute to research.
Within a model of models, alternative implementations raise the issue of
interoperability. Conceptual models may share parameters or alter parameters of
other models. For example, physiology influences attention based upon theories
of motivated attention: a hungry agent will attend to food better. Which model
should quantify hunger? Hunger could be calculated by the physiology, based on
the stomach but the perceived hunger of an individual could vary greatly by their
mood. A motivated attention model could calculate hunger, but this model would
need to be changed to fit a new model of physiology. A separate hunger model
could be created, but taking this approach in every case will explode the space of
programmatic models to the size of the ontology. Deciding on the specifications
APPENDIX E. IMPLEMENTATION PARADIGMS 237
of one model will guide the specifications of interconnected models.
For a single implementation with no expected adjustments, explicitly
interweaving submodels gets the job done at the expense of flexibility. However,
if every submodel hooks explicitly into the implementation of other submodels
then attempting to add, remove, or rework a submodel could involve reworking
the full model. Since the correct configuration of cognitive theories is not known,
this approach is not well suited for modeling memes.
An alternative approach involves multiple types of computational models,
which differ by their level of correspondence and emergence. Table E.1 notes
types of implementations possible. A direct implementation realizes a conceptual
model as a cohesive module in code. A composite implementation realizes a
conceptual model from parts of multiple modules. While it may not be possible
to directly correlate any cohesive piece of code to a composite implementation,
all mechanisms and data for the model exist at each point in time. A metric
implementation represents a conceptual model through its dynamics over time,
such as a how a cellular automata can represent market equilibria. An emergent
implementation does not exist at any given point in time, but is evident in the
dynamics of the computational model over time.
Table E.1: Translating Conceptual Models to Code
Time
Correspondence Instantaneous Dynamic
Single Module Direct Metric
Many Modules Composite Emergent
In order to build a versatile model of memes, the theory discussed in
Chapter 2 will be implemented by a combination of direct, composite, metric,
and emergent methods. This allows the computational representation to lay
out data structures and modules flexibly, while allowing the each theory to be
identified and monitored within code.
This model of memes is designed to capture meme reproduction dynamics
for learning of new actions, also known as affordances. These are an emergent
phenomenon resulting from the interaction of agents and groups. Memes
reproduce through an interaction of agent decisions and their environment. Meme
expressions are represented using affordances of the environment, always present
but not always known. This allows a meme expression to be implemented directly,
based upon the action it represents. Other actions available in the environment
are also important, as they provide competition for behavioral expression. These
models of behavioral expression will be kept simple and are discussed for each
specific simulation scenario.
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As noted in Section E.1, the cognitive models are the centerpiece for the family
of meme models. Agent decision making is implemented through a composite set
of cognitive models. The cognitive models will be implemented through a mixture
of methods, appropriate to the specific theories involved. Only a subset of theories
from Chapter 2 will be implemented, tailored to capture specific dynamics. This
will be the focus of the following section.
Appendix F
Attention Salience Weight
Methodology
The attention salience weights for each factor determine the relative importance
of that factor toward attention. These weights were determined by looking
for empirical research that showed a relationship between the factor and the
probability that an subject showed some learning from the stimulus, since that
typically indicates that a significant level of attention was focused on the stimulus.
The process used to select the papers was an informal version of the methodology
used to mark up PMF models, as defined shown in Figure F.1 which is an section
from Figure 4 in Silverman et al. (2001). This figure shows the fields that
are considered when examining the suitability of a paper for helping to build
a Performance Moderator Function.
The empirical articles examined focused on attention tasks, recall tasks, and
influence tasks (i.e. the Asch conformity study). On the validity assessment
scale, most of the articles rated as low or medium. That is to say, they either
contained a conceptual model that was too vague to implement directly or which
had some ambiguity about how to operationalize certain aspects. In particular,
the biggest source of ambiguity across all papers was that the factors involved
did not have well-defined units or ranges. These are complex conceptual issues,
as operationalizing a concept such as authority is an ill defined problem.
For this reason, all factors used in the computational model assume that the
min and max values of each factor are those found in the specific experiment used
to model the factor. This allows a slope to be defined which estimates the amount
of increase in the dependent variable as a function of the different conditions
(ex. low authority, high authority). While this is clearly an oversimplification,
it seemed more appropriate to model only the known range rather than make
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Figure F.1: Performance Moderator Function Anthology Markup Fields.
Reprinted from Silverman et al. (2001), p.7
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assumptions about regions which have not been studied empirically. While it
is likely that the authority of an post-doctoral experimenter is less than that
of the President, the distance between those levels is unclear. This means that
all weights for salience components are ultimately in terms of the experimental
units. This means that relative importance of each weight for salience cannot
be directly verified, because it is always possible that only a small range of any
factor was measured and it might have a larger impact in other circumstances.
With these caveats stated, the process applied to the papers was intended to
get the most out of the available information. The first step was to establish the
input and output variables of interest. The second step was to determine the
form of the empirical relationship, to the best of the experimenter’s knowledge.
The third step was to estimate amount that the input could affect the output,
if known. Finally, each relationship was normalized so that the input variable
ranged between 0 and 1. From these, the salience weights were defined. The goal
of these salience weights was not to precisely duplicate the empirical attention or
recall results but to get a best-guess estimate of the relative importance of each
factor in orienting attention.
For example, Johnston et al. (1990) was used as the basis for estimating
the importance of novelty. This article described a novel pop-out effect when a
novel item was placed amongst familiar items, with subjects being more likely
to remember the location of the novel word. For the PMF in this experiment,
the input was the familiarity of a word and the output was the percent recall
for the position of the word. The experimental relationship showed that a novel
word had a recall percentage about 21% higher than a familiar word, in the novel
pop-out condition (one novel word with three familiar words). For normalization
purposes, it was assumed that the familiar words were maximally (novelty=0)
familiar while the novel words were minimally familiar (novelty=1). So then,
the salience weight assigned to the novelty factor was 0.21. This meant that a
completely familiar word would have no increase in salience, while a completely
new word would have a salience of at least 0.2.
This same process was performed for each of the noted factors to infer a
salience weight for that input. This process gave an estimate of the relative
importance of each of the factors, as compared to each other. This process was
performed to help determine the relative importance of Number of exposures,
Motivated Attention, Novelty, Selection, Authority, Conformity, Credibility,
Ingroups, Reference groups, Similarity, Transferability, and Valence on the impact
of a message to get an agent’s attention and promote learning. Motivated
attention, novelty, selection, authority, conformity, similarity, and valence were
each estimated using these steps.
Ingroups, reference groups, and transferability were defined only as theoretical
relationships and a literature search did not turn up a solid magnitude of impact
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of these factors. For example, literature shows that ingroups have higher social
influence (Tajfel, 1982) and literature shows that social influences affect attention
(Bandura, 1986) but empirical data on the strength of this impact is unclear.
While they are stated as increasing social influence and imitation, they failed
to pass the third step where a magnitude could be established to determine the
impact of these factors. As a result, these factors were weighted based upon
qualitative statements about their importance. This meant that transferability
was given a low weight, as it was not indicated as a primary influence on attention
(Bandura, 1986). Ingroup and reference group influence have been shown to
have a significant impact on persuasion, but an operationalizable form of this
relationship was not found. As such, these factors were given medium weight
magnitudes comparable to other social factors such as valence and authority.
The number of exposures and credibility were processed using this
methodology, but were found to not have a reliable relationship with attention or
persuasion on a per-event basis. The number of exposures, while cummulatively
influential, shows no reliable benefit for attending to later exposures of the same
thing (Ray et al., 1971). The effect of credibility on social influence appears to be
moderated by other factors and does not have a consistent impact on attention,
if it has any impact at all. For this reason, these two factors were eliminated as
salience factors and not included in calculating attentional salience.
Appendix G
Scenario Data Specification
The ideal data did exist for implementing even this limited model for affordance
learning. The full data required to build a scenario within this model requires
weighted social linkages, detailed personality assessment, pertinent situational
factors, cultural information, and a measurement both of meme awareness and
expression. For analysis of dynamics this information has to be collected over
time, a significant undertaking.
Though full data does not exist, it was important to start with the ideal data.
This allowed determining the strengths and weaknesses of the data available
for modeling and experimentation. Weakly known parameters must be varied
more than ones known with full confidence, for example. Table G.1 displays
the full information for analysis running this model, broken into categories.
Note that more data could be readily employed by this model by adding new
motivators or social sub-models. However this level of data already exceeds what
is available empirically, which indicates that increased empirical research could
greatly benefit modeling of memes.
These data guidelines were used as a guideline in choosing scenarios Each
PMFServ scenario directly uses many of these parameters.
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Table G.1: Agent Data Specification for Studying Affordance Transmission
Situational
Alternate actions
Meme
Awareness
Adoption
Expression mechanisms
Material means
Employment
Money
Tools
Physical state
Disabilities
Physiology
Fatigue
Hunger
Stress
Health
Skills
Personality
GLOBE (House 2004)
Scope of Doing
Sensitivity to Life
Time Horizon
Hermann (2003) Standards
Ingroup Bias
Need for Control
Need for Openness
Need for Power
Task/Relationship
Valuation Prefs
Material things
Sacred things
Symbolic things
Society
Relationships
Authority/Power
Credibility/Trust
Interaction
Context
Duration
Frequency
Similarity
Valence/Liking
Groups
Structure
Authority
Members
Roles
Interactions
Outgroups
Reference Groups
Appendix H
Stanford Prison Experiment Data
The GSP Tree in the Stanford Prison scenario (and also Hamariyah) consists of
numerous personality factors, as mentioned in the main text. Table H.1 below
notes the meanings of each of the personality nodes. The dash indentations
represent the hierarchal structure of the nodes within the tree. The origins of
many of these nodes are noted in Table G.1 in Appendix G. This is available
as a reference for interpreting references to these nodes within Section 6.1.3 on
the Stanford Prison design and also for the classifications performed on the Iraqi
Experiment in Section 7.5.3.
H.1 Stanford Prison Experiment Scenario Design
Methodology
Representing the Stanford Prison Experiment is complicated by the issue of entry
and exit of participants. Guard presence is complicated due to the fact that
certain guards tended to stay later after their shift than others, based upon their
level of comfort in being guards. Nice guards and avoidant guards often to left
their shift more promptly than mean guards. Additionally, some exceptions were
made with respect to guard shifts- including an overlap period caused by the
experimenters requesting a double shift on duty. The first problem with guard
shift endpoints was handled by giving guards actions for starting and stopping
their shift. This allowed the guard agents to decide individually how long they
wanted to stay after their shift and how early (or late) they would show up.
The second problem of experimenter manipulation was more complicated since it
involved inputs not simulated: the researchers. Since shift manipulation occurred
as a response to an attempted prison break, this event cannot be treated as
entirely exogenous. However, since it would be infeasible to model the researchers,
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Table H.1: GSP Personality Factors
NodeName Description
Goals Nodes Short term goals, which connect to joy and distress
Individual Overall Importance of Individual goals, e.g. Maslow (1943) hierarchy
- Belonging Importance of feeling socially accepted and situated
- Esteem Importance of feeling self-efficate and respected
- Physiology Importance of basic needs, such as eating and sleeping
- Safety Importance of personal safety and well-being
Standards Nodes Standards of behavior, which define how an agent prefers to accomplish
things. Connects to Pride and Shame.
Conformity Assertiveness Overall importance of conformity and individuality matters
- Assert Individuality Importance of expressing individuality
- Conform to Society Importance of conforming to culture
- Respect Authority Importance of respecting authority figures
Exercise of Power n Culture Overall importance of power balances in actions
- Be Controlling Importance of controlling others, using power
- Be Open Importance of being open to others, allowing freedom
Honesty Overall importance of honesty and promises
- Keep Ones Word Importance of keeping promises, being honest
- Use Duplicity Importance of lying for its own sake
Humanitarian Sensitivity to n Respect4 Life Overall importance of considering lives and showing respect for life
- Life Res r Sensitive Importance of respecting and being sensitive to lives of others
- None r Sensitive Importance of disregarding and being insensitive to others’ lives
Military Doctrine Importance of adhering to military codes
- Shun Violence Importance of avoiding violence
- Use Asymmetric Attacks Importance of attacking unevenly, even unfairly
- Use Conventional Attacks Importance of using force-on-force conventional tactics
Scope of Doing Good Overall importance of doing good to others
- Bring About Greater Good Importance of good in the world, in general
- Look After Narrower Interests Importance of only looking after one’s own
Task Relationship Balance Importance of balancing tasks and relationships
- Be Task Focused Importance of concentrating on tasks only
- Be Relationship Focused Importance of building relationships
Treatment Of Outgroups Importance of interacting with outgroups
- Outgroups Are Legitimate Targets Importance of targeting outgroups for discrimination
– Enemy Is Outgroup Importance of targeting one’s enemies
– Friend is Out Group Importance of targeting one’s friends
– Neutral is Out Group Importance of targeting neutral parties
- Treat with Fairness n Justice Importance of treating everyone equally
Preferences Nodes Long term wishes for the world state. Connect to Like and Dislike
emotions.
Desirable Future Importance of good outcomes, by scope
-For Everybody Importance of everyone doing well
-For the Group Importance of one’s immediate group(s) doing well
-For the Self Importance of self doing well
People Importance of people doing well, by relationship
-Enemy Faction Importance of enemy factions doing well
-Friendly Faction Importance of friendly factions doing well
-Own People Importance of one’s own members doing well
-Other Groups Importance of other neutral groups doing well
Places n Things Importance of objects in the world
- Materialistic Physical and monetary objects’ importance
- Symbolistic Importance of symbols, principles being maintained
- Wholistic Spiritualistic Importance of religious or spiritual matters
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there is no easy solution to this issue. The modeling choice was made to assume
that shifts ran regularly, rather than enforcing exceptions that might never have
happened under different counter-factual scenarios.
The problem of prisoners being dismissed has similar implications. Prisoners
were released early from the experiment as a result of their stress and emotional
state- dynamic properties that are simulated. Based upon these factors, the
experimenters chose when to dismiss participants. As with shift manipulation,
it would be foolish to assume that prisoners would always have been released at
certain times- even if they were in a very different emotional state due to different
initial conditions. In this case, the Experimenter agent was allowed to take actions
to release subjects from the experiment if their stress level was very high and they
demanded release. This was implemented in the form of a conservative utility-
based decision rule, since the experimenters were not modeled.
Appendix I
Modified Inversion Algorithm:
Additional Information
Inversion counts are a metric for measuring the distance between orderings of
different sequences. This class of distances is commonly used in genome research.
The algorithm designed for this research was built to be a one-way test, comparing
one sequence for its fit against a ground-truth sequence. It compares these
sequences based upon the number of single-element moves required to turn the
test sequence into the ground truth sequence.
This algorithm differs from a standard inversion count in a few meaningful
ways. Firstly, this metric has been adapted to account for ties and right censored
elements, both in the test sequence and in the ground truth sequence. Secondly,
this metric is normalized- it is guaranteed to fall between 0 and 1 so long as it can
produce a value. Finally, this metric is typically unbiased in that the distance of
a random permutation of a sequence will have a distance of 0.5. The only bias
metric is evident if averaging over tests where the algorithm cannot establish any
distance, due to too many right censored ground truth elements. A correction
could be can to these conditions, but if the metric is consistently not producing
a value then it should not be used. The algorithm was implemented in Python
and the source code may be made available at a future date.
The process by which the algorithm determines how close a test sequence is
to a ground truth sequence goes as follows:
1. Replace elements of test sequence into their sort-order numbers, based upon
their position in the ground truth sequence.
2. For all ties in the test sequence, count the maximum number of inversions
that could occur within the tied subsequence. Sum these inversion counts
and set aside.
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3. Sort all tied subsequences so they will have no inversions.
4. Flatten the test sequence, evaluating all ties into elements positioned in
their sorted order
5. Count the number of inversions for the flattened sequence, using a merge
sort algorithm
6. Calculate maximal number of inversions for the flattened sequence
7. Subtract the inversion counts from ties from the ties from the maximal
number of inversions, i.e. maxInversions -= sum(tie inversions)
8. If the maximal number of inversions is greater than 0, return
the number of inversions divided by the maximum inversions, i.e.
Inversions/MaxInversions
Right censored elements for the test list are treated as if they are one big
set of ties at the end of the sequence, since ties and right censored elements are
handled in the same way (count how many inversions they could cause, sort them
correctly, and subtract those possible inversions from the maximum possible).
This algorithm is unbiased so long as the ground truth sequence is well formed.
A well formed ground truth sequence is one where all permutations are assured
of producing a result with at least one possible inversion. The algorithm shows
a bias if one blindly excludes the cases where the maximal number of inversions
is zero. This is because this increases the chance that any list with at least one
possible inversion will perform better than chance.
For the ground truth sequences in this research, the algorithm is unbiased.
In the future, work may be performed to compensate for biasing due to excluded
cases by detecting the possibility of these cases and allowing an option for an
adjusted distance score that will be unbiased for all sequences.
Appendix J
Supplementary Data Analysis
This section contains additional analysis which is not included in the main
document for the sake of brevity and focus. These additional analyses were
run and may be of interest. A few notes on each will be presented, along with
the figures and tables.
J.1 Event Salience Component Weights (Simulation)
To look deeper in to the issues of collinearity noted in Section 7.3.2, correlation
matrices were calculated from the observations data set. Table J.2 shows the
Kendall correlation calculated for the Iraqi village scenario under the random
start condition. This correlation analysis looked at agent attention and learning
from all events and not just those involving a meme, since they are processed
by the same cognitive models. For space considerations, the variables were
assigned labels designating them as the dependent factors (Yi) and the input
factors (Xi). Agents were allowed to learn from everything they attended, so
attention and learning have a correlation of 1.0 (omitted from the table due to
space constraints). Table J.1 shows the equivalent matrix for the Stanford case.
The Pearson correlation matrices are similar to these and are examined in J.2.
When looking at these matrices, it must be kept in mind that each has over
two million samples- so all correlations are technically statistically significant
(p<0.0001). Moreover, these factors were set up to be primarily orthogonal so the
emergence of significant correlations between them is an interesting phenomenon.
For the purposes of this analysis, anything with a correlation magnitude less than
0.05 will be considered uncorrelated. While there may be some small interaction,
these seem unlikely to be of major importance. Those between 0.05 and 0.1 will
be considered marginally significant. These will not generally be discussed unless
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Table J.1: Correlation Matrix for Stanford Prison Attention (Hypothesis Cond.)
Y X0 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9
Attended (Y ) 1.00 - - - - - - - - - -
Novelty (X0) -0.06 1.00 - - - - - - - - -
Motivation (X1) 0.00 -0.03 1.00 - - - - - - - -
Selection (X2) 0.17 -0.02 -0.07 1.00 - - - - - - -
Authority (X3) 0.01 -0.12 -0.05 -0.06 1.00 - - - - - -
Conformity (X4) -0.06 0.01 0.09 -0.20 -0.05 1.00 - - - - -
Similarity (X5) 0.12 -0.07 0.02 0.16 -0.01 -0.12 1.00 - - - -
Transferability (X6) 0.13 -0.27 0.08 -0.02 0.07 -0.07 0.08 1.00 - - -
Valence (X7) 0.15 -0.17 0.07 0.20 -0.01 -0.03 0.35 0.15 1.00 - -
InGroup (X8) 0.15 -0.26 0.22 0.01 -0.10 0.07 0.06 0.70 0.23 1.00 -
Ref Group (X9) 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06 -0.04 -0.10 0.29 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 1.00
Table J.2: Correlation Matrix for Hamariyah Attention (Randomized Cond.)
Y X0 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9
Attended (Y ) 1.00 - - - - - - - - - -
Novelty (X0) -0.05 1.00 - - - - - - - - -
Motivation (X1) -0.17 0.10 1.00 - - - - - - - -
Selection (X2) 0.03 -0.03 0.02 1.00 - - - - - - -
Authority (X3) 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.00 1.00 - - - - - -
Conformity (X4) 0.10 -0.01 -0.20 0.01 -0.07 1.00 - - - - -
Similarity (X5) 0.00 0.02 0.20 0.19 -0.01 -0.03 1.00 - - - -
Transferability (X6) 0.01 -0.05 -0.14 0.10 -0.04 0.39 0.00 1.00 - - -
Valence (X7) 0.10 -0.17 -0.07 0.19 0.08 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 1.00 - -
InGroup (X8) 0.07 -0.10 0.03 0.14 -0.01 -0.02 0.07 0.04 0.28 1.00 -
Ref Group (X9) 0.07 -0.06 -0.00 0.09 0.01 -0.04 0.06 0.00 0.23 0.68 1.00
they are part of a larger pattern, but they do indicate some level of interaction
between the variables. Finally, anything with a correlation stronger than 0.1 will
be considered significant and anything higher than 0.2 is highly significant.
J.1.1 Generalized Correlation Trends (Both Simulations)
Using these standards, the correlations shared by both simulations will be
discussed. The first factor, Novelty, shows a very interesting effect. In
short, novelty correlates negatively with almost everything else. In particular,
it correlates negatively with ingroups and valence in both conditions. This
results from a de-facto negative feedback loop. While novelty increases salience,
attending to certain events increases familiarity with them. This means that
while novelty may initially correlate positively with attention, over time it will
tend to correlate with events that are otherwise uninteresting. Part of the reason
for this interaction is that each simulation uses a fixed set of actions and actors-
very little new stimuli appear. As a result, agents and actions that remain more
novel are the ones that had low salience due to other reasons. This indicates that
while novel stimuli may be more salient than other stimuli, unfamiliar stimuli in
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a fixed environment will tend to have low salience in other respects.
Selective Attention is expected to vary based upon the simulation, since
it depends upon agent’s actions within their environment in who they choose
to interact with. With that said, in both simulations it correlates positively
with valence and similarity. This indicates that agents tend to perceive and
interact more with agents that they like and who have similar personalities.
While this may not hold true in all contexts, it correlates with findings from
network science that indicate that increased similarity correlates with increased
interactions (Christakis & Fowler, 2008). However, it is not difficult to imagine
contexts where dissimilar rivals would be the focus of selective attention- such as
in a war or other competitive environment.
Finally, Ingroups and Valence are correlated in both cases. This makes
intuitive sense, in that it would be expected that people sharing an ingroup
would like each other more than people in outgroups. This dynamic matches
with a significant body of research on social identity theories, which posit a
preference towards people who appear to be in the same ingroup (Tajfel, 1982).
While each of these correlations match with intuition, none of them were
directly coded into the cognitive model of the agents. Each of these correlations
is emergent from the perceptions and decisions driven by their cognitive models.
Of these, the novelty effect is quite interesting. This model predicts that in the
long haul, even if novelty increases attention salience, novel stimuli will eventually
tend to correlate with less salient aspects of an agents environment if they are
free to explore it.
J.1.2 Simulation-Specific Correlation Trends
The remaining correlation effects were only significant in one simulation, but
in some cases were highly significant in that simulation. These are interactions
that are due to the specific construction of the simulation. Additional analysis
of each model was performed to examine why each simulation evidenced its
particular correlations. Novelty correlates negatively with transferability, but
it correlates much more strongly in the Hamariyah Iraqi village. This is due to
the design of the simulations. Since the Hamariyah Iraqi village is much larger,
many actions are only possible in certain locations. Conversely, the Stanford
Prison experiment’s actions are typically available to all agents when they are
perceived. Since agents are less likely to go places where they can’t perform any
actions, actions that a Hamariyah agent can’t do will tend to be more novel.
Motivation was the most complicated of the factors, which had significant
correlations in both simulations but was not consistent between them. A
correlation with motivation indicates that agents would most like to have the
results of events that certain agents are taking. Motivation is complicated because
it depends highly on both the environment and the GSP personality model. Since
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motivation is moderated by the GSP tree and the GSP tree helps define actions,
one would expect that similarity would correlate positively with motivation. In
Hamariyah, a fairly strong correlation exists between these factors. However,
this correlation is barely present in the Stanford simulation. Instead, motivated
attention is correlated highly with membership in the same ingroup. Despite
having a high salience component weight, motivated attention was the worst
indicator for attention. It correlated moderately or highly with a large number of
factors in both simulations. This may indicate that motivated attention should
not typically be modeled separately from such factors, but should be a function
of such factors.
Selective Attention shows a significant negative correlation with conformity
influence in the Stanford simulation. This is due to attentional limitations. Since
all events occur simultaneously and a maximum of 4 may be attended at any
one time, periods of high conformity can result in periods where all attended
events match conforming action but there are still a large number of unattended
events with the conforming action. As seen in the Hamariyah condition, this
effect disappears when each event is examined individually.
Authority had a small negative correlation with ingroup membership in the
Stanford scenario. This is readily explainable due to the power differential
between groups. Prisoners observed a larger total number of the events in
the Stanford scenario than guards, since guards were on shift only part of the
time. Since prisoners typically had lower authority than guards, this biases the
observations so that authority correlates negatively with being in the same group.
The Hamariyah scenario had no such power differential, so this effect disappears
in that scenario.
In the Stanford scenario, Conformity correlates negatively with Similarity and
membership in a Reference Group. This seems to indicate that the more central
members of the simulation are less prone to acting at the same time as other
agents. These effects do not carry over to the Hamariyah scenario and appear
to be incidental. In Hamariyah, Conformity correlates with Transferability. This
results from the fact that the most commonly occurring actions in the village
are also the ones that are most commonly available. As with novelty, it is a
structural factor due to the situation. In the Stanford scenario, the majority
of actions are physically possible at all times so the frequency of actions is
mainly guided by personality and interpersonal dynamics. Conversely, the village
scenario’s larger scope causes the ability to perform actions to be much more
context dependent. This means that the transferability of actions is a proxy for
their general availability, which affects the ability of large numbers of agents to
simultaneously engage in an action.
The Stanford scenario shows a strong positive correlation between Similarity
and Valence, as well as between Similarity and membership in a group with
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a higher reference value. These factors correlate much more weakly in the
Hamariyah scenario. The difference between these scenarios is that in the
Stanford simulation, agents start initially neutral and form valence relationships.
As a result, the formation of valence levels correlates with personality factors.
However, the Hamariyah scenario utilizes more entrenched valence values that
are associated with clan structures rather than personal choices. This is evident
in the fact that the Hamariyah scenario shows a high correlation between Valence
and Ingroup membership that is not present in the Stanford simulation.
Transferability shows a very strong correlation with Ingroup membership in
Stanford only. This is due to the fact that certain actions are only available to
members of certain groups, another structural factor. This relationship, along
with the Hamariyah relationship between Transferability and Conformity, show
that this implementation of Transferability depends significantly on the structural
factors of the environment.
InGroups and Reference groups also share an interesting correlation. While
the Hamariyah scenario shows a strong correlation between ingroup membership
and reference groups, indicating that members tend to want to be in the groups
they belong to, there is no significant correlation between these in the Stanford
study. While in the Stanford scenario, sharing a common ingroup tends to lead
to higher valence, the groups were randomly assigned and it appears that some
agents might prefer to be in the opposite group. This is consistent with statements
from the subjects in the Stanford Prison Experiment (Zimbardo, 2007).
J.1.3 Effect of Collinearity on Attention in Simulation
Due to the significant effects of collinearity, mixed with the number of factors
involved, these simulations show that the apparent relative importance of each
factor can differ based upon the context. While this was intended to be a simple
internal validity test, it provided some much more interesting results. Despite
knowing the form of the equation and the correct ground truth values, the
effect of covariance between the factors makes their relationship with attention
more complicated. The resulting correlations and regressions for each simulation
display a situation where certain factors appear more dominant in orienting
attention. Additionally, as was shown with the novelty factor, goal oriented
agents can demonstrate results that appear counter to controlled experimental
results due to feedback dynamics.
These results provide an interesting view of agent based software as a way to
look at experiment design. Certain factors displayed a more dominant impact on
attention due to situational factors rather than cognitive processes. This analysis
of the simulation data provided some interesting insights for empirical verification
and also showed good correspondence with findings from other analyses, such as
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social network science. In this way, this analysis provided a useful internal validity
check for some of the higher level emergent properties.
Additionally, this kind of analysis may be beneficial for mocking up empirical
studies. While the origin of the data was from a simulation, attempting
to examine real-life people interacting encounters similar issues. Especially
in empirical studies using many variables, situational effects may result in
significant, potentially unexpected interaction between dependent variables. This
issue becomes increasingly significant as the complexity of the theoretical model
grows. This indicates that in some circumstances, especially for large studies
or complex theories, it would be worthwhile to create a simulated analog of the
proposed theoretical model and data collection design. This would allow testing
to make sure that the experimental design would provide appropriate data to test
the model. This approach would also give an indication of higher-level emergent
dynamics that would be indicators that the underlying theory might be valid.
J.2 Attention Pearson Coefficient Tables
For an alternative perspective, the Pearson Correlation Coefficients were also
calculated to examine these relationships. These tended to show the same trends,
but in a few cases hinted at slightly different relationships. Tables J.3 and J.4
show the Pearson Correlation Coefficients for the Hamariyah Randomized and
Stanford Hypothesis conditions, respectively. These are the Pearson equivalents
of the Kendall analysis examined previously.
Table J.3: Hamariyah Transmission (Random Cond.) Pearson Correlations
Y X0 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9
Attended (Y ) 1.00 - - - - - - - - - -
Novelty (X0) -0.02 1.00 - - - - - - - - -
Motivation (X1) -0.15 -0.02 1.00 - - - - - - - -
Selection (X2) 0.02 -0.02 0.04 1.00 - - - - - - -
Authority (X3) 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.00 1.00 - - - - - -
Conformity (X4) 0.14 0.10 -0.26 -0.00 -0.08 1.00 - - - - -
Similarity (X5) 0.01 0.00 0.25 0.19 -0.03 -0.03 1.00 - - - -
Transferability (X6) 0.01 -0.03 -0.18 0.09 -0.05 0.47 0.02 1.00 - - -
Valence (X7) 0.11 -0.14 -0.07 0.14 0.08 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 1.00 - -
InGroup (X8) 0.07 -0.08 0.02 0.12 -0.02 -0.02 0.12 0.04 0.40 1.00 -
Ref Group (X9) 0.08 -0.05 -0.01 0.10 0.01 -0.04 0.10 0.01 0.37 0.82 1.00
One significant difference in the Hamariyah correlations is that the Pearson
correlation does not show the moderate connection shown by Kendall (-0.10)
between Novelty and Motivated Attention. This indicates that while the values
are often ranked in a particular order, their values do not track each other
linearly. In the Stanford Analysis, Pearson shows conformity with a smaller
negative correlation with attention than in Kendall analysis. Authority and
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Table J.4: Stanford Prison Transmission (Hypothesis Cond.) Pearson
Correlations
Y X0 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9
Attended (Y ) 1.00 - - - - - - - - - -
Novelty (X0) -0.02 1.00 - - - - - - - - -
Motivation (X1) 0.00 -0.03 1.00 - - - - - - - -
Selection (X2) 0.17 -0.02 -0.11 1.00 - - - - - - -
Authority (X3) 0.01 -0.08 -0.20 -0.11 1.00 - - - - - -
Conformity (X4) 0.02 0.03 0.07 -0.14 -0.02 1.00 - - - - -
Similarity (X5) 0.15 -0.02 0.03 0.17 -0.01 -0.12 1.00 - - - -
Transferability (X6) 0.13 -0.09 0.08 -0.02 0.13 -0.00 0.10 1.00 - - -
Valence (X7) 0.23 -0.07 0.04 0.36 -0.10 -0.12 0.56 0.29 1.00 - -
InGroup (X8) 0.15 -0.06 0.31 0.01 -0.13 0.10 0.07 0.70 0.36 1.00 -
Ref Group (X9) 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.08 -0.15 0.41 -0.05 0.11 -0.08 1.00
Motivated Attention show the opposite effect, being a much stronger negative
correlation, though both are non-negligible. This same change is seen with
Authority and Selective Attention. Additionally, the negative correlation between
Transferability and Conformity disappears under the Pearson correlation. The
Pearson correlation shows a negative correlation between Authority and Valence
which does not exist in the Kendall Analysis. The Pearson correlation shows a
much weaker negative correlation between InGroup and Novelty.
J.3 Stanford Transmission Quartiles
The full table for the Stanford Quartile examination is presented here, as an
additional reference. These tables lists the value for each agent on the metrics
for: average first time learned, average number of exposures to learn, average
time of first expression, and fraction of actions taken by the agent which use
the meme after it is learned. The agent’s average value is displayed, as is their
quartile ranking. These rankings were used in Section 7.4.2 to generate the
quartile classifications. Table J.6 shows the metrics for guards and ThrowInHole,
while Table J.5 shows these same metrics for prisoners and Resist. Note that
these tables show time as simulation time (steps) rather than the experiment
days.
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Table J.5: Stanford Resist Meme Quartiles (Prisoners)
Learning Time First Expression Expression Count Exposures To Learn
Agent Step Quartile Step Quartile % Actions Quartile # Exposures Quartile
S 00 0 0 451 3 0.13 1 0 0
S 01 50 3 52 1 0.37 2 3.77 2
S 02 50 3 551 3 0.002 0 4.10 3
S 03 49 1 61 2 0.24 2 2.50 1
S 04 50 2 51 0 0.43 3 3.50 2
S 05 0 0 48 0 0.043 0 0 0
S 06 49 1 53 2 0.40 2 3.03 1
S 08 50 2 52 1 0.43 3 3.63 2
S 09 50 3 122 2 0.21 1 4.70 3
Table J.6: Stanford ThrowInHole Meme Quartiles (Guards)
Learning Time First Expression Expression Rate Exposures To Learn
Agent Step Quartile Step Quartile % Actions Quartile # Exposures Quartile
S 11 387 3 399 2 0.032 3 2.27 0
S 12 390 3 413 2 0.018 2 2.50 1
S 13 0 0 66 0 0.015 1 0 0
S 15 95 0 179 1 0.012 1 2.37 1
S 16 239 1 669 3 0.0002 0 3.57 3
S 17 262 2 301 1 0.019 2 3.97 3
S 18 364 3 525 3 0.019 1 3.17 2
S 19 217 1 545 3 0.0008 0 2.70 1
S 20 120 1 122 0 0.032 3 2.73 2
S 21 272 2 280 1 0.026 3 4.67 3
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